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ABSTRACT 
 
 
 Standardized testing is a defining feature of contemporary American society. It not only 
governs how people are channeled through their schooling; it amplifies existing social 
disparities. Nonetheless, standardized testing endures, namely because it has served as a vital 
tool for the post-1945 American state. The postwar state prioritized, on the one hand, the 
cultivation of intellects resilient enough to sustain American geopolitical supremacy through 
scientific discovery and technological innovation and, on the other hand, the maintenance of an 
obedient population that would not disrupt existing social hierarchies. Standardized testing 
helped the postwar state solve this mind-body dilemma. As a function for social order, 
standardized testing provided the means for governing bodies to make sense of their citizens—
particularly to gauge the skills, knowledge, and ability youth could eventually bring into a labor 
force. Standardized testing thus makes it clear not just who the so-called best and brightest are, 
but how well a population of students has adjusted to a set of educational norms the state has 
deemed necessary for future social success. Standardized testing is thus a way to monitor and 
enforce educational compliance with projected state and social needs.  
 This dissertation examines how standardized testing became a vital instrument for the 
postwar state—and, in turn, how this state dependence on standardized testing fueled several 
larger postwar political cultures. This dissertation also focuses on the tension between the ways 
the state made sense of its citizens and the ways citizens made sense of society through 
standardized tests. Standardized testing acted as a massive social sorter in postwar America, but 
 iv 
with time, many groups of Americans began to question the wisdom of educational reliance on 
standardized testing, as well as challenge the foundational assumptions about what testing 
actually measured. African-Americans, women, and working-class Americans pursued legal, 
legislative, and academic methods to push back against unjust standardized testing practices. 
This resistance also often provoked responses from those who had great stakes—whether 
socioeconomic or corporate—in maintaining the use and meaning of standardized tests. 
Politicians, parents, consumer advocates, academics, educational reformers, feminists, civil 
rights activists, entrepreneurs, and white supremacists all interpreted standardized testing scores 
and trends for larger political ends, often using similar information as their opponents to stake far 
different positions about race, gender, class, and merit. Yet, as more Americans questioned the 
legitimacy of standardized testing, they often reinforced standardized testing data’s use as a 
rhetorical tool, ultimately entrenching testing data as a way to make sense of society, even as 
more and more Americans find testing regimes purposeless.  
 This dissertation shows that, by the beginning of the twenty-first century, standardized 
testing data had become a potent tool for contending who mattered and who did not for 
America’s future. Because debates about standardized testing’s social utility often hinged on the 
meaning of test data—whether it reflected objective truths about the natural distribution of 
mental aptitudes or, instead, exposed the biases psychologists built into their devices as well as 
the prejudicial baggage that informed laypeople’s interpretation of statistical information—
standardized testing itself continues to have value as a political weapon. Whether or not one has 
a specific policy proposal for the future use of standardized testing, its rhetorical function as a 
symbol for what is wrong with America will continue to fuel numerous, often oppositional, 
debates.  
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INTRODUCTION: THE SCALE AND SCOPE OF STANDARDIZED TESTING 
 
 
 Standardized testing governs American life. From the earliest stages of education, 
American children face a steady stream of standardized tests.1  The results from standardized 
tests shape how teachers, parents, guidance counselors, and administrators view students—and, 
in turn, how students see themselves. These test scores form the path a student takes during their 
schooling: whether they are placed in advanced or remedial courses; whether they pass from one 
grade to the next; whether they are accepted into a more selective school; and whether they are 
granted entry into a graduate program. Standardized test scores also determine whether schools 
gain or lose funding and if teachers earn promotion. Standardized testing may carry high stakes 
for all educational participants—but it also has widespread effects well beyond the classroom. 
Realtors refer to the average SAT scores in a district when marketing property in affluent 																																																								
 1 Many researchers agree that strictly using standardized tests to assess learning in children under the age of 
8 is an unethical practice that produces wildly unreliable results—and that educators should, at the very least, 
incorporate additional methods of observation and tracking before third grade in order to identify and monitor 
children who may have learning deficits or exceptional educational needs. Such professional reticence, however, did 
not stop the G.W. Bush and Obama Administrations from trying to implement national standardized assessments for 
preschool- and early-elementary-aged children. The ethical haziness in both cases resided in whether such 
assessments would have relied on data-gathering methods unsuitable for small children—and what potential 
consequences early-childhood educators would have faced if children entered elementary school without having 
demonstrated proficiency in certain areas. See: Lorrie Shepard, Sharon Lynn Kagan, and Emily Wurtz, eds., 
“Principles and Recommendations for Early Childhood Assessments,” National Education Goals Panel, February 
1999, http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/negp/reports/prinrec.pdf; Ann S. Epstein et al, “Preschool Assessment: A Guide 
to Developing a Balanced Approach,” Preschool Policy Matters 7 (July, 2004), http://www.doe.in.gov/ 
sites/default/files/earlylearning/preschool-assessment-guide-developing-balanced-approach.pdf; Marcy Guddemi 
and Betsy Case, “Assessment Report: Assessing Young Children, Pearson, 2004, http://images.pearsonassessments. 
com/images/tmrs/tmrs_rg/Assessing YoungChildren.pdf?WT.mc_id=TMRS _Assessing_ Young_Children; Valerie 
Strauss, “Bush Plan to Assess 4-Year Olds’ Progress Stirs Criticism,” Washington Post, January 17, 2003; and 
Michele McNell, “New Race to Top Stresses Pre-K Tests, Early Ed. Program Ratings,” Education Week, July 1, 
2011, http://blogs.edweek.org/ edweek/campaign-k-12/2011/07/ to_compete_states_ must.html?_ga=2.128105100. 
1239417728.1493166805-1254062810.1426548188 (all links last accessed April 25, 2017).  
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neighborhoods.2  Massive corporations generate hundreds of millions in revenues selling 
standardized tests to various school districts and state education boards, all while other massive 
corporations generate hundreds of millions in revenues selling pricey standardized test 
preparatory guides, courses, and private tutoring programs.3  Standardized testing has even 
manifested its own unique version of anxiety, leading psychologists to consider the therapeutic 
and pharmaceutical regimens students could use to weather potentially disabling scenarios.4  The 
anxiety that many feel over standardized testing reflects the disproportionate role it plays in 
everyday American life.  
 Many Americans have become so frustrated with the ubiquity of standardized testing that 
they have developed an entire political culture in response. The contemporary anti-testing 
movement has its anchorage in a broader politics of the family, which advocates that the rights of 
																																																								
 2 Lauren Meade, “The Higher the SAT Scores, the More the House is Worth,” Christian Science Monitor, 
April 28, 2005, http://www.csmonitor.com/2005/0428/p11s01-lihc.html. Observe as well the routine way in which 
SAT scores are remarked in real estate profiles of tony areas; see: Elsa Brenner, “Chappaqua, N.Y.: A Hamlet in a 
Woodsy Setting,” New York Times, September 3, 2014, https://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/07/ realestate/chappaqua-
ny-a-hamlet-in-a-woodsy-setting.html (all links last accessed April 25, 2017). 
 3 The British company Pearson VUE, one of the largest test providers for the United States, posted 
revenues of over 4 billion pounds in 2016, while Graham Holdings posted over $280 million in revenues through its 
test preparation holdings alone; see: Pearson, “Press Release: Pearson 2016 Preliminary Results (Unaudited),” 
February 24, 2017, https://www.pearson.com/content/dam/one-dot-com/one-dot-com/global/Files/news/news-
annoucements/2017/2016_Full_Year_Results_Press_Release.pdf; Graham Holdings, 1, 2016 Annual Report, 
http://www.ghco.com/phoenix.zhtml?c=62487&p=irol-reportsannual (all links last accessed April 25, 2017).  
 4 Psychologically speaking, test anxiety is not a distinct diagnostic category in the most recent edition of 
the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-5), and is usually located within a broader 
umbrella of anxiety disorders. Absence in the DSM-5 aside, psychologists have spent decades determining the 
existence of test anxiety, its physiological and cognitive effects, its relationship to learning disabilities and other 
anxiety disorders, and its measureable effects on test performance. Test anxiety’s amorphous quality—a subject of 
considerable psychological analysis, but not an official diagnostic category—ironically makes it easier to circulate 
as a popular topic among nonprofessional circles. For recent examples of psychological research, see: Dubi Lufi and 
Lina Darliuk, “The Interactive Effect of Test Anxiety and Learning Disabilities Among Adolescents,” Educational 
Research 43 (2005): 236-249; Markus Sommer and Martin E. Arendasy, “Comparing Different Explanations of the 
Effect of Test Anxiety on Respondents’ Test Scores,” Intelligence 42 (2014): 115-127; and Frank Herzer, Julia 
Wendt, and Alfons O. Hamm, “Discriminating Clinical from Nonclinical Manifestations of Test Anxiety: A 
Validation Study,” Behavior Therapy 45 (2014): 222-231. 
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parents take precedent over the responsibilities of the state.5  A groundswell of parents, 
concerned that educators are stuck doing little more than “teaching to the test, ” have staged 
widespread protests of statewide testing programs.6  In New York State alone, parents pulled 
over 200,000 children from statewide standardized tests in 2015—and in some districts, over 
two-thirds of students refrained from that year’s exams.7  Even Massachusetts, which had been at 
the vanguard of developing high-stakes testing programs that generated more ambitious curricula 
as well as demonstrable growth in student learning, backed away from proposed multistate 
testing schemes after considerable public antipathy.8  Fueled partially by social media networks, 																																																								
 5 For some sense of the background of this contemporary political culture, see: Donald T. Critchlow, 
Phyllis Schlafly and Grassroots Conservatism: A Woman’s Crusade (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005); 
Robert O. Self, All in the Family: the Realignment of American Democracy Since the 1960s (New York: Hill and 
Wang, 2012); and Georgina Denton, “Neither Guns Nor Bombs—Neither the State Nor God—Will Stop us From 
Fighting For Our Children: Motherhood and Protest in 1960s and 1970s America,” The Sixties: A Journal of 
History, Politics, and Culture 5, no. 2 (November, 2012): 205-228. 
 6 Teaching to the test, by contrast, is often advocated by thinktanks, and reflects a centrist consensus on 
education in which educational assessment is pegged to social order in a fashion that presumes the deviance of 
students and teachers who do not willingly submit to such a system. In one confounding example, printed in the 
prestigious peer-reviewed Quarterly Journal of Economics, depicted as a necessary function similar to speed traps 
or anti-terrorist measures. In this article, later used by The Brookings Institute as the premise for its support for 
teaching to the test, the author remains unclear about why teachers should be related to speeding drivers or terrorists, 
and what good comes from an educational apparatus premised on the presumed deviance of educators. (Or, for that 
matter, why students would be cars or bombs in such economic analogies.)  Dismissing such an argument as inane, 
however, misses the role that criminality and obedience play in many high-stakes testing regimes—namely, that 
teachers are presumed incapable of effectively guiding students toward learning objective unless threatened with 
negative consequences based on poor test scores. The test—and more importantly, the threat of occupational 
sanctions following low test scores—is thus rendered the only acceptable motivation for learning. See: Edward P. 
Lazear, “Speeding, Terrorism, and Teaching to the Test,” Quarterly Journal of Economics 121, no. 3 (August, 
2006): 1029-1061; Michael Hansen, “ Teaching to the Test: Hype or Reality?” Brown Center Chalkboard blog, 
Brookings Institute, https://www.brookings.edu/blog/brown-center-chalkboard/2016/05/16/teaching-to-the-test-
hype-or-reality/ (last accessed April 24, 2017); and Roland G. Fryer, Jr., et al, “Enhancing the Efficacy of Teaching 
Incentive Through Loss Aversion: A Field Experiment,” National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper 
18237 (Cambridge: NBER, 2012), http://www.nber.org/papers/w18237 (last accessed April 24, 2017).  
 7 Elizabeth A. Harris and Ford Fessenden, “’Opt Out’ Becomes Anti-Test Rallying Cry in New York 
State,” New York Times May 20, 2015, https://www.nytimes.com/2015/05/21/nyregion/opt-out-movement-against-
common-core-testing-grows-in-new-york-state.html?_r=0. For a look at parent-led grassroots opt-out efforts in 
Florida, a state much more beholden to high-stakes standardized testing programs, see, Kristina Rizga, “Sorry, I’m 
Not Taking This Test,” Mother Jones September/October, 2015, http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2015/08/opt-
out-standardized-testing-overload (links last accessed April 29, 2017).  
 8 Kate Zernike, “Massachusetts’s Rejection of Common Core Test Signals Shift in U.S.,” New York Times 
November 21, 2015, https://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/22/us/rejecting-test-massachusetts-shifts-its-model.html? 
_r=0. The anti-testing movement has also provided a way for teachers unions to dredge up support in otherwise 
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this “opt out” movement reflects the distrust many Americans hold for the state (however 
abstractly or imaginatively defined) and its data-gathering impulse.9  Within this capacious 
political mindset, standardized testing regimes are, at once, an assault on childhood, an 
imposition of anti-intuitive learning patterns, a devaluation of genuine inquiry and knowledge, an 
abandonment of traditional educational basics, a form of social control, the triumph of neoliberal 
educational corporatization, a waste of taxpayers’ dollars, and the reason the United States will 
fall behind one of any number of countries that either, ironically, use tremendous high-stakes 
testing mechanisms (China) or barely employ standardized educational testing at all (Finland).10  																																																																																																																																																																																		
unpopular environments, using an issue that effects their livelihood (the punitive use of test scores in annual 
evaluations) and parents’ fears (an unjust labeling of their child as abnormal or deficient, especially as studies 
indicated teachers stuck in high-stakes testing environments spent more effort on marginally-proficient students than 
low-performing pupils); see: Kate Taylor and Motoko Rich, “Teachers’ Unions Fight Standardized Testing, and 
Find Diverse Allies,” New York Times April 20, 2015, https://www.nytimes.com/2015/ 04/21/education/teachers-
unions-reasserting-themselves-with-push-against-standardized-testing.html?_r=0; and Kathleen McGrory, “Gov. 
Rick Scott Signs Bill That Scales Back Testing,” Tampa Bay Times April 14, 2015, http://www.tampabay.com/ 
news/politics/stateroundup/gov-rick-scott-signs-bill-that-scales-back-testing/2225436; Chicago Teachers Union, 
“Debunking the Myths of Standardized Testing: A CTU Position Paper,” CTU website, http://www.ctunet.com/ 
quest-center/research/position-papers/text/CTU_Testing_Position_Brief_web-1.pdf (all links last accessed April 24, 
2017); and Derek Neal and Diane Whitmore Schanzenbach, “Left Behind by Design: Proficiency Counts and Test-
Based Accountability), Review of Economics and Statistics 92, no. 2 (May, 2010): 263-283. 
 9 Observe, for example, the relative popularity of anti-Common Core Facebook Groups. One can join 
“CHOOSE TO REFUSE COMMON CORE” (38,178 as of late April, 2017), “AMERICANS AGAINST 
COMMON CORE” (2,177 members), “Don’t Be Cattle! Fight Common Core!” (7,430)—or, based on state and 
local allegiances, one can join similar groups united against Common Core in Utah, Rhode Island, Ohio, and East 
Islip, New York (4,448, 1,606, 2,817, and 485 members, respectively.)  In these groups, Common Core is linked to 
evils of progressive politics, Islam, socialism, charter schooling, big government, and transgenderism under the 
matrix of “indoctrination.”  In turn, anti-Common Core activists—whether or not they oppose actual standardized 
testing based on Common Core standards or just a shapeless “Common Core” bogeyman—pose themselves as the 
defenders of the purity of children’s minds and spirits. While state- and local-focused groups seem more opposed to 
the ideas of needless educational bureaucracy and corporatism, national groups seem overtly aligned with far-right 
politics; Facebook’s algorithms suggest Trump-fawning pages based on the network-joining patterns for these 
general anti-Common Core groups. 
 10 For brief considerations of whether teaching to the test actually dilutes learning through teachers’ 
disproportionate focus on content most likely to appear on a high-stakes exam—thus creating test inflation, or the 
false impression that students have learned more overall rather than select discrete points of content—see: Henry 
Braun, “Taming Inflation is Never Easy,” Measurement 13 (2015): 31-34; and Jennifer L. Jennings and Jonathan 
Marc Bereak, “’Teaching to the Test’ in the NCLB Era: How Test Predictability Affects Our Understanding of 
Student Performance,” Educational Researcher 43, no. 8: 381-389.  
 For widespread pubic commentary against teaching to the test, see: Kelly Gallagher, Commentary: Why I 
Will Not Teach to the Test,” Education Week, November 12, 2010, http://www.edweek.org/ew/articles/2010/11/17/ 
12gallagher_ep.h30.html; Times Editorial Board, “No Child Left Behind: How to End ‘Teaching to the Test,” Los 
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These parents’ anti-testing politics are steeped in the fears and fantasies about the direction of 
American society, the United States’ standing in relation to other countries, and most 
importantly, the future their own children will face. Opting out is not seen primarily as a retreat 
from society but a means of self-preservation.  
 Nonetheless, standardized testing endures, namely because it has served as a vital tool for 
the post-1945 American state. The postwar state prioritized, on the one hand, the cultivation of 
intellects resilient enough to sustain American geopolitical supremacy through scientific 
discovery and technological innovation and, on the other hand, the maintenance of an obedient 
population that would not disrupt existing social hierarchies. Standardized testing helped the 
postwar state solve this mind-body dilemma. As a function for social order, standardized testing 
provided the means for governing bodies to make sense of their citizens—particularly to gauge 
the skills, knowledge, and ability youth could eventually bring into a labor force. Standardized 
testing thus makes it clear not just who the so-called best and brightest are, but how well a 
population of students has adjusted to a set of educational norms the state has deemed necessary 
for future social success. Standardized testing is thus a way to monitor and enforce educational 
compliance with projected state and social needs.  
																																																																																																																																																																																		
Angeles Times, February 23, 2015, http://www.latimes.com/opinion/editorials/la-ed-testing-no-child-left-behind-
20150223-story.html; and Vince Bertram, “Standardized Testing Review: Let’s Make ‘Teaching to the Test’ a 
Thing of the Past,” Fox New Opinion, November 16, 2015, http://www.foxnews.com/opinion/2015/11/16/ 
standardized-testing-review-lets-make-teaching-to-test-thing-past.html; (links last accessed April 24, 2017). 
 For a sense of American education writers’ fascination with Finland and its nearly-complete lack of 
standardized testing, see: Anu Partanen “What Americans Keep Ignoring About Finland’s School Success,” The 
Atlantic, December 29, 2011, https://www.theatlantic.com/national/archive/2011/12/what-americans-keep-ignoring-
about-finlands-school-success/250564/; Pasi Sahlberg, Finnish Lessons 2.0: What Can the World Learn from 
Educational Change in Finland? (New York: Teachers College Press, 2014); and William Doyle, “Op-Ed: Why 
Finland Has the Best School,” Los Angeles Times, March 18, 2016, http://www.latimes.com/opinion/op-ed/la-oe-
0318-doyle-finnish-schools-20160318-story.html (links last accessed April 26, 2017).  
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 This dissertation examines how standardized testing became a vital instrument for the 
postwar state—and, in turn, how this state dependence on standardized testing fueled several 
larger postwar political cultures. Beginning with World War Two, the American state began 
engaging with widespread standardized testing in a sustained fashion, with an eye toward 
broader geopolitical needs.11 The state’s ability to continue large-scale testing depended on its 
use of independent test manufacturers, which developed standardized exam programs for the 
military, corporations, and institutions of higher education alike. Testing programs provided a 
convenient way to harmonize geopolitical, business, and educational interests without breaching 
commonly agreed-upon tenets of liberalism, capitalism, or decentralization.  
 This dissertation also focuses on the tension between the ways the state made sense of its 
citizens and the ways citizens made sense of society through standardized tests. Standardized 
testing acted as a massive social sorter in postwar America, but with time, many groups of 
Americans began to question the wisdom of educational reliance on standardized testing, as well 
as challenge the foundational assumptions about what testing actually measured. African-
																																																								
 11 By “state,” I mean the institutions and actors that give the federal government its shape, scope, and 
power. This not only includes the executive, legislative, and judicial branches of the federal government, but also the 
military, governmental bureaucracy, federal agencies, and their employees. The state also includes the policies, 
rituals, and laws that compel social order among a certain people in a specified territory. What I aim to convey 
through this dissertation is that the state is buttressed by non-state actors that provide vital technologies for the 
state—namely, technologies that facilitate social order—but which are not themselves officially part of the state. 
Hence, standardized testing is used by the state to make meaning of its citizens in a way that the state, by its own 
devices, cannot. See: Theda Skocpol, “Bringing the State Back In: Strategies of Analysis in Current Research,” in 
Bringing the State Back In, eds. Peter B. Evans, Dietrich Reuschemeyer, and Theda Skocpol (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1985), 3-37; Patrick J. Akard, “Bringing the Economy Back in (Again): Conceptions of 
the Capitalist State and Their Relevance for Public Policy,” Mid-American Review of Sociology 11, no. 2 (Winter, 
1986): 75-100; Theda Skocpol, “A Society Without a ‘State’? Political Organization, Social Conflict, and Welfare 
Provision in the United States,” Journal of Public Policy 7, no. 4 (October-December, 1987): 349-371; Desmond 
King and Robert C. Lieberman, “Finding the American State: Transcending the ‘Statelessness’ Account,” Polity 40, 
no. 3 (July, 2008): 368-378; Eric M. Patashnik and Julian E. Zelizer,” The Struggle to Remake Politics: Liberal 
Reform and the Limits of Policy Feedback in the Contemporary American State, Persepctives on Politics 11, no . 4 
(December, 2013): 1071-1087; Daniel Béland, François Vergnoille de Chantal, and Sarah-Louise  Raillard, “The 
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Americans, women, and working-class Americans increasingly resisted the way standardized 
testing was used as both proof of their diminished capabilities and justification for their social 
disparity. These groups pursued legal, legislative, and academic methods to push back against 
unjust standardized testing practices. This resistance also often provoked responses from those 
who had great stakes—whether socioeconomic or corporate—in maintaining the use and 
meaning of standardized tests. Politicians, parents, consumer advocates, academics, educational 
reformers, feminists, civil rights activists, entrepreneurs, and white supremacists all interpreted 
standardized testing scores and trends for larger political ends, often using similar information as 
their opponents to stake far different positions about race, gender, class, and merit. Yet, as more 
Americans questioned the legitimacy of standardized testing, they often reinforced standardized 
testing data’s use as a rhetorical tool, ultimately entrenching testing data as a way to make sense 
of society, even as more and more Americans find testing regimes purposeless.  
 Finally, this dissertation shows that, by the beginning of the twenty-first century, 
standardized testing data had become a potent tool for contending who mattered and who did not 
for America’s future. Because debates about standardized testing’s social utility often hinged on 
the meaning of test data—whether it reflected objective truths about the natural distribution of 
mental aptitudes or, instead, exposed the biases psychologists built into their devices as well as 
the prejudicial baggage that informed laypeople’s interpretation of statistical information—
standardized testing itself continues to have value as a political weapon. Whether or not one has 
a specific policy proposal for the future use of standardized testing, its rhetorical function as a 
symbol for what is wrong with America will continue to fuel numerous, often oppositional, 
debates. Until we get rid of standardized testing, we are stuck with political cultures fueled by 
standardized testing.   
 8 
 Ironically, as much writing exists on the perils and promises of standardized testing, there 
remains relatively little historical research on the topic. The touchstone for the history of 
standardized testing remains Nicholas Lemann’s The Big Test, which not only critically 
examined the development of American higher education’s dependence on the SAT, but also the 
test’s role in fueling the myth of meritocracy—that is, the ideological belief that the most 
qualified and talented earn a space at the top of society through natural talent and hard work and 
not profound structural advantages. Meritocracy let prestigious institutions offer the semblance 
of a path to social comfort without ever acknowledging the broader social forces that kept 
minorities outside of elite educational environments and, by extension, outside social privilege. 
The SAT added a technocratic sheen to meritocracy’s bootstrapping rhetoric. Those who did well 
on the SAT—namely, middle-to-upper-class white men in well-funded schools—could attribute 
their place in prestigious colleges to the fuzzy idea of merit rather than ever question if the SAT 
was a device better suited for maintaining the existing composition of the social elite. Lemann’s 
work spurred considerable scrutiny and reform among American admissions counselors, and 
added weight to public displeasure with the college application process, but his work lets the 
SAT stand in for a far broader system of standardized assessment. By focusing on the attitudes 
and backgrounds of the men who ran Educational Testing Service, however, Lemann forecloses 
on the primary role the postwar state played in making standardized testing so commonplace a 
social sorting device. Standardized testing was not just a tool for technocrats to replicate the 
Northeastern elite among the masses, but also a way for the state to use new technology for 
reproducing existing racial and economic power dynamics.12     
																																																								
 12 Nicholas Lemann, The Big Test: The Secret History of the American Meritocracy (New York, Farrar, 
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 Although other useful works exist on the history of standardized testing—in particular, 
William Reese’s investigation of the origins of testing in mid-nineteenth-century Boston 
schools—most research on the topic either has a decidedly journalistic bent or is the product of 
internal corporate histories. While this allows some authors to give compelling portrayals of test-
preparation entrepreneurs (as David Owen did with the founders of The Princeton Review in 
None of the Above), or to depict the actual children harmed by harebrained state testing policies 
(as Anya Kamenetz did in The Test), such work is usually pegged to immediate public concerns 
with standardized testing. Such work often has a deeply foreshortened sense of testing’s history, 
as well as a clear aim to castigate standardized testing wholesale. By contrast, histories created 
by standardized testing companies are flush with bureaucratic detail, but devoid of any genuine 
critical examination of standardized testing’s impact on postwar American society. In these 
corporate histories, standardized testing is always portrayed as a social good that contributes to 
an undefined but ever-present idea of Progress. Standardized testing does not contribute to 
socioeconomic disparities, these corporate histories maintain, but merely reflects the unequal 
educational experiences that create test score differences between different socioeconomic 
groups: don’t shoot the messenger. Both journalistic and corporate approaches to this topic avoid 
a thorough examination of the role standardized testing played in expanding the reach of the 
postwar state, as well as the intergenerational effect standardized testing data has had on various 
groups’ socioeconomic mobility.13 
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America’s Selective Liberal Arts Colleges: A Boom for Equity of Something Else?” Education Evaluation and 
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 The history of standardized testing makes more sense when placed in a broader history of 
numeracy, quantification, and social science research. Over the course of four centuries, 
scientists have engaged in the process of relating humans to abstract quantities, whether by 
surveying communities, forecasting voters’ choices, imagining the behavioral patterns of rational 
actors, or constructing ideal physical shapes. Quantified abstractions mark the division between 
the pre-modern and modern worlds: they signify when people became populations, when the 
value of a life became an actuarial sum, when enslaved humans became units for insurance 
adjustment, and when legal systems encoded fractional bases for race and nativity. The modern 
state could hold better control over its subjects by treating them as economic figures—and, in 
turn, could accustom populations to discipline themselves in line with statistical norms. 
Modernity, then, has involved the confluence of governmental control, economic constraints, and 
corporeal self-regulation through methods that render humans into numerical data.14  
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Standardization has been one crucial facet of quantification—and the early history of 
standardized testing, as discussed below, involved the incremental development of tools that 
allowed the American state to make sense of its citizens and, in turn, for Americans to make 
sense of themselves in numerical terms.  
 The history of standardized testing also benefits from sociological examinations of the 
mechanics of class formation—both the actual creation of student bodies and the reinforcement 
of socioeconomic strata—through postsecondary institutions, particularly the research of Jerome 
Karabel and Mitchell Stevens. Whereas Karabel illustrates the historical dimensions of elite 
replication at Harvard, Yale, and Princeton, Stevens examines the contemporary admissions 
process at a small liberal arts college. Karabel and Stevens show that elite colleges are not just 
producers of the social elite, but respondents to broader economic forces. Moreover, Karabel and 
Stevens illustrate how both prestigious and less-prestigious educational institutions appeal to 
select groups of students based on a sense of their own place in the academic pecking order: an 
small private college or large public research university, cannot market itself in the same way as 
Ivy League schools do, quite simply because they lack the same clout—a clout increasingly 
based on quantified guidelines.15   
What, Exactly, Is a Standardized Test? 
 
 One irony of the widespread use and criticism of standardized tests is that relatively few 
people are clear with what, exactly, standardized tests are. In this sense, standardized testing 																																																																																																																																																																																		
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becomes pornographic: we can’t exactly define it, but we know it when we see it. A standardized 
test is, quite simply, an assessment that is designed and administered in a uniform fashion, from 
how much time test-takers are given, the questions they receive, the tools they may use, and even 
the instructions they are provided.16  Although standardized testing may carry high stakes—such 
as students’ promotion from one grade to the next, teachers’ pay rates and employment, or 
schools’ funding and operations—not all standardized tests carry such severe consequences. Nor 
do all standardized tests have the same primary purpose: some gauge the degree to which test-
takers have acquired skills up to a certain point, while others assess test-takers’ learning 
strengths or predict readiness for further education. Nonetheless, a standardized assessment’s 
shape and questions first depend upon its stakeholders agreeing upon what its main objectives 
should be.17  Based on these objectives, test designers—usually private corporations—create a 
considerable number of test items, far more than is needed for the actual final exam, and give 
them a trial run on sample populations. These experimental sample groups are ideally 
representative of who will be taking the final exam—e.g., a test designed to measure high-school 
seniors’ math skills should not use sixth-grade students for a trial sample. Given how well or 
poorly these sample groups fared, test designers cull the best-constructed questions and assemble 
them in a final experimental version. The data from this final experimental version often forms 
the foundation for the published test’s scoring standards.18  Standardized exams thus go through 
an elaborate multi-stage process to hone how they will assess test-takers’ skills and knowledge.  
																																																								
 16 Educational Testing Service, “Glossary of Standardized Testing Terms,” ETS website, 
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 17 As Wayne Au observes, the decision for a standardized test to carry high stakes is above all a policy 
decision, one that has historically been disproportionately detrimental to minority communities; see: Wayne Au, 
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 Contemporary standardized tests fall into two broad categories, which each offer 
considerably different models for adequate and extraordinary behavior. In a norm-referenced 
test, test-takers’ performances are compared to those of a pre-constructed sample group. Such 
sample groups are created during a test’s experimental period, although larger-scale standardized 
testing programs (such as the SAT) may develop ongoing experimental design to ensure a cohort 
of test-takers is never disproportionately abnormal compared to the original sample group. Test-
takers’ scores on norm-referenced tests do not directly reflect how well or poorly they did on 
questions but, instead, their performance compared to the experimental sample group. A test-
taker may answer only half of all questions correctly and still score in the 70th percentile on a 
norm-referenced test if they performed better than 70 percent of all students in the sample group. 
In a criterion-referenced test, by contrast, students are measured by how much they know about a 
specified domain of knowledge. The reference point for test-takers’ scores is not an original 
sample group but, instead, predetermined objectives—what a high-school junior ought to know 
in English by the end of the school year, or fundamental nursing procedures. These test-takers 
are not in competition with a sample population, but against an imagined ideal test-taker who 
knows all of the content.19  Whatever the basis for reference, standardized test scores do two 
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things at once: they render individual students into quantities suitable for comparison and, more 
potently, they personalize quantifiable data. Standardized test scores become a stand-in for 
capability, and the ineffable aspects of skill and achievement are replaced with numbers referent 
only to a test’s measurement system.  
 Test standardization also involves the elimination of subjective—that is, human—
judgment whenever possible, which allows proponents to more easily frame the argument that 
standardized tests are fair and reasonable devices. More specifically, standardization involves 
reducing the number of questions that require considerable time to assess, as fatigued graders are 
prone to making scoring variations or inserting their own biases. Most Americans commonly 
associate standardized tests with No. 2 pencils, pastel bubble sheets, and scanning machines. 
This technology, developed by Reynold Johnson in the early 1930s and honed by IBM soon 
after, allowed for hundreds of tests to be scored in an hour—making national annual 
standardized tests feasible in subsequent decades.20  Some test manufacturers have reduced the 
need for human graders by building computer-based standardized exams. People who take a 
computer-adaptive test (CAT) are first presented a set of medium-difficulty questions. Based on 
how well they perform with this initial batch, test-takers are then presented with questions that 
the testing program has calculated to be moderately difficulty for that particular test-taker. As 
test-takers progress through a CAT, the weight for each cluster of questions typically decreases; 
how well or poorly one does on the last five questions often has much less impact on their final 
score than how well or poorly one does on the first five. CAT designers maintain the results on 
such exams provide a more accurate depiction of test-takers’ range of ability than other versions 
of standardized testing can provide: high-ability test-takers are not drained of energy answering 																																																								
 20 “Automated Test Scoring: Overview,” IBM 100 website, http://www-03.ibm.com/ibm/history/ 
ibm100/us/en/icons/testscore/ (last accessed April 29. 2017).  
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easy questions, and low-ability test-takers did not gain cheap points with lucky guesses on hard 
questions.21  In both paper-based and computer-based formats, however, human adjudication is 
pared to its requisite minimum.22  
A Brief History of Standardized Testing to the late 1930s 
 Although standardized testing is often seen as an educational practice, its origins extend 
well beyond the classroom. The early history of standardized testing is ensnarled in the histories 
of bureaucracy, intelligence, industrialization, urbanization, immigration, progressivism, and 
warfare. Each of these historical phenomena generated concepts and practices fundamental to 
contemporary standardized testing. Briefly considering how standardized testing developed 
before the Second World War illuminates how, above all, early test developers sought to manage 
social change. The initial uses for standardized testing reflect an underlying aim to maintain the 
structural integrity of social institutions all while shaping the direction in which different 
populations flowed into social systems. Whatever the anchoring ideology, standardized testing 
has been from its earliest versions a mechanism for social control and order. 
 From a bureaucratic perspective, standardized testing is nothing new. Indeed, 
standardized examinations were central to maintaining imperial China’s vast civil service.23  As 
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an American educational practice, however, standardized testing began in earnest during the 
mid-nineteenth century, as several northern states began to enact mandatory minimum schooling 
laws. The most notable early case of U.S. standardized testing took place in Boston, where 
Massachusetts Board of Education Secretary Horace Mann ended the practice of recitation-based 
examinations administered by visiting committees. Influenced by Whig politics, Prussian 
pedagogical practices, and phrenology, Mann enacted citywide written examinations in 1845. 
Rather than have cherry-picked students reply to individualized prompts, such tests required all 
pupils to answer identical series of questions in the same subjects within a set timeframe at a 
specific point in the year: standardization meant uniformity. Mann and his reformist allies used 
the results from these standardized exams to usher in structural reforms for Boston’s schools, 
including the transition from one-room schoolhouses to graded classrooms segregated by 
students’ age. Although written standardized exams would gain widespread use throughout many 
populous American school districts during the late-nineteenth century, debates over whether to 
use standardized exams would continue to fuel broader educational arguments over the 
relationship between states’ power and local control.24 
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 Mann and other early proponents of standardized testing built their arguments on the 
foundational tenets of nineteenth-century social science, particularly the idea that humanity could 
be measured, generalized, and discussed in quantified terms. Belgian statistician Adolphe 
Quetelet’s work with normal curves provided a foundation for quantified knowledge about 
human characteristics. Quetelet observed that people’s physical dimensions fell along a normal 
curve: some had rather small features, other rather large, but most clustered around an average 
equally distant from both extremes. From these observations, Quetelet devised the ideal “average 
man”--l’homme moyen-- and posited that any individual’s deviation from that imagined average 
could be represented as a probability.25  Quetelet’s homme moyen not only naturalized abstract 
ideas about the body, but also served as a potent metaphor for the social body. Quantifiable 
information about individual bodies, human capacity, and the larger social body served states’ 
political, moral, and economic needs. Such information fueled state power systems that exacted 
social and corporeal discipline through knowledge production, a process Michel Foucault would 
later deem biopolitics.26  Standardized testing’s scoring systems—often built to fit normal curves 
and designed to quantify abstract information about human capability—are one legacy of these 
earlier biopolitical developments. 																																																								
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 During the second half of the nineteenth century, many social scientists became 
enchanted by developments in biological sciences, and shifted their focus from measuring social 
bodies to improving them. What emerged from this shift was eugenics, a scientific ideology 
premised on the belief that humanity could be qualitatively improved by encouraging certain 
groups to reproduce more and preventing other groups from reproducing at all. British polymath 
Francis Galton was at the forefront of nineteenth-century eugenics. Inspired by Quetelet’s work 
with normal curves, Galton developed tests to gauge mental faculties relative to an imagined 
norm. Galton was also inspired by the research of biologist (and cousin) Charles Darwin, but 
feared that natural selection, if left to its own devices, would not create lasting evolution. 
Observing the seed size pattern for several generations of pea plants, Galton discovered a 
phenomenon he deemed “regression to the mean”: pea plants that developed from large seeds 
tended to produce seeds closer to the average seed size of the progenitor plant. Galton presumed 
that humanity, like pea plants, could lose superlative qualities just as easily—and that the social 
elite would bear middling sorts without any intervention.27   
 The mental test was one eugenicist tool psychologists designed to correct this observed 
course of nature. Researchers honed mental testing practices during the early twentieth century, 
standardizing numerous methods for assessment and diagnosis. By studying the faculties of 
French youth, Alfred Binet and Theodore Simon developed the concept of mental age. Binet and 
Simon grouped children by how well they performed relative to the average performance of 
children at specific ages on a series of increasingly difficult cognitive tests. A twelve-year old, 																																																								
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for example, could have a mental age of seven if her performance on these tests was equivalent 
to the degree to which most seven-year olds would successfully complete them.28  The 
intelligence scale that developed from these studies—conveniently named the Binet-Simon 
scale—became the foundation for American psychologists’ sense of intelligence measurement.  
 The Binet-Simon Scale did not gain its cultural heft, however, until Stanford psychologist 
Lewis Terman made several alterations. Most substantially, Terman retooled the way the Binet-
Simon scale expressed intelligence levels, changing the expression to a ratio between an 
individual’s mental age and their chronological age. Terman deemed this expression the 
intelligence quotient, or IQ. Terman’s IQ soon became the psychological and cultural standard 
for making sense of intelligence.29  The appeal of IQ, as Paula Fass argues, resides in its ability 
to personalize an abstract concept. Because IQ expresses intelligence as a ratio, it hides the 
abstract qualities that form the concept of mental age. The relational aspect of IQ rests on the 
specious premise that physical age has as some direct, linear relationship to normal mental 
development. 30  
 Because Terman devised norms for IQ by measuring the capabilities of native-born 
middle-class white children, the intelligence quotient also masked the standards against which 
ethnic minorities were measured. Through psychological slight-of-hand, IQ recast the economic 																																																								
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and social advantages of whiteness as the conditions for normal intelligence. The logic of IQ 
positioned poverty and race-based disparities as social abnormalities—and IQ became, in turn, 
evidence for the inherent inferiority of African-Americans, immigrant communities, and poor 
whites. Although intelligence scales would sustain substantial revisions and criticisms 
throughout the twentieth century, IQ retained cultural power because it posed abstract concepts 
as natural skill, and anchored relational measurements in individuals’ abilities.31 
 As Terman developed a new scale for expressing intelligence, Robert Yerkes invented a 
method now synonymous with popular depictions of standardized testing: multiple-choice 
questions. The psychologist built multiple choice apparatuses, partitioned wooden devices with 
brass keys wired to lamps and buzzers. Yerkes and his assistants had subjects determine which 
key was connected to a buzzer, rotating switches to ensure each experimental trial used a 
different key. After a person successfully determined which key had been wired, the researchers 
asked the subject to articulate how they figured out which key to press, scoring for both the 
speed at which they came to the right answer and the way in which they described their choices. 
Yerkes used these contraptions on numerous species in order to measure ideational behavior, or 
the “series of reactive tendencies that a person displays when confronted with solving a 
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problem.”32  To Yerkes, ideational behavior was a measurable action rooted in intelligence—and 
although intelligence itself could not be directly measured, the behaviors that reflect intelligent 
decisions could. While multiple-choice devices fell out of favor after World War One, the 
multiple choice method held experimental currency among researchers for quite some time. 
 Psychologists’ fondness for standardized testing and assessment mirrored late-nineteenth- 
and early-twentieth-century shifts in American capitalism. As the United States industrialized, 
businesses began to standardize all aspects of operations: manufacturing, resources, and 
distribution all began to coalesce around agreed-upon terms. Standardization of rail track gauges, 
screw sizes, brick dimensions, and thousands of other materials not only lubricated 
infrastructural development, but also encouraged marketplace cohesion. Yet, as with the tensions 
that developed through the growth of standardized education testing, industrial capital’s 
standardization processes revealed a tension between local political power and national 
economic forces. What set the United States’ industrial growth apart from contemporaneous 
developments elsewhere, as D. Linda Garcia notes, was the private sector’s preponderant role in 
establishing bodies for standards development.33  During the industrial era, standardization was 
never solely within the purview of the state.  
 This is not to say the era of industrial capitalism was devoid of any state influence. 
Rather, the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth-centuries marked substantial growth in the size 
and scope of U.S. federal governmental bureaucracy—as well as its increasing encroachment on 
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everyday life. The Progressive Era makes most sense, however, when viewed as a loosely 
bundled series of political movements emanating from the American middle class. White 
middle-class Progressives feared the drag both the elite and destitute alike placed on societal 
wellbeing. Through this fear, these Progressives elided being middle class with being righteous 
and normal—making the very wealthy and the poor statistically, politically, and morally deviant. 
This slippage between moral virtue, white supremacy, political soundness, and statistical 
preponderance guided Progressive reformers as they entered politics, seeking to reformat the 
relationship between society and state.34   
 The Progressive mission was fueled by the fear that the white middle class—and, by 
extension, the American state—was at risk of corruption and devolution. Progressives grafted 
this fear of degeneration onto the language of intelligence, which allowed reformers to express 
nativist and white supremacist logic in scientific terms. Intelligence was one of many ways 
progressive reformers anchored the fantasy that American civilization was at risk from blacks, 
poor whites, and the foreign-born. For many Progressives, however, the most insidious social 
menaces were those whose intelligence was just below average. Idiots and imbeciles, as 
intelligence researchers and eugenicists deemed those with mental ages below eight years of age, 
posed less risk for white Americans’ degeneracy than morons: those whose mental ages were 
deficient compared to the standard adult population, but who were able enough to operate in 
society undetected. Henry Herbert Goddard, who invented the condition of moronia in the early-																																																								
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twentieth century, insisted that morons were multigenerational threats to the white race. Because 
morons could not expand their mental capacity, the state wasted valuable resources on their 
education—and because feeblemindedness was a heritable trait, normal whites risked diluting 
their own family’s stock by mating with morons. Further, Goddard and other eugenicists used 
genetic logic to link feeblemindedness with criminality, thereby turning moral shortcomings into 
medical symptoms. Any outward deviation of public social norms became proof of poor 
genetics, and poor genetics were diagnosable by observed by the lewd and licentious behavior of 
ancestors. Identifying and curbing feeblemindedness—by legally sanctioning intelligence testing, 
institutionalization, and sterilization—was not just sound state policy but racial duty. Progressive 
logic turned standardization and intelligence testing into moral social obligations: white 
American vitality depended upon vigilantly monitoring for statistical abnormalities.35 
 World War One profoundly expanded the scale of standardized mental testing as well as 
the stakes the American state placed in psychological testing results. Robert Yerkes, Lewis 
Terman, and dozens of other psychologists collaborated to devise the Army Alpha exam (for 
those literate in English) and Army Beta exam (for illiterate recruits). The United States Army 
administered these standardized tests to over 1.7 million recruits over the course of American 
involvement in World War One. The number of recruits who were discharged or sorted on the 
basis of these tests was quite small compared to the overall number of recruits. Despite the 
limited direct application of test scores, the Army Alpha and Army Beta tests showed that 
massive testing projects could be undertaken, and that test-takers could be categorically sorted on 
the basis of their results. Further, the state-orchestrated test-design project that created the Army 																																																								
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Alpha and Army Beta exams united dozens of previously detached researchers, sparked a sense 
of national community among psychologists, and familiarized many Americans to psychology 
and psychological testing.36 
 Although the results of the Army Alpha and Army Beta tests had limited immediate 
application, psychologists and politicians alike used data from recruits’ exam scores to reinforce 
white supremacist logic. Black and white recruits who took the Army Alpha Test had, on 
average, a significant gap between results—a difference used by both researchers and laypersons 
as evidence of black mental inferiority. Yet, on closer examination, several factors clearly 
contradicted the white supremacist explanation for white recruits’ superior test performance. 
Although white recruits had higher average performances on the Army Alpha Test, the median 
scores for recruits from northern states, whatever their race, were higher than their counterparts 
in southern states. Northern black recruits frequently performed better on the Army Alpha Test 
than southern whites. The relationship black and white recruits’ scores also correlated strongly 
with the average amount of time blacks had in school relative to white students: the more time 
blacks spent in school, the narrower the gap. Rather than consider socioeconomic educational 
disparities as the root causes for the gap between blacks’ and whites’ Army Alpha test scores, 
leading psychologists and laypeople leaned on published intelligence test data to further 
naturalize racial difference.37  
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 During the interwar period, standardized testing became part of the grammar of U.S. 
education.38  Following the perceived success of the Army Alpha and Beta projects, IQ tests and 
other psychological assessments became increasingly popular instruments for measuring and 
sorting students. These standardized tests became instruments for managing the massive 
demographic changes in public schooling that had begun during the late-nineteenth century. 
Although immigration quotas essentially ended immigration from Southern Europe, Eastern 
Europe, and Asia by the mid-1920s, these multigenerational immigrant communities still placed 
tremendous stress on school districts—not only by the amount of resources required to teach 
millions of children, but also by the political and ideological battles over how to best incorporate 
these youth into American society. Meanwhile, child labor laws and minimum education 
provisions ensured that youth typically stayed in school longer than their counterparts from 
previous generations. The demands of industrial capital clashed with Progressive educational 
theory: How could schools provide equal education for all students, while also preparing certain 
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segments of students for different types of labor?  Standardized testing helped educational 
bureaucrats broker this paradox by making it easier for schools to sort students into different 
paths—typically, vocational, normal, and college preparatory tracks. Standardized intelligence 
testing did not create educational tracking, just as it did not create nativism. But, these 
standardized psychological and intelligence tests provided a seemingly objective scientific logic 
that allowed many school districts to reinforce nativist sentiments and eugenic beliefs, all while 
satisfying industrial demands. If poor whites and the foreign-born scored poorly on standardized 
exams, it was a sign of natural shortcomings and not socioeconomic conditions, and so it was in 
national best interest to channel these youth into vocational educational tracks.39 
 During the early-twentieth century, institutions of higher education also began turning 
toward standardized testing to address demographic pressures without democratizing the entire 
system. At the end of the nineteenth century, elite American colleges and universities each had 
their own particular set of admissions requirements. The materials students composed to apply 
for admission to Harvard, for example, had little overlap with the materials used to apply to 
Yale. Several of these prestigious schools formed the College Entrance Examination Board at the 
turn of the twentieth century to standardize their admissions process—including using a common 
admissions exam. For this exam, students composed essays in several subjects, which were then 
read and scored by College Board graders. These standardized essay exams were not originally 
intended to democratize access to higher education, however. Instead, this early version of 
collegiate standardized testing provided College Board member institutions a clearer standard to 
gauge students from different elite preparatory schools, to better ensure that college student 
bodies were not overrepresented by select feeder academies on the basis of tradition alone. This 																																																								
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insularity continued when the College Board developed the Scholastic Aptitude Test—or SAT—
in the late 1920s. Even though the original SAT more closely resembled contemporary 
standardized tests forms, many of the original 8,000 test takers were East Coast students from 
top-level preparatory schools applying for entrance into the most prestigious colleges. Not until 
the 1930s would elite colleges explicitly use the to draw in talented youth from distant 
Midwestern and Western locations. These early College Board exams broadened educational 
opportunity only for those who already had a great deal of it.40 
 Although standardized testing became a far more popular educational practice after 
World War One, some public figures challenged the intelligence testing rhetoric espoused by 
Lewis Terman and other prominent psychologists. Most famously, the journalist Walter 
Lippmann questioned the tenets of intelligence testing in a series of essays for The New Republic 
in late 1922. Over six installments, Lippmann argued that intelligence testing, already a flawed 
instrument, was “in danger of gross perversion by muddleheaded and prejudiced men.”41  
Lippmann accused psychologists of failing to clearly define intelligence, and for designing 
unjust, unreliable tests that were primarily devices for social sorting. The journalist worried 
dogmatic educations would “treat people with low intelligence quotients as congenitally and 
hopelessly inferior.”42  Indeed, Lipmann concluded his series by wishing the belief in hereditary 
intelligence would go “into that limbo where phrenology and characterology and the other Babu 
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sciences are to be found.”43  Lewis Terman did not hold Lippmann’s criticisms in high esteem, 
and rattled off several dismissive, sarcastic replies to The New Republic—dragging the public 
debate well into the following year. This friction, between what psychologists intended to 
measure with standardized tests and how nonspecialists understood standardized tests, would 
become the main force for public discourse on standardized testing in the United States in the 
century following World War One. 
 American psychologists continued to refine and reconstruct standardized psychological 
assessments throughout the interwar period. Most notably, the psychologist David Wechsler 
developed his namesake intelligence scales in 1939 while leading New York’s Bellevue 
Psychiatric Hospital. The Wechsler-Bellevue scale attempted to clarify adult intelligence 
measurement by reworking the formula for IQ. Rather than frame IQ as a ratio between mental 
age and chronological age—a model that, when misinterpreted, suggests either that people 
become less intelligent as they age, or that people’s intellectual capacity stops somewhere early 
in adolescence—Wechsler calculated IQ by using standard deviations. Using the Wechsler-
Bellevue rubric, a psychologist could calculate a person’s IQ by measuring the distance between 
their cumulative test scores and the average score for people the same age. Because the 
Wechsler-Bellevue test measured for both verbal IQ and performance IQ, the exam also 
drastically altered psychological perceptions of intelligence.44  Just as Lippmann’s essays set a 
foundation for decades of public criticism for intelligence testing, Wechsler’s scale provided a 
wedge for future psychologists to offer—and fight over—competing models for intelligence.  																																																								
 43 Walter Lippmann, “A Future for the Tests,” The New Republic November 29, 1922: 10. Lippmann later 
tempered this fervor in a profile of British psychologist Cyril Burt, whose “common sense” approach to intelligence 
testing showed “there can be little or no doubt [that] the I.Q. is a composite measure of native and acquired 
abilities”; see: Lippmann, “Mr. Burt and the Intelligence Tests,” The New Republic May 2, 1923: 264. 
 44 Richard W. Woodcock, “New Looks in the Assessment of Cognitive Ability,” Peabody Journal of 
Education 77, no. 2 (2002): 8; Boake, 396-398. 
 29 
 The early history of standardized testing cannot entirely fit within the history of 
education because standardized testing has some basis in social measurement and management. 
Contemporary versions of standardized testing grew out of nineteenth-century social scientists’ 
methods for quantifying human characteristics, early psychologists’ quest to measure 
intelligence, Progressive Era reformers’ fear of racial degeneration and moral depravity, 
industrial capital’s tendency to turn human labor into an abstract resource, and American armed 
forces’ aim to sort recruits by their potential usefulness in combat. These branches all had a 
common biopolitical root: modern states have sustained themselves in part by generating 
knowledge about individual bodies and the social body. Standardization, including methods of 
educational assessment, was one of many biopolitical methods. Although the American federal 
government had relatively weak authority over the course of education, standardized testing 
allowed greater district, state, and national encroachment into practices traditionally deemed 
community affairs.  
Testing and the Postwar World 
 My dissertation picks up where this short history leaves off, by unpacking the profound 
changes standardized testing made to the relationship between state and society during and after 
World War Two. What changed was not the use of testing itself—after all, standardized testing 
had been part of the American educational landscape for decades by the time the United States 
entered conflict—but the scale and stakes of testing data. War created an opportunity to use 
standardized tests to gather an unprecedented amount of data about the American populace’s 
capabilities. This data, already reflective of a very specific and narrow understanding of aptitude, 
became a tool for defining the American state’s postwar brainpower needs. Standardized testing 
validated postwar visions that premised democratic vitality on efficient social sorting. The 
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postwar state, in turn, validated the widespread use of standardized testing by using test data as a 
key metric for spotting and harnessing brainpower. What developed, however, was a gap 
between the limited technical applications for standardized testing data and what many 
Americans, both non-specialists and experts alike, asserted the data truly meant. Standardized 
testing data thus became a tool in broader arguments over who truly contributed to—and thus 
who deserved to benefit from—the postwar American state. 
 This dissertation also depicts how standardized testing served a vital function for the 
postwar American state without being internal to the American state. Until the late 1970s, the 
American state lacked a separate cabinet-level entity for education. Yet, as much as education 
was traditionally a responsibility of state and local governance, it was also entangled with 
scientific discovery, technological prestige, and military innovation—all issues central to the 
postwar state. The American state needed a way to harness brainpower without disrupting, at 
least on the surface, the traditional divisions of power for education. Standardized testing, in its 
various forms, filled that need. Standardized testing helped channel students into certain 
educational and vocational paths—steering to some degree their life course—without creating 
bureaucratic heft. The American state instead relied on outside manufacturers to research and 
produce standardized tests, thus allowing for vital state functions without warping the shape of 
the state. Even when the Department of Education eventually took on a broader mandate decades 
after its creation through No Chil Left Behind, it acted as the supervisor for statewide test-based 
accountability programs. Standardized testing—and especially its creators—allowed the postwar 
American state to be strong where it was structurally weak.  
 Over the following five chapters, this dissertation tracks the way the American state came 
to rely on standardized testing for its wartime and postwar needs—and, eventually, how various 
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groups of Americans reacted against the use of standardized testing as a social sorting device. In 
Chapter One, “Manpower from the Masses,” I examine the vital role standardized testing served 
in the developing logic of the postwar national security state. The American state’s dependence 
on standardized testing began in earnest as it drafted millions of men during World War II. This 
dependence grew as the state reintegrated servicemen back into civilian life, and solidified as 
new test-development organizations undertook enormous projects for the federal government. 
Standardized testing provided the American state the mechanism for making manpower a 
measurable national resource. Both during and after the war, manpower served as a key unit of 
measurement for American military, business, and scientific needs. The rhetoric of manpower 
allowed policymakers to create measures—most notably, the GI Bill—that rewarded servicemen 
with social benefits without setting them apart as a privileged class of citizens. Manpower 
instead designated all members of the war effort, soldier and civilian alike, as citizen-workers, 
whose labor was both a civic duty and an abstract quantity serving various state needs. By 
prioritizing manpower, policymakers could endorse postwar plans that expanded the scale of the 
state’s educational responsibilities without changing its fundamental federal shape. Standardized 
testing, refined and massively employed during the war, provided the state a tool to continue 
quickly sorting millions of Americans by their abilities, aptitudes, and interests, all in the effort 
to extract the greatest possible manpower for postwar projects.  
 The second chapter, “American Talent Show,” examines how the state used standardized 
testing as a geopolitical tool. Well before the Eisenhower Administration responded to Sputnik, 
the federal government, extragovernmental educational organizations, and corporations began 
building a network dedicated to catching the United States’ brightest youth and steering them 
toward scientific and engineering careers that would secure American geopolitical supremacy. 
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Sputnik did not spark a commitment to science and mathematics so much as solidify the direction 
multiple stakeholders, both private and public, took in harnessing brainpower for geopolitical 
means. Test-based scholarship programs allowed corporations to use standardized tests to cull 
talent while promoting the merits of American capitalism. Standardized testing also allowed the 
federal government to dodge accusations of centralization at a moment when many alleged it had 
superseded traditional local control over education. Rather than restructure U.S. education, 
standardized testing became the netting that bound all vested parties together. Standardized 
testing provided heft and fuel for geopolitical ambitions that the rhetoric of American democratic 
brainpower could not alone. 
 Chapter Three, “Managing Marginal Men,” unpacks the way the federal government used 
standardized testing as a way to maintain oversight and control over black Americans’ social 
mobility. Over a several-year period following the Second World War, the United States Armed 
Forces integrated its troops—and in the process, replaced its “racial quota” with one based on the 
Armed Forces’ standardized aptitude entrance exam: the General Classification Test (GCT). In 
swapping the racial quota for a GCT quota, policymakers used standardized testing to forge a 
postwar social order that, on the surface, prioritized ability over race, but in effect used testing as 
a means to avoid disrupting too much of the existing white supremacist social order. By allowing 
some viable channel for deeper black participation in the armed forces, however limited, the 
Truman Administration could satisfy its aim to integrate and modify the military without 
creating too much discontent within military leadership at a vital moment in American statecraft. 
This pattern of the state disproportionately marginalizing black men through standardized testing 
continued through the advent of minimum competency testing and test-based special education 
tracking. Conversely, quota systems designed to increase the presence of minorities in graduate 
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programs came under legal fire during the 1970s, as white students alleged the looser test score 
requirements for minority candidates created a double standard that discriminated against 
qualified whites. Standardized testing thus not only reinforced the postwar racial order, but 
attempts to create racially equitable educational environments were met with resistance from 
whites who felt their test scores genuinely reflected why they merited a space in an increasingly 
competitive postgraduate environment. 
 This dissertation’s fourth chapter, “Bad at Math,” analyzes the emergence and 
development of dueling arguments about the root cause of American women’s lack of presence 
in science and mathematics during the late-twentieth century. Although American girls tended to 
do better than boys in math classes, far more men wound up in engineering and laboratory 
positions than women. This anomaly persisted even as women entered higher education and the 
American labor force at unprecedented levels. Standardized testing data fueled two opposing 
arguments for this phenomenon. One group, influenced by second-wave feminist politics, 
maintained that girls were negatively socialized into women who avoided scientific careers. The 
other group, building off of sociobiological models, maintained that as a matter of biological 
capacity, females typically lacked the exceptional quantitative and scientific skills found among 
top male researchers. Both groups nonetheless relied on standardized testing data to build 
contrasting arguments about sex, gender, and women’s role in the state. By the time the federal 
government formally launched its own investigation of the “gender gap,” the debate had already 
begun to become the topic of mainstream debate, in which identity politics clashed with media 
depictions of “pink” and “blue” brains.  
 In the final chapter, “Birth of the Student-Consumer,” I examine how parents, students, 
and pundits voiced their discontent with standardized testing during the 1970s and 1980s—and, 
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by securing reforms, unintentionally wed standardized testing to marketplace practices. Spurred 
by Ralph Nader’s Public Interest Research Groups, students and parents voiced their frustrations 
with standardized testing from the position of consumers entitled rights—and accused certain 
testing companies of widespread consumer fraud. In securing transparency legislation, consumer 
advocates and student-consumers stripped Educational Testing Service and other test 
manufacturer of their longstanding protections as nonprofit organizations. To remain financially 
solvent—in light of not only laws that mandated the publication of test answers, but also a 
growing and federally legitimized test preparation industry—test manufacturers embraced a new 
business model. Test producers packaged old tests for commercial release and sued test-prep 
companies for copyright infringement. Ultimately these companies staged public battles with 
test-prep providers over who genuinely had the American middle class’s best interests in mind. 
By framing their grievances as dissatisfied customers, student-consumers helped reinforce the 
broader marketplace aspects of standardized testing—and indeed, of higher education at large. 
 This dissertation concludes with a brief consideration of the political culture borne from 
No Child Left Behind and sustained through Common Core. The No Child Left Behind Act of 
2001 (NCLB) established a profound shift in the federal government’s relationship to education, 
one rooted in widespread standardized testing. Under the watchword of “accountability,” NCLB 
mandated schools show quantifiable improvement in students’ reading and mathematical abilities 
or face drastic consequences. Voucher programs and the threatening rhetoric of “school choice” 
compelled many public schools to overhaul their curricula and impose strict test preparation 
regimens. But what factors influenced the way American ultimately responded to these testing 
regimes?  What broader forces shaped the ways they framed their discontent?  And why does 
standardized testing seem to be more embedded that ever as an educational practice and a mass 
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tool for staking social identity, even as a growing number of Americans find the practice 
detrimental to genuine learning or social success?  Ultimately, the fear of what could replace 
standardized testing—and the social and economic investment it would take to develop 
something more worthwhile—may be what will keep it a widespread educational practice. 		 	
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CHAPTER ONE: MANPOWER FROM THE MASSES: 
 
STANDARDIZED TESTING, STATE LEGITIMACY, AND POSTWAR ORDER 
 
 As the Second World War revved the American economy into overdrive, many 
policymakers worried about postwar stability. War had relocated millions of men to defense 
positions, placed white women in the workforce at unprecedented levels, sparked a second wave 
of black internal migration, transformed manufacturers into materiel suppliers, and rerouted 
domestic spending patterns.45  Yet the war could not go on indefinitely, nor could the men and 
women aiding the war effort. Whether or not the Second World War genuinely wrested the 
United States out of the Great Depression, the end of war threatened a calamitous economic 
transition. The peacetime national economy had to accommodate millions of returning service 
personnel and displaced defense workers or risk fermenting social distress and deep political 
unrest. 
 Policymakers made manpower—and in effect, standardized testing of all sorts—central 
to postwar socioeconomic plans. Both during and after the war, manpower served as the unit of 																																																								
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measurement for military, business, and scientific needs. Manpower, as a national resource, 
could be harnessed and refined, ensuring the state used Americans effectively for broader 
geopolitical goals.46  The logic of manpower allowed policymakers to create measures—in 
particular, the GI Bill—that rewarded servicemen with social benefits without setting them apart 
as a privileged class of citizens. Manpower instead placed all members of the war effort, soldier 
and civilian alike, as citizen-workers, whose labor was a both a civic duty and an abstract 
quantity serving various state needs. By prioritizing manpower, policymakers could endorse 
postwar plans that expanded the scale of the state’s educational responsibilities without changing 
its fundamental federal shape. Standardized testing, battle-tested during the world war, provided 
the state the tools to continue quickly sorting millions of Americans by their abilities, aptitudes, 
and interests, all in an effort to extract the greatest possible manpower for postwar projects. 
 Through wartime military entrance testing, the American state solidified its use of 
standardization as a method for social order. Although standardization had been a feature of the 
American economy and society since the mid-19th century, the state adopted standardization in 
the 20th century as a way to regulate social attitudes, behaviors, and practices. This governmental 
approach to standardization typically took judicial, legislative, and regulatory forms. The 
General Classification Test (GCT) allowed the armed forces—and by extension, the American 
state—to incorporate standardization as a matter of protocol. Millions of men experienced the 																																																								
 46 I use the term “national resource” here and throughout the chapter, not only in reference to the National 
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GCT as part of the routine for military induction—and, in turn, saw their lives in the armed 
forces shaped in their performance on this exam. The high stakes the GCT carried, then, 
established a social precedent that standardized testing was a serious practice that merited 
genuine effort. The personal consequences for not taking this standardized test seriously were too 
steep not to comply.47 
 Wartime standardized testing also set a foundation for the postwar expansion of guidance 
counseling, which led Americans to use testing data as a means for constructing their sense of 
self and relationship to society. Federal postwar planning emphasized the role higher education 
had to play in sustaining American vitality—and through the GI Bill, the state facilitated the 
veterans’ postsecondary training. The state’s reliance on advanced training enabled a massive 
expansion of American higher education during the immediate postwar period. Colleges and 
universities needed personnel who could not only help veterans adjust to their new role as 
students, but help these veteran-students select a path of study that would, at once, satisfy their 
interests, tap into their intellectual strengths, fulfill the state’s geopolitical needs, and not drain 
school resources. Standardized testing—here in the form of guidance inventories and personality 
assessments—allowed guidance counselors to efficiently determine the path of best fit for their 																																																								
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charges. This type of diagnostic standardized testing produced a self-reflexive process by which 
people made sense of sense of their intellect, talents, and personality in uniform categorical 
fashions. For such testing to be successful in the postwar period, test developers and 
administrators developed methods for communicating about testing in ways that allowed 
individuals to personalize and personify certain psychometric principles. 
Harnessing Manpower: Resource Planning, Vocational Guidance, and Wartime Education  
 Well before officially entering conflict, the Roosevelt Administration began sketching its 
ideal postwar condition. The vision that emerged among policymakers acknowledged the United 
States’ irreversible role influencing international affairs, but refused to accept historic precedent 
for peacetime economic busts. Were the federal government to shy away from direct 
involvement in the postwar economy, as it did immediately after the First World War, a deep, 
sharp recession seemed inevitable. Private enterprise, left to its own devices, could not maintain 
wartime-level demand in peacetime conditions. Yet, for the sake of democracy and capitalism, a 
peacetime government could not control specific facets of the economy the way a wartime 
government could. To combat potential economic calamity, the Roosevelt Administration used 
the idea of manpower to mobilize American business, labor, military, and education in line with 
both its wartime demands and postwar visions.  
 In late 1940, President Roosevelt assigned the National Resources Planning Board 
(NRPB) the hefty task for harnessing manpower: consider “all constructive plans for significant 
public and private action in the post-defense period […using] the natural and human resources of 
the Nation.”48 The key for postwar vitality, NRPB determined, was government-sustained 
demand. As NRPB forecasted, war would create full employment and unprecedented gross 																																																								
 48 National Resources Planning Board, After Defense—What? (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government 
Printing Office, 1942), 9. 
 40 
national product. By shifting massive governmental investment into public works projects, 
industrial partnerships and security programs, the American state could ensure peacetime private 
enterprise had incentive to absorb the estimated 20 million Americans left unemployed by 
demobilization—all while cushioning the American economy from periodic boom-bust cycles. 
In this vision, the federal government would not engage in central economic planning. Instead, 
the NRPB would serve as a coordinating agency that ensured public and private entities 
cooperated in the shared goal of sustained American postwar vitality. In its post-defense plans, 
NRPB established cooperation and coordination as actions that would protect federal, 
democratic, capitalist traditions against socialist and totalitarian threats.49 
 The Roosevelt Administration enabled these plans by shifting American economic policy 
toward personnel management tactics that treated human effort as a national resource. As the 
United States began mobilizing for conflict, Roosevelt increasingly embraced Keynesian 
economic theory, which advocated large-scale public investment and deficit spending to 
maintain national economic stability. Keynesian theory cast the state as a manager whose 
involvement served as a multiplier for economic growth. Keynesian formulas treated national 
income as a dependent variable through which policymakers could gauge the effectiveness of 
certain economic policies.50  By extension, embracing Keynesian methods required the state to 																																																								
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treat human labor as a quantifiable unit—manpower—that could be measured and centrally 
managed. If national income was the way to measure sound economic policy, Keynesian 
approaches to manpower became the means to ensure national income remained high, both in the 
short and long term. Personnel management shifted the priority in labor away from the rights of 
workers and toward the needs of managers, whether the workplace was a shop floor or the U.S. 
Armed Forces.51 
 As a national and natural resource, manpower did not limit itself to a certain type of 
American. Every worker, whatever their vocation, possessed manpower. Manpower had some 
internal limits, namely a person’s intellectual and physical capabilities. But the state could 
encourage measures that ensured individuals refined their manpower through training and 
received employment in areas that made the most of their capabilities. Using Keynesian logic, 
large-scale public investment in manpower cultivation would not only help protect the national 
economy from future economic instability—it would also give the state multiplied benefits when 
it reinvested refined manpower into public works projects. What mattered to the state, by 
extension, were the ways Americans could strengthen their manpower through training. Higher 
education, vocational institutions, and the military all provided convenient venues for boosting 
manpower. Distinctions between wartime educational, labor, and military needs, then, resided in 
the methods the state could employ for harnessing and distributing manpower.52 																																																																																																																																																																																		
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 The Roosevelt Administration created federal means for managing manpower, thus 
addressing military and economic demands through the same unit of measurement. By executive 
order, President Roosevelt established the War Manpower Committee in April 1942 in order to 
coordinate “the recruitment, vocational training, and placement of workers to meet the needs of 
industry and agriculture.”53  Chaired by Federal Security Agency Administrator Paul V. McNutt, 
the War Manpower Commission also gauged shifting military and civil service manpower needs, 
and recommended policies to ensure the American labor force did not gravitate toward more 
alluring lines of work. The War Manpower Commission aimed to ensure government agencies 
and industries alike adhered to geographic and numerical hiring restrictions. Although limited in 
power by partisan pushback, the War Manpower Commission reinforced the idea that, as a 
matter of self-preservation, the state had the right to measure and manage human resources as it 
would natural resources.54  Good citizens—human or corporate—did not take jobs that ran 
against the state’s immediate needs, because such jobs robbed the state of manpower.   
 Some industries concerned with personnel management turned to standardized testing to 
maximize manpower. One such company, Wichita’s Coleman Lamp and Stove Company, 
employed the personnel guidance company Search-Service, Incorporated to develop a battery of 
standardized vocational tests to determine who among their workers would make worthwhile 
shop foremen. To do so, Search-Service first gathered managers’ composite ratings for current 																																																																																																																																																																																		
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foremen’s employee relations and budgetary efficiency. Search-Service then subjected these 
same foremen to a series of standardized vocational aptitude tests to determine which exams 
produced the clearest and most distinct relationships between test-takers’ responses and those 
two qualities. The psychologists Search-Service used these correlation coefficients to devise a 
master rating system—a T-score—that provided the Coleman Stove and Lamp Company a 
standardized, efficient way to select future leaders. Workers whose combined vocational 
guidance test results cleared a certain T-score threshold could be placed in “a ‘pool’ for future 
replacement and upgrading.”55  As mathematically complex as this setup was, companies that 
hired psychological consultants such as Search-Service believed the net result would be an 
efficiently-managed workforce: no manpower would be wasted training men with insufficient 
skills for leadership positions, nor would manpower be squandered holding workers with 
“natural” skills down in lower positions. Psychologists portrayed efficient corporate personnel 
management as a matter of national security, too. As search-Service representatives asserted, 
“the problem of selecting personnel for industry on the home front [was] second only to the 
efficient utilization of human resources in the armed forces.” 56   Victory hinged on the testing, 
training, and enriching, American manpower, for the shop floor as well as the battlefield.  
 During wartime, the federal government implemented programs that steered both workers 
and employers toward embracing the idea of harnessing manpower through education. In this 
approach, education was not postsecondary training, but job-specific instruction designed to 																																																								
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facilitate personnel management. Overseen by the War Manpower Commission, the Training 
Within Industry program reoriented labor toward viewing personnel management as a matter of 
resource refinement. To better refine the manpower needed for wartime industrial jobs—skilled 
manufacturing jobs that many millions of men had little prior experience given the previous 
decade of economic crisis—Training Within Industry packaged short job instruction training 
programs that shop foremen used to provide workers intensive supervised guidance. In time, 
Training Within Industry also developed and refined job relations training programs for foremen 
and supervisors. By instructing workers and supervisors how to interrogate the methods of 
production in a way that increased efficiency without inflaming workplace antagonisms, 
Training Within Industry reinforced the idea that manpower, as a unit of both liberal democracy 
and capitalism, depended upon subsuming personal needs to those of the state.57 
 The National Resources Planning Board likewise set education as a cornerstone of its 
“post-defense” plans for democratic and capitalist vitality.58  Asserting education of all types 
“would greatly assist the manpower readjustment process,” the NRPB sketched a dozen general 
provisions for postwar education in its 1943 plans for demobilization and readjustment.59  At the 
base level, education would serve as a general counterbalance for employment levels:  the fewer 
available jobs, the more the federal government would promote education as an opportunity to 																																																								
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refine manpower for skills useful to the postwar state. Men who returned from military service 
would be allowed to resume interrupted vocational training—and, once fully demobilized, 
industries would be encouraged to admit “an appropriate quota of ex-service men” for peacetime 
apprenticeships.60  Beyond vocational and secondary education, the NRPB also proposed 
coordination between the federal government and higher education institutions to devise plans 
that incorporated veterans more fully into American colleges and universities. In this vision, 
education was an important for demobilization, and the means by which military manpower 
could be reconverted to peacetime manpower in ways that created social good as well as 
generated profit.  
 As the National Resources Planning Board and War Manpower Commission tethered 
manpower to specific kinds of workplace training, the U.S. Office of Education (USOE) 
coordinated vocational training efforts among the nation’s disparate educational systems. Under 
the auspices of the Federal Security Agency (FSA), USOE oversaw a nationwide vocational 
development program for various industrial, mechanical, engineering, and managerial defense 
positions, training 1.75 million Americans between mid-1940 and Pearl Harbor.61  FSA 
Administrator Paul McNutt and USOE Commissioner John W. Studebaker insisted that the 
United States’ decentralized approach to educational oversight did not hinder vocational training 
efforts but instead allowed for a rapid rate of defensive vocational training. The officials 
portrayed shared federal, state, and local oversight on vocational education as the most 
democratic approach to defensive training—but this shared investment also created a complex 																																																								
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network of responsibilities. The chain of authority over defensive vocational education 
connected various departments and intersected several levels of governance: the president, a 
state-level bureaucrat, and a local school board member all had a share in the direction of 
vocation education. Plans to preserve democracy by cultivating manpower also had to defer to 
traditional decentralized divisions of educational governance.62 
 USOE created a wartime educational agenda that stressed manpower development over 
military drill in secondary schools. Maintaining that defense was not strictly a combat issue—nor 
was military preparedness simply a matter of marching exercises—the office urged secondary 
schools to pivot coursework toward equipping students with broad defensive readiness. Schools 
could develop “robust toughened bodies” by boosting inexpensive contact sports and exhausting 
activities.63  Beyond preparing future combat troops, schools could aid the war effort by helping 
students develop technical skills with uses beyond the battlefield: youth with auto maintenance 
experience or radio repair skills would be valuable national resources both during and after the 
war. The Office proposed that even courses with no direct connection to defense—such as 
English and social studies—could be reoriented toward developing communication and 
contextual skills vital for a fully equipped citizenry. As USOE policymakers insisted, these 
courses were “military training in as real a sense as is military drill.”64  By focusing on defense 
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rather than specific combat need, USOE made clear all youth could contribute to the war effort, 
so long as schools fully developed all aspects of their manpower. 
 The federal government collaborated with colleges differently, carving out overt military 
programs for post-secondary study. As USOE urged secondary schools to prepare students for 
well-rounded defense needs, the War Department rolled out Enlisted Reserve Corps programs 
for institutions of higher education. These programs, as well as their Air Force equivalents, 
sought to transform “a certain number of college students possessing superior qualification” into 
reservists prepared for sudden combat demands.65   Yet, the War Department was less interested 
in making sure intellectually capable men found their way to college and more interested in 
ensuring their college training happened speedily. If men’s status as reservists depended upon 
completing their college education—and, in turn, their ability to lead proven by having earned a 
degree—then the armed forces needed speedier ways for college-goers to earn their credentials. 
Simply getting a man into educational channels appropriate for his intellectual capacity would 
not do: he also had to be trained as quickly as possible. As the Army and Navy jointly stressed, 
“[t]he country can no longer afford to have young men proceed with their education at a 
moderato tempo.”66  Manpower was a time-sensitive resource, and educational institutions put 
the nation at risk if they refined it too slowly.  
 The Federal Security Agency also devised plans to improve American teachers’ 
manpower so they could better serve the state’s wartime needs. Although the American Armed 
Forces had developed the Engineering, Science, and Management Defense Training program 
(EMSDT) to equip young Americans with the skills needed for advanced air-based warfare, it 																																																								
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also realized too few teachers had substantial training in mathematics, physics, aviation, or 
physical education. With no projected end to war in sight, officials projected the strain on 
educators would only worsen. Hence, in late spring 1942, USOE Commissioner John Studebaker 
solicited college and university academic directors to indicate the amount of summer sessions 
their respective institutions planned to offer in crucial subject areas. As Studebaker stressed, 
summer study programs would not only equip college teachers with the scientific know-how, but 
also deepen the bench of who could prepare reservists and defense personnel. With adequate 
summer intensives, high school and retired teachers could also do their share.67  As the state 
made unprecedented manpower demands, it also had to devise new programs to ensure enough 
people could actually harness and refine young adults’ potential skills. 
 By the end of the United States’ first year of combat, officials in the Roosevelt 
Administration pursued two seemingly contradictory paths: lowering the draft age to the edge of 
adulthood, all while preparing for a postwar society in which youth delayed their independence. 
Although the Selective Service Act of 1940 required all men between 18 and 65 to register for 
the draft, men under the age of 20 were not conscripted when the United States first entered 
combat. By mid-1942, however, the War Department changed tack, and began publicly 
petitioning the president to lower the draft floor. Selective Service Director General Lewis 
Hershey argued that existing age restrictions could not keep pace with forecasted manpower 
demands: the army and navy needed millions more young men unencumbered by spouses or 
families. The Selective Service had already deferred millions of available men from the draft 																																																								
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because they had dependents—and men under 20 who voluntarily enlisted in the armed forces 
neither made up for that shortage nor consistently offered “A-1”-level capabilities. Following 
some congressional debate, including a failed Senate amendment requiring teenage draftees to 
spend a year in military training before facing overseas combat, President Roosevelt signed draft 
revisions into effect in November, 1942. Over two million men suddenly became eligible for 
conscription. Buoyed by public support, the federal government emphasized that the most 
valuable manpower came from young American men unburdened by any other obligations 
except those to the state.68    
 Before the draft age officially dropped, however, policymakers and educational experts 
began formalizing practices that ensured youth would have more fully-developed manpower 
whether they stopped schooling after high school or continued onto college. As one War 
Department official explained in a fall, 1942 letter to USOE Commissioner John Studebaker, the 
armed forces needed more men with “preliminary preparation of a fundamental scientific and 
technical character,” who could more easily acclimate to specific combat positions.69   Given 
these manpower needs, the department enacted a Pre-Induction Training Section within the 																																																								
 68 Between exclusive coverage and Associated Press wire services, the New York Times provides a 
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Manpower Branch of its Services of Supply Civilian Personnel Division. Yet, consistent with its 
earlier dismissal of demands for military drill in high schools, the War Department stressed that 
pre-induction training programs would not take a narrow focus. For high schools with fewer than 
300 pupils—by far the greatest proportion of institutions at the time—the Pre-Induction Training 
Section recommended offering courses in physics and mathematics, shop, physical fitness, and 
“pre-flight aeronautics,” and encouraged larger high schools to provide classes in radio, 
typewriting, anatomy, and first aid.70   Because defensive needs would change as the war 
continued, the US Armed Forced needed men and women who could be pressed into a variety of 
tasks. The war effort also required participation beyond combat, and universities designed 
programs of study to ensure women as well as men deemed unfit for service also met wartime 
agricultural, educational, scientific, and industrial demands. Some, such as the Ohio State 
University, offered a variety of study tracks—from accounting clerk, to cartography, to farm 
management—that could be completed within two years.71   Wartime educational policy ensured 
that American youth had enriched their manpower in ways applicable to shifting defensive 
needs. 
 Yet educators also took the early war period to speculate about the future of youth. While 
considering postwar education, the Washington-based Educational Policies Commission 
forecasted postwar economic demands would encourage “expanded conceptions of youth” that 
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would keep many youth in educational institutions and public agencies through the age of 20.72  
The commission also predicted the end of general and vocational educational tracks. Following 
the trends of wartime educational demands, postwar students would be expected to develop a 
wide array of practical and scientific skills that could be applied to numerous peacetime 
challenges. By drawing 18- and 19-year olds into combat, the American state may have also 
created conditions that encouraged prolonged transitions into adulthood in postwar society. If the 
concept of manpower bound educational, military, and workplace trajectories—and if the state 
favored the cultivation of manpower for its wartime needs over simply gathering bodies for 
combat—then postwar planners may have envisioned a social structure where the transition to 
adulthood was marked by thorough cultivation of an individual’s own manpower. Before it could 
fully figure out what to do with men in postwar society, however, the American state had to first 
figure out how to sort men already poised for military service.  
Measuring the Masses: The General Classification Test and Preparatory Guides 
 The concept of manpower made it easier for the American state to unify its wartime 
needs, but the military had particular time constraints that required a quicker way to sort men by 
their potential capabilities. Men and women who took accelerated college programs or on-the-
job vocational training had time to develop their manpower before giving it to the American 
defense effort. The tradeoff in these cases was straightforward: development now for services 
rendered later—and, theoretically, for well-paying jobs afterward that could serve the postwar 
state. The Army and Navy, by contrast, needed to locate men for particular roles without 																																																								
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extending the time it took to create soldiers and sailors. The military needed a snapshot of 
servicemen’s existing manpower capabilities before training even began.  
 The solution ultimately embraced by the state—mass standardized testing as part of the 
induction process—would find widespread postwar use outside of the military, and helped 
legitimize the field of psychology to many who encountered military entrance exams. War 
brought psychologists and their objective tests an unprecedented audience: over ten million men 
encountered the Army General Classification Test (AGCT).73  Through its widespread use of 
general classification tests, the armed forces instilled a high social value in standardized testing. 
AGCT test scores were meaningful because they carried such high stakes. Not only did 
psychologists assert that the test indicated a recruit’s overall aptitude, but AGCT scores also set 
the foundation for servicemen’s military careers, influencing the potential positions men could 
earn and the perils they might face. The AGCT exam set a precedent for American social value 
in standardized testing as a mechanism that could profoundly alter an individual’s life course—
and as such, ushered in a wave of commercial preparatory material. These preparatory materials 
reinforced the state’s manpower needs: men who understood the AGCT could provide a better 
sense of their manpower capabilities and would thus be of better to the nation, in war and 
beyond. Using the AGCT to link recruits’ aptitude to military order and the preservation of 
democracy, military psychologists set rhetorical connections between individuals’ mental skills, 
institutional efficiency, and the needs of the American state which endured well beyond war’s 
end.  
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 In order to create a military entrance exam, the U.S. War Department had to forge 
bureaucratic space for psychological personnel well before the United States’ formal entry into 
World War II. By spring 1940, the department made several organizational adjustments to ensure 
a psychological system for classifying recruits and inductees would be in place before any 
massive military escalation—in particular, creating a Personnel Testing Section within the 
department’s Adjutant General’s Office the year prior. (The division would later be called the 
Personnel Research Section.)  The department also tapped into existing scientific institutions 
created during the First World War, requesting that the National Research Council form a 
Committee on Classification of Military Personnel. To counterbalance this bureaucratic 
hodgepodge, the war department appointed Walter Bingham as both head of the new National 
Research Council committee and Chief Psychologist of the Army. Under Bingham’s watch, the 
Personnel Testing Section and the Committee on Classification of Military Personnel had leeway 
to plan various standardized objective tests.74  This leeway, however, came with the tradeoff of 
psychology having a disjointed space within the state. 
 Once assembled, the psychologists under Bingham’s supervision had to create a test for 
incoming recruits that measured complex thinking skills without unfairly rewarding educational 
advantages.75  An entrance exam that relied too heavily on specific subjects would only reflect 																																																								
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the coursework a soldier had taken, neglecting more fundamental verbal and mathematical 
reasoning skills—the difference, for example, between questions about geometry properties and 
questions about spatial reasoning. Yet psychologists also couldn’t make test questions too 
abstract. An exam that didn’t “appeal to the average officer and soldier as sensible” would also 
elicit inaccurate results.76  Researchers spent the spring and summer of 1940 creating thousands 
of questions and designing experimental versions of the test, cutting out overly verbal items and 
revising the test form to expand its range of difficulty. By August, Army psychologists 
completed version 1A of the Army General Classification Test. In its final form, the AGCT was 
a 40-minute, 150-question exam that alternated between clusters of multiple-choice vocabulary, 
arithmetic, and block-counting questions, becoming more difficult the further test-takers 
advanced.77  Although researchers would create several other versions of the AGCT during the 
war, each test form sought to strike a balance between measuring how quickly recruits could 
answer general knowledge questions and how deep their verbal and quantitative aptitudes ran.78 
 In order for the AGCT to have any meaningful use for the army, however, psychologists 
actually had to standardize the exam. Test standardization is a multi-step process, and its 
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fundamentals illustrate how the AGCT would set a profound precedent for widespread American 
social constructs of normalness, intelligence, and national worth: 
 . Standardized tests measure individual performances in relation to a larger group. After 
taking a standardized test, a person’s performance is translated to a raw score, and that raw score 
is then compared to other test-takers’ performances. This comparative performance is typically 
represented as a percentile—e.g., “So-and-so performed better on this exam than 73% of test-
takers.”  Finally, this percentage is translated to a scaled score. Scaled scores—almost always the 
number that people refer to when discussing standardized test scores—represent the raw score’s 
location on a statistical model. This model is typically a normal distribution. In a normal 
distribution, about two-thirds of all values are within one standard deviation from the mean, 95% 
fall within two standard deviations, and virtually all values fall within 3 standard deviations.79 
This normal distribution is set to an arbitrary score range—for the AGCT, practically all scores 
fell between 40 and 160, with a median score of 100—and divided into evenly spaced 
increments. Because standardized tests are often given multiple times over many years, these 
score scales are often based on a representative sample originally gathered during a test’s 
experimental phases. Although these master scales are often adjusted and recalibrated, especially 
if a test becomes very popular or if the original sample group no longer reflects the current group 
of test-takers, they remain the backbone for how test-takers understand their performance and 
how institutions assess test-takers’ worth. The statistics behind the final score ultimately mean 
that it usually takes far more effort for a person to raise their score from slightly below-average 
to slightly above-average than it would to raise their score from above-average to well above-
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average. Whether a speed or power test, standardized assessments groups a wide range of 
performances under the idea of “average”—and in turn, standardized test scores become 
shorthand for social usefulness.80 
 While standardizing the AGCT, army psychologists had to reduce the friction between 
the state’s needs and the exam’s limitations. Namely, researchers had to standardize an exam 
designed for armed force recruits when no such population existed. Researchers developed the 
earliest version of the AGCT months in advance of the Selective Service Act of 1940, which 
mandated all male citizens and resident aliens between the ages of 21 and 36 to register for the 
draft.81  Lacking an available pool of draftees, the test’s designers essentially invented a sample 
population, administering the AGCT to over 4000 men already serving in the Army and Civilian 
Conservation Core.82  Using these results, army psychologists built a score scale using a 5-grade 
system: the higher the scaled score a test-taker received, the higher their classification. Yet army 
officials remained unsatisfied with the number of recruits who received the AGCT’s lowest 
possible classification—causing the test’s designers to make its lowest grade much narrower and 
the next-lowest grade much wider. Readjusting the boundary between Grade IV and Grade V 
classification may not have made hundreds of thousands of incoming recruits any more or less 
capable for duties in the armed forces—but it reduced the stigma these men would have faced 
during their service, opened opportunities that would have otherwise been closed, and allowed 																																																								
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the armed forces a new rationale for their use. By inventing a representative sample where none 
existed, psychologists gave the armed forces the ability to quickly compare millions of men 
against an imagined average—and with a couple basic adjustments, established the boundaries 
for which men were more of less useful for the state. 
 Psychologists for the Adjutant General’s Office made repeated efforts to show the AGCT 
was a valid examination, revealing in the process the complicated logic needed to demonstrate 
standardized tests’ effectiveness.83  Some studies focused on the relationship between test-takers’ 
scores and their civilian occupations. Researchers concluded that the greater degree of training a 
man needed for his job, the higher his AGCT score. Accountants, chemists, personnel clerks, and 
engineering students typically earned far higher scores than miners, farmers, and lumberjacks. 
Yet, these results only validated the AGCT by suggestion: surely the test measured men’s 
intellectual capacities accurately, because the men who scored highest typically had highly 
skilled, training-intensive occupations.84   
 Researchers also studied AGCT results to see if the test helped or hurt the military’s 
policies on illiteracy. Widespread illiteracy complicated American wartime manpower needs. 
Illiteracy was not proof in itself of a man’s mental faculties—but the military could not afford to 
refine all illiterate draftees’ manpower when time and money could instead be spent on men with 
basic reading skills. Yet the state also could not turn away too many illiterate men, especially as 																																																								
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the American war effort continued to escalate: combat required bodies. 85   This dilemma created 
wildly shifting recruitment policies for illiterate men during the war, and placed pressure on 
army psychologists to determine the actual benefit of special training units geared toward 
streamlining illiterate recruits into the general draftee population after intensive reading training. 
Analyzing the test-taking patterns of illiterate recruits in special training units, researchers at Fort 
Leavenworth, Kansas discovered a pattern: many boosted their AGCT scores by focusing on test 
question with little written content. In particular, such recruits gravitated toward block-counting 
questions, which made test-takers determine how many blocks a three-dimensional form would 
contain based off of a two-dimensional representation. By favoring text-less questions, many 
men reached the Grade IV AGCT classification needed to graduate from their special training 
units and enter general basic training.86  These findings revealed a tension between standardized 
testing and manpower needs. Men who gamed the AGCT by avoiding verbal question may have 
cost the state specific types of skills—but by excelling at block-counting questions, they 
demonstrated other kinds of aptitude that could have been harnessed to benefit wartime needs. 
Standardized tests revealed recruits’ capabilities whether or not men took them as intended. 
 Army psychologists also analyzed the relationship between AGCT scores and race, 
repudiating certain racist logic in order to build legitimacy for their own field. Decades after the 
United States employed psychologists to design entrance exams for the First World War, 
differences between blacks’ and native-born whites’ scores on Army Alpha and Beta Tests 
continued to fuel racialized theories of intelligence. The AGCT’s designers sought to avoid racial 																																																								
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differences in test scores becoming additional evidence for prevailing arguments about “native 
capacity.”87  As one 1942 Army report stressed, black and white recruits’ AGCT scores were not 
fully comparable because no existing samples could account “[for] economic, social, and cultural 
factors [and] with respect to educational opportunities and background.”88  No adequately sized 
sample for similarly equipped men existed. Even college-educated black men—who scored 
similarly to white recruits with some high school education—lacked economic resources and 
social safeguards enjoyed by white inductees. Yet the Army’s repudiation of racist intelligence 
theories was, above all, an aim to distance itself from inappropriate uses of statistical data. The 
report’s emphasis on incomparable subgroups—namely, the implausible conditions under which 
white and black recruits’ AGCT scores could be soundly judged against each other—was 
primarily a lesson in statistical logic. Psychologists, working on a project of unprecedented scale, 
wanted to ensure their newly-gained legitimacy was not just as quickly lost, particularly as they 
aimed to pave over the enduring cultural memory of the Army Alpha and Beta Tests. Their 
concern was less about social inequities themselves (the armed forces, after all, remained 
segregated throughout the war) and more about the misuse of statistical psychological data to 
maintain racialized theories of difference.  
 Psychologists’ difficulty attributing meaning to score differences may have also been 
complicated by imbalanced access to AGCT preparatory material. Although the armed forces 
maintained secure testing conditions at its induction centers, recruits with even a little financial 
leeway could acclimate to the Army and Navy entrance exams by purchasing a guidebook. 
Guidebooks not only prepared men for the general classification tests, but also enforced the 																																																								
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notion that testing was central to efficient personnel management. Recruits may not have known 
every occupation the army and navy needed to fill, but guidebooks offered the promise that, with 
some practice, men could find a role among thousands of job classifications that made the most 
of their education, skills, and potential.89  These guidebooks used the idea of aptitude to connect 
personal responsibility to military victory. As one guidebook published by Arco asserted, “the 
most pronounced aptitude may be 2 ½ and [sic] 3 times as strong as the least pronounced” within 
any particular individual—and recruits needed to spend time determining what was the best they 
had to offer the state.90  Guidebook publishers thus justified their products as a service rather than 
a strictly commercial item by providing the means for potential recruits to make the best display 
of their manpower capabilities on military entrance exams.  
 To encourage sales, guidebook authors repeatedly stressed to readers that the AGCT was 
not an intelligence test. Intelligence tests, these authors noted, measured relatively fixed mental 
capacities, and if an individual’s general native intelligence could not change, then there would 
be no need to purchase a guidebook to improve one’s AGCT score. Guidebook authors also had 
to delicately balance the relationship between AGCT scores and education. Prep guide writers 
routinely emphasized that training for the AGCT should not be confused for formal education—
but, to remain enticing to readers, guidebooks also emphasized that military entrance exams 
assessed a wide range of aptitudes, most of which could be strengthened with diligent short-term 
training. Some prep books, such as one printed by Pergande, used anecdotal data to suggest that 
the most educated men did not always do best on the AGCT: 																																																								
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"In a Milwaukee examination for the air corps, a young man who 
had completed only the eighth grade made a rating of 120 points. 
For this test 80 was the passing grade and three hours were 
allowed. On average 50% of those who applied here failed to pass. 
In one group four out of five college students failed. The highest 
score ever made in Milwaukee was 142 and the lowest 23.”91 
 
Without confirming whether the man with an eighth-grade education or the highest-scoring 
Milwaukee recruit had ever used a prep guide, Pergande severed the relationship between 
schooling and test scores. The state needed men of many different talents—including those 
ignored by schools. 
 The surefooted, precise way prep guides familiarized their audiences with the military 
induction process contrasted sharply with their motley assortment of AGCT practice material. 
Prep guides walked readers through the initial steps of the induction process. These guides 
familiarized potential recruits with soldier qualification cards, stressing that men should prepare 
for the biographical information required on the 8 ½ -by-11 cardstock form. One guide went so 
far as to tell readers the types of clothing recruits would receive upon induction.92 But specific 
AGCT material was often harder to come by. Some guides, such as one printed by Arco, 
bombarded students with nearly thirty pages of vocabulary practice, asserting that “[i]t may be 
stated on sound, psychometric authority that the vocabulary test is one of the most important 
single means of testing intelligence”93—without ever indicating whether the words printed in the 
prep guide would ever appear on the AGCT. Mathematics practice often took the form of 
elementary arithmetic and algebraic review. Readers were assured that the inductions tests 
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“measure ability and intelligence with a very high degree of accuracy”94. One company even 
included additional testing material that had little to do with preparing recruits for the AGCT, 
such as general intelligence tests for civil service licensures; within a span of three questions, 
test-takers were asked what the definition for “versatile,” Bizet’s most famous work, and the 
primary use for a trombone.95  In the absence of reliable information about actual AGCT 
questions, prep guides replaced quantity for quality.  
 Neither the gravity of war nor imprecise preparatory material stopped some publishers 
from reminding readers they were, in fact, businesses with other goods for sale. Pergande 
encouraged men with lackluster vocabularies to purchase its vocabulary and spelling guidebook, 
“which contain[ed] 4000 specifically selected words” suitable for review.96  Arco reminded 
readers that the AGCT was likely not the only standardized test they would face in their 
lifetime—“After the War—You’ll Want a Good Position!”—and listed the printing and pricing 
information for dozens of other licensing exam prep guides. 97  Publishers also built off of their 
wartime prep guide consumer base when the United States maintained a peacetime draft. Some 
postwar guides, such as one written by former chief of the Adjutant General Office’s Manpower 
Analysis Section Reuben Horchow, aimed to capitalize on the author’s wartime experience and 
expertise. Horchow’s guide, How to Get Ahead in the Armed Forces, posed military service as a 
near-certainty—and whether a man enlisted or received a draft notice, he had plenty of 
opportunities to make the most of his required service. Horchow stressed that a soldier’s test 
records existed far beyond the superiors with whom he had direct contact: a man’s 																																																								
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“Qualifications Record (tests and all) stands for you and furnishes the chief basis on which 
action is taken [or] selection is made.”98  By this logic, purchasing and using a prep guide was 
the only way for a soldier to ensure that any official who came in contact with his permanent 
record would know his true potential. 
 By the time Horchow’s guide was published in the early 1950s, the link between 
standardized test scores, military efficiency, and the state’s needs had already been set, even as 
the armed forced transitioned from the GCT to the Armed Forces Qualification Tests (AFQT). 
Incoming soldiers who resisted their role in this system by intentionally botching their 
standardized entrance exam faced grave consequences. Horchow asserted that the “personnel 
people at induction stations have a pretty good idea about who should pass the test, and they also 
have ways of finding out is a man is ‘faking.’”99  Even a nervous man who unintentionally 
thwarted a reliable measurement of his aptitudes could undermine his entire military career; 
personnel who selected soldiers for promotions and advanced training preferred candidates with 
consistent score records to men with “tests that are ‘out of line’ with each other.’”100  Horchow’s 
warnings were not just vague threats; psychologists had conducted several studies to see if 
“malingering” men displayed any generalizable test-taking patterns.101  Regardless of whether 
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Horchow’s words of caution had any truth behind them, such prep guides reinforced the notion 
that the only thing worse than a man with little aptitude to give the state is a man unwilling to 
give their skills to the state. This sentiment would be sustained by the federally backed push to 
readjust veterans to the state’s postwar educational and occupational demands. 
Postwar Readjustment: The GI Bill, Guidance Counseling, and Personality Inventories   
 Well before World War II ended, American policymakers began developing legislative 
measures that would ensure returning soldiers readjusted to peacetime society, all while 
continuing to contribute their manpower to the postwar state. However, the main congressional 
provision for veteran readjustment—the GI Bill—revealed the limits to which the federal 
government could use education as a means for postwar social planning. For veteran 
readjustment to truly succeed, educational and corporate institutions also had to embrace 
psychological developments in guidance counseling and personality inventories. This burgeoning 
psychological field added new dimensions to standardized assessments, and further encouraged 
Americans see themselves as measurable categorical types. Through standardized guidance 
inventories, veterans and civilians alike facilitated postwar manpower planning by internalizing 
the ways various institutions made sense of student bodies and labor pools.  
 Many policymakers realized midway through the war that hodgepodge federal provisions 
for returning servicemen would provide insufficient support, but momentum for comprehensive 
veteran benefits ultimately came from outside efforts. The National Resource Planning Board 
had drafted initial plans for veterans’ postwar reintegration, but politicized disdain for the NRPB 
and Rooseveltian governance in general had weakened the board’s ability to push forward 
policy. (Congress made the issue moot by eliminating the board’s funding in 1943.)  The 
American Legion, a relatively conservative veterans organization, ultimately did what the NRPB 
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could not: draft legislation and organize a massive public relations campaign to ensure Congress 
would address the issue of veterans’ readjustment in a timely manner. The Legion drew upon 
existing state-level provisions for veterans to craft legislation for an expansive set of 
entitlements, including unemployment benefits, home and farm loan benefits, and educational 
aid. For the Legion, an all-encompassing package seemed more likely to withstand congressional 
bandying than the existing piecemeal bills languishing in Congress. Boosted by sympathetic 
press coverage from publishing magnate William Randolph Hearst’s network of newspapers—as 
well as the evocative title “The GI Bill of Rights”—the ambitious legislation made its way to the 
78th Congress carrying popular support, particularly for having been developed by former 
military men rather than government bureaucrats.102  
 As much clout as the GI Bill of Rights carried when it entered Congress, the legislation 
faced several key detractors who opposed the way the bill would recalibrate the relationship 
between the government, citizens, and soldiers. As the legislation worked through the Senate 
Finance Committee in early 1944, lawmakers gathered testimony from leaders of several rival 
veterans’ interest organizations, who believed that expansive federal benefits for all veterans 
would harm disabled veterans already underserved by the government. Several state school 
board chancellors also offered the subcommittee their concerns that broad federal provisions 
would create bureaucratic duplication that undermined the traditional subfederal control of 
education. Even the bill’s chief sponsor, Mississippi Senator John Rankin, turned against the 
legislation after realizing the wide array of benefits available to returning soldiers could disrupt 
the white supremacist system that kept black citizens at the bottom of the socioeconomic order 
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bereft of political power. These detractors all expressed a concern that the postwar order would 
weaken the very power networks kept the existing social structure afloat.103  
 Despite its many discontents, the GI Bill became law on June 22, 1944, retaining the 
delicate balance of power between federal and state governments while striking a new 
relationship between education and citizenship. Title II of Public Law 346 granted veterans, 
whatever their physical condition upon discharge, numerous educational opportunities. The bill 
defined educational or training institutions to include: 
 “all public or private elementary, secondary, and other schools 
furnishing education for adults, business schools and colleges, 
scientific and technical institutions, colleges, vocational schools, 
junior colleges, teachers colleges, normal schools, professional 
schools, universities, and other educational institutions, [and] 
business or other establishments providing apprenticeship or other 
training on the job”104  
 
By staking such an expansive concept of education, the GI Bill ensured that veteran education 
remained valuable insofar as it enabled former servicemen to expand their manpower capabilities 
in ways that best suited both the individual and the state. The law entitled soldiers with at least 
ninety days’ service and “discharged or released […] under conditions other than dishonorable” 
to at least one year of education, with up to four years available depending on a veteran’s length 
of service.105  The GI Bill allowed veterans to continue their education at any institution 
“whether or not located in the State in which he resides,” but insisted that the federal government 																																																								
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would not “exercise any supervision or control, whatsoever, over any State educational agency, 
or State apprenticeship agency.”106 By placing education alongside home loans and 
unemployment payments that veterans could—but by no means were required—to take, Public 
Law 346 kept federal expansion in check by deferring to existing bodies of governance and using 
the language of choice.  
 Not all veterans benefitted equally from the new educational provisions. The men who 
gained the most were those who already did well on the general classification tests: younger 
white men who had completed their schooling. This cohort was considerably more likely to 
complete high school and at least some college than nonveterans in the decade following their 
service. Black veterans, by contrast, were largely written out of the GI Bill’s educational 
benefits—and by extension, out of the promises of the postwar state. By deferring educational 
appropriations to the states, Congress ensured the GI bill wouldn’t disrupt traditional racist 
educational power structures. Although black veterans in the north had limited positive 
educational experiences, southern black veterans were offered little. Lackluster administrations 
for southern black vets—many of whom were disqualified from the GI Bill’s generous 
unemployment provisions for refusing to accept white VA officer’s job placement offers for 
menial labor—encouraged many to relocate to northern urban areas. While the GI Bill may not 
have explicitly excluded benefits to veterans on grounds of race, the execution of the bill’s 
provisions ensured that black veterans would not be able to use their benefits to upend America’s 
racial social order, nor that the bill’s benefits would contradict existing race-based policies in 
education, housing, or employment.107 
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 As part of its educational benefits, the GI Bill also authorized the Veterans’ Affairs 
Administrator to “arrange for educational and vocational guidance to persons eligible for 
education and training.”108  Such guidance would not only include informing veterans about “the 
need for general education,” but also encouraging returning servicemen to pursue job-specific 
training “in the various crafts, trades, and professions.”109  Though slight, this provision 
established the idea that guidance was a necessary component of readjustment. Veterans, left to 
their own devices, may not make occupational or educational choices that would maximize what 
manpower they had to offer the state. Guidance offered a conduit between individual vocational 
needs and state manpower demands.  
 To accommodate the postwar wave of veteran-students, universities created guidance 
programs that both situated servicemen to college life and adjusted their institutions to postwar 
demands. Through new guidance policies and procedures, higher education institutions sought to 																																																																																																																																																																																		
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and those written out of it?  
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comply with federal mandates without diluting their existing prestige. The University of 
Wisconsin system steered veteran-students toward guidance services; in the absence of recent 
educational measurements, a battery of guidance test could more accurately capture a veteran’s 
set of aptitudes and abilities. Universities such as Princeton felt a responsibility to their graduates 
as well as potential freshmen, pledging to help alumni with job guidance. Psychologists, like 
veterans, also had to readjust, and City College of New York launched a four-week program to 
acclimate psychologists to the guidance needs of veteran-students. Although over sixty percent 
of those who served in the Army and Navy during the Second World War had not completed 
high school, the number of veterans who did have a high school education could have placed 
unbearable strain on American colleges and universities had institutions not made adjustments to 
most of them used GI Bill benefits to pursue higher education 110 
 Worried about the maintenance of their own internal standards, some universities 
conducted internal studies to determine whether veteran-students maintained the same academic 
rigor as their civilian counterparts. In the absence of standards, the University of Michigan 
worried “government assistance might induce a good many veterans to try college work,” using 
resources at the expense of otherwise qualified civilians.111  Without any previous bases for 
comparison, Michigan turned to measurements they could control and measure: grade point 
averages. Yet researchers at the university could not discern a consistent, let alone statistically 
significant, difference between the grade of veterans and non-veterans. (A noticeably positive 
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difference in grade point averages existed for veterans who returned to school after leaving for 
combat.)  When confronted with a new legal basis for educational access—one that did not allow 
for much prediction—colleges and universities turned to internal standards to ensure their own 
educational prestige remained undiluted. 
 Psychologists also used wartime conditions and postwar planning to lay the foundation 
for guidance counseling. Guidance, as understood by experts, involved adjusting an individual’s 
personal appraisal and aspirations to fit with broader social needs through objective 
measurements—in other words, getting people to make sound life plans after some self-
reflection and a few standardized tests.112  Guidance counseling, by extension, helped individuals 
personalize broader social norms and values. Schools had long been institutions for cultural 
alignment—replicating hierarchies and mores found outside the classroom—but wartime defense 
planning introduced a new dimension to social adjustment. War had turned labor into manpower, 
and postwar economic stability depended in part upon Americans’ ability to view their efforts 
and ambitions through this abstract sense of work. Vocational guidance experts, in turn, devised 
mechanisms that would personalize postwar planning, particularly for those Americans most 
crucial for sustained successful economic adjustment: returning soldiers, college students, and 
adolescents. Although vocational counseling and personality inventories existed before the 
Second World War, defense planning ushered in an approach to guidance counseling that 
married the language of self-discovery and theory behind standardized objective testing with the 
logic of manpower.  
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 Before vocational guidance experts could steer Americans into postwar jobs, they first 
had to convince the public well in advance that there would be a worthwhile economy to 
participate in after the war. This burden of proof was especially high for enlisted men, whose 
defense jobs were largely redundant once war ended. One pamphlet, printed in 1943 by the 
nonprofit Public Affairs Committee, assured soldiers the federal government would not shrug off 
its obligations as it had after the last war with “a $60 bonus and a ticket home.”113  Temporary 
unemployment—on the government’s dime as a paid furlough—would be the best way to ensure 
that the transition to a peacetime economy would occur in a graduated manner. As experts 
suggested, if the federal government could be trusted to reposition millions of Americans into 
wartime defense positions, it could be trusted with ensuring postwar economic success.  
 Clear as their message may have been, there simply weren’t enough vocational guidance 
experts during or after the war to provide direct counseling to Americans in non-combat 
positions. As much as psychologists asserted the public good of their field by publicizing their 
wartime efforts, they were still a relatively small group—many of whom directly involved in the 
war effort. Most vocational counselors, particularly those working outside of a military 
environment, also lacked professional training. In 1944, the War Manpower Commission 
estimated that the United States had only 6,000 vocational counselors, nearly half of whom “only 
partially trained in the professional sense.”114  Comparatively few high school guidance 
counselors worked in the Southeast, Pacific Northwest, or New England—and those schools with 
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guidance systems often assigned hundreds of students per counselor.115  While dozens of 
colleges and universities scrambled to develop vocational guidance training programs, the 
federal government leaned on existing community pillars to steer youth into making sound 
workforce decisions. Even if the government could curb some vocational pathways, as it did by 
ending voluntary military enlistment midway through the Second World War, community 
institutions had to shoulder primary responsibility for how well youth grappled with their 
choices. As the war drew a growing number of employable minors into the workplace, the 
federal government needed to address a growing dilemma: how to provide guidance to millions 
of teenagers and young adults without having widely-dispersed trained personnel.116  
 Psychologists tried to solve this problem by encouraging readers to understand 
themselves in standardized terms through self-appraisal and self-assessment. Guidebooks 
provided tests, charts, and questionnaires to help readers understand their own skills and 
aptitudes categorically. As authors often stressed, most people could succeed in several 
vocations—but individuals had a personal responsibility to determine what objective criteria 
those jobs held in common, as well as what capabilities made them a better fit for certain lines of 
work. Some guides used the language of accounting to help readers standardize their sense of 
self, advising youth to create a “Personal Balance Sheet,” in which job seekers soberly assessed 
their physical, mental, sartorial, vocational, and psychological “assets” and “liabilities.”117  Other 																																																								
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guides standardized the dimensions of personality, asking veterans to assess their level of 
friendliness, initiative, dependability, and “pep and enthusiasm” on a five-point scale.118  
Vocational guides that avoided tests still encouraged readers to categorize themselves in broad 
occupational archetypes: mechanically-inclined people should stay away from jobs best suited 
for those inherently gifted at communications and sales.119  By familiarizing readers to self-
assessment, guidance experts sought to convince Americans that vocational planning was “a 
process, not an event,” and that process began with understanding one’s strengths and limits in 
standardized ways.120 
 Through vocational guidebooks, student readers learned they held primary responsibility 
in maintaining postwar economic health. Adolescents who failed to develop skills and habits 
would lack the mental dexterity needed to make informed choices about how they entered the 
workforce. In this framework, people possessed different levels of intelligence—and while 
environmental factors could enhance skills, good training and a supportive environment would 
do little to help an individual who was naturally poor at a skill. As these guides suggested, 
accepting natural variations in aptitude, whether in reference to general intelligence or broad skill 
sets, was the necessary first step in lining individuals with jobs that best suited their 
predispositions. To this end, these guidebooks suggested that adulthood came when a person 
faced the choice of how to develop and expend their manpower. As one wartime vocational 
guide suggested, “freedom from fear” was not only one of the Atlantic Charter’s core tenets, but 
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a learned response to the uncertain. Those who neglected to overcome their fears through well-
reasoned conditioning risked a future of uncertainty—not only for themselves, but also the 
nation.121  Regardless the future job market’s strength, young Americans had a civic—and 
moral—responsibility to understand how they could best serve the postwar economy.  
 Realizing adolescents often weren’t their own best guidance counselors, psychologists 
and school boards also developed materials that allowed teachers to guide students through the 
process of test-based personality assessment. For the psychologists who designed personality 
inventories, vocational aptitude test results became meaningless when educators neglected to 
learn fundamental test mechanics. Many assessments had complex scoring systems—such as the 
Strong Vocational Interest, which allowed for over 40,000 possible weighted responses in 36 
career fields. Educators risked wasting their students’ potential manpower with sloppy, 
halfhearted calculations.122  Some school boards, meanwhile, went beyond single assessments 
and developed semester-long courses in vocational guidance. Developed in 1941, the School 
Board of Chicago’s Self-Appraisal and Careers course devoted several weeks toward honing 
students’ understanding of psychological tests, statistical concepts, and test interpretation. By 
helping students assess test data without feeling “that some mysterious finality is inherent in a 
result because it is expressed numerically,” teachers could help youth understand their role in the 
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post-defense order by attuning to think of their capabilities as improvable abstract qualities.123  
Becoming a even-keeled adult not only meant finding a career, then, but using psychological 
tests to understand how one would fit in best in a rapidly changing world.  
 Some researchers devoted their time to developing standardized examinations for 
personality types that were not only easily internalized, but would in time prove highly 
profitable. During the war, Katharine Briggs and her daughter Isabel Briggs Myers constructed 
the earliest form of the Myers-Briggs Type Indicator, namely as an alternative method for 
measuring potential workplace strengths for women who lacked job experience. Inspired by 
Jungian archetypical models, Briggs and Myers argued that personalities could be categorized 
along four oppositional spectrums. The two researchers theorized that individuals favored either 
extraverted or introverted behavior, sensing versus intuitive perception, thinking versus feeling 
judgment, and general judgment versus perception. Briggs and Myers devised a forced-choice 
questionnaire that compelled test-takers to indicate their preferences along these spectrums. The 
duo categorized results into sixteen distinct personality types, stressing that none was inherently 
better than the other. Introverted, sensitive, thinking, judging individuals were as useful to the 
workforce as extraverted, intuitive, feeling, perceptive people—so long as they knew their 
personality dynamics and had an awareness of which jobs suited what personality types best. 
This archetypical approach to workplace personalities would become far more popular decades 
as corporations and organizations purchased the Myers-Briggs Type Indicator from Educational 
Testing Service (and later Consulting Psychological Press) beginning in the 1960s.124 																																																								
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Nonetheless, its widespread use and familiarity by the end of the twentieth century illustrates the 
culmination of what emerged during and immediately after World War II: the corporate embrace 
of vocational guidance testing as a way to make the American labor force personalize and absorb 
the responsibility of workplace adjustment.  
 As professionalized guidance counseling and vocational assessments became more 
widespread practices, psychologists attuned Americans to a worldview in which it was their civic 
responsibility to find a job that fulfilled the nation’s manpower needs. Self-assessments 
ingrained in Americans new patterns for relating to the workplace: quantifying your personality 
type made it easier to figure out the line of work that would best serve you and your workplace. 
A poorly adjusted workforce could not provide the state robust manpower, even if jobs were 
fully available. Human resources, then, not only involved extracting and refining manpower, but 
also guiding individuals toward educational and vocational choices that would create the highest 
quality manpower for the state. Participatory democracy meant embracing a system in which 
citizens determined their capacity as workers for the good of the state. Standardized guidance 
tests, vocational batteries, and personality assessments allowed psychologists to continue 
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justifying the importance of their methods in the postwar order while adjusting millions of 
Americans to their upcoming responsibilities. 
 
  
 78 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER TWO: AMERICAN TALENT SHOW: 
STANDARIDZED TESTING AND THE COLD WAR SCRAMBLE FOR BRAINPOWER 
 
As the Cold War developed, American lawmakers and educationists obsessed over the 
development of brainpower. If the United States did not harness and refine this national resource, 
experts warned, the country would squander its ability to maintain geopolitical supremacy. The 
nation needed a way to determine which youth had the greatest potential, guide them toward 
rigorous high school coursework, and encourage them to pursue science and engineering tracks 
in college—all while ensuring youth who weren’t naturally gifted were also steered toward paths 
that fulfilled the nation’s needs and fostered personal satisfaction. There was, however, one 
catch. Despite the fear the United States would slide behind the Soviet Union in scientific and 
technological innovation (and despite the burgeoning administrative state), the federal 
government remained reluctant to overextend its role in the shape of American education, a 
system historically built on decentralized authority and populated by non-state administrative 
actors.125  Together, these various nodes of oversight created a complex postwar educational 																																																								
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administrative network and political culture: American education had numerous governors, often 
at cross-purposes and with intersecting zones of control. If the federal government no longer had 
vested authority or reason to massively test tens of millions of citizens, as it had during the 
Second World War, and if massive swaths of white Americans actively resisted any federal 
interference in the form or pace of education, how could the state find and train the brains it so 
desperately needed?   
Standardized testing companies solved this dilemma by providing products for 
identifying brainpower that validated both traditional divisions of educational oversight and 
served the geopolitical needs of the Cold War administrative state. Although standardized testing 
companies existed earlier in the twentieth century, they were often small-scale affairs typically 
devoted to the intelligence and personality inventories. After the Second World War, 
psychologists, emboldened by their wartime contributions to the state, collaborated with 
educational leaders to consider how standardized assessments could continue to be useful to 
American society. Philanthropic organizations collaborated with psychologists and leaders of 
elite universities to form Educational Testing Service (ETS), the largest of several postwar 
standardized test manufacturers. A private not-for-profit enterprise, ETS could provide testing 
material to the armed forces without bloating federal bureaucracy—and federal contracts 																																																																																																																																																																																		
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provided ETS financial solvency and legitimacy beyond its initial philanthropic funding. As 
American higher education expanded, and as the federal government grew more concerned with 
the quality of American scientific expertise, psychometric standardized examinations became 
more valuable for national goals. Because school districts and colleges remained clients rather 
than legally mandated users, early postwar test manufacturers nationalized educational 
assessments and admissions policies while maintaining the spirit of voluntary association. In 
effect, ETS and other early postwar test companies standardized the type of information various 
state- and non-state actors wanted to know about young American citizens. By the time both 
sputniks entered the atmosphere, American education had already begun to transition toward a 
nationwide talent hunt, in which standardized tests helped determine which brains were most 
geopolitically useful—and which Americans held the greatest marketplace value.126  
Harnessing Brainpower: Educational Testing Service, the Korean War, and the SSCQT 
 
The United States enabled its Cold War pursuit of science and technology through a 
power-sharing arrangement of private and public funding. Prior to the Second World War, the 
largest funders for scientific research had been private philanthropic organizations—namely the 
Rockefeller Foundation. War compelled the American state, and in particular the military, to 
invest in scientific research in order to accelerate technological development. After the Second 
World War, the military and Rockefeller Foundation joined other federal, philanthropic, and 
academic organizations to jointly sustain funding for scientific endeavors. This shared custody of 
scientific and technological funding—neither fully separate from nor entirely bound to the 
state—meant that the American scientific Cold War effort took on several seemingly-
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contradictory characteristics: a commitment to applied research while continuing to fund science 
for its own sake; visions of a global democratic future while producing tools for an American 
hegemonic agenda; and researchers who debated the ethics of their creations while agency heads 
committed to destructive anticommunist agendas. To satisfy the numerous interests of their 
federal, business, philanthropic, academic, and military funders, postwar scientists (especially 
postwar social scientists) wedded knowledge work to the promotion of industry and democracy, 
all while glossing over the difference between experimental approaches to knowledge and the 
notion of objective truth. The truth, in this approach, was clearly demonstrable—and what was 
true would also be good for democracy because it was also good for business. Not beholden to a 
single source or type of funding, American Cold War science glossed over any tensions between 
the promotion of democracy and a belief in free market values.127  
Scientists, business leaders, educational experts, and policymakers all cultivated the idea 
of brainpower, gradually building a case for how the United States could best use its human 
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resources to secure geopolitical advantage.128  Early postwar definitions of brainpower 
established it as a national resource—the innate “ability of the human brain to process raw facts 
and impressions into creative thought,” as the educationist J. W. Brouillette put it—that could be 
refined and used in the workforce for the benefit of both state and society.129  As industrial 
leaders inserted themselves into discussions of postwar power sharing, however, brainpower also 
became defined in terms of profit. Speakers at the 1947 National Electronics Conference, for 
example, made the case that public funding alone for scientific research would never lead the 
United States to greatness: only free market incentives could spur the best brains into action.130  
A decade later, participants at the same conference would frame the national brainpower pool as 
more than human output alone, but “the eventual vastly grater part contributed by synthetic 
intelligence devices and systems.”131  Industrial scientists, meanwhile, expanded the idea of 
brainpower throughout the early Cold War to include not only the trained brains that made 
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machines, but also the trained machines that freed up time and energy for trained brains. 
Brainpower, as a national security resource, came to be portrayed as a profitable creative force 
with technological byproducts that could exist independent of human action.  
Bureaucrats within the Office of Education shared the belief that, if monitored carefully, 
education could play a key role in preserving postwar democracy. In an address to the National 
Council for the Social Studies, Office of Education Commissioner John Studebaker asserted that 
education served as a “trustee for posterity,” helping “preserve, protect, develop, and transmit to 
each succeeding generation the glorious heritage of freedom and democracy that is ours as a 
people.”132  Communism, as democracy’s polar opposite, threatened to undermine American 
stability and prosperity. The key to democratic vitality, as Studebaker maintained, was through 
education system that, among other benefits, gave youth “a true appreciation […] of their 
glorious American heritage of freedom wrung from the bitter struggle of centuries” and “an 
understanding and appreciation of the ethical and spiritual values, as well as the material 
benefits, of the American Way of Life.”133  Tapping into progressive educational sentiment from 
the early twentieth century, Studebaker declared that revitalized civics education would “inspire 
[youth] with the resolve and with the zeal to do their full part in helping to improve the working 
of democracy”134  
Yet some within the Office of Education also worried that the very hallmark of 
democratic American education—local control—could also be its greatest threat. 
Superintendents often ran school districts with little mind for democratic process, and 																																																								
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researchers within the office worried that students who encounter autocratic governance in 
schools would favor autocratic rule as adults. Dismayed that decentralized education could 
generate citizens unable to “withstand any form or type of insidious foreign ideology,” the office 
created a report in 1949 outlining seven principles that defined democratically run school 
districts.135  These principles reinforced a functionalist view of society: A democratic society 
depended upon school districts in which roles for every member, from the superintendent to 
teachers to the community to grade school students, were clearly delineated and each member 
used their role to promote democratic principles. To ensure readers understood the importance of 
democratic process, the report included a checklist that school officials could self-administer to 
determine if their district lay prone to autocratic rule. Because the Office of Education could not 
directly enforce administrative procedure—and such centralized dictates would be in themselves 
anti-democratic—the subdepartment could only provide behavioral guidance for school boards 
and superintendents that would ideally reverberate in the classroom. 
Because the federal government lacked the capability or authority to identify brainpower 
by itself, it had to rely heavily on external standardized testing research and development. The 
state found its greatest supplier in Educational Testing Service (ETS), which would soon design 
a wide array of standardized tests for the government, military, higher education institutions, 
secondary schools, and occupational licensing boards, among others. ETS spawned from the 
merger of three key testing and educational organizations—by the American Council on 
Education, the College Entrance Examination Board and the Carnegie Foundation for the 
Advancement of Teaching—and was granted an absolute charter by the New York State Board 
of Regents in December 1947. ETS was not an educational institution in itself, but the Board of 																																																								
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Regents had the ability to grant such charters to not-for-profit corporations.136  Although the 
corporation held its main office in midtown Manhattan, ETS also quickly opened offices in 
Princeton, New Jersey, and Berkeley, California, establishing a cross-country presence even in 
its infancy. More than any other testing organization, ETS provided the federal government and 
defense industries the testing tools required to harness Cold War brainpower, making 
standardized testing much more than a pedagogical practice: it was a Cold War ideological 
tactic. ETS, in turn, operated less like a nonprofit and more like a state quasi-apparatus. 
ETS absorbed a complicated network of new responsibilities from its parent companies. 
While the American Council on Education relinquished control over its Cooperative Test 
Service, National Teacher Examination, and American Council Psychological Examination, the 
Carnegie Foundation gave ETS oversight of the Graduate Record Office. The College Entrance 
Examination Board, meanwhile, made ETS responsible for all of its testing services.137  (ETS 
devoted a great deal of its early time and materials to the tests it inherited from the College 
Entrance Examination Board; by 1950, 75,000 students sat for at least one College Board 
exam.138)  Bolstered by a $750,000 grant from the Carnegie Corporation of New York, these 
parent companies also provided financial backing for the newborn corporation.139  Although ETS 
took over testing research and development from its parent organizations, they still held 																																																								
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considerable sway over the new organization’s early leadership and mission. The chairmen of 
each parent organization not only served as ex oficio members of ETS’s twelve-member Board 
of trustees, but also appointed the remaining nine board members. Each parent organization also 
mandated that ETS not encroach upon their non-testing activities, such as the College Board’s 
mandate to set higher education policy guidelines.140  Beyond improving certain functions of 
existing testing organizations, ETS would have to develop its own distinct mission to the postwar 
state. 
Through its earliest annual reports to its board of trustees, Educational Testing Service 
developed the rhetoric it would use to describe its mission to the both the public and the state. In 
the corporation’s first report, published in 1949, ETS President Henry Chauncey stressed how 
misguided the general American public was about the costs of test manufacture. Although early 
developers had historically provided psychological tests for nominal costs, the days of small-
scale test-craft were over. Americans, by Chauncey’s judgment, were shortsighted in their view 
of modern testing, assuming that test developers could still eat the costs of development and 
operations while providing an increasing number of services. Charging more for tests was not 
only a matter of recouping expenses for the extensive time and effort put into test development, 
but also a reflection of necessary expenses in postwar society.141  The company may not have 
been publicly traded, “but ETS, though non-profit, is not eleemosynary. Tests cannot be 
provided at a nominal cost. Fair and reasonable prices must be charged.”142  This proclamation, 
stentorian and graceless, would define the relationship between ETS and the postwar public: 
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because ETS defined test users as the organizations who collaborated with the corporation and 
purchased its tests, its primary role was in increasing institutional efficiency. ETS served the 
public to the extent that it provided services to organizations in instances where the state could 
not (or lacked the means) to step in. Their primary responsibility was thus to the American state 
and not its public.  
By the following annual report, Chauncey seemed even more surefooted about his 
nonprofit’s sense of mission. Likening the preceding year to a naval “’shakedown cruise,’” 
Chauncey asserted that ETS had weathered the turmoil of consolidation and was geared to 
engage in long-range planning—most notably, creating “an articulated series of test batteries,” 
standardizing a useful system of scores and norms, and developing new types of aptitude and 
personality tests.143  The nonprofit’s ambitions, the president declared, were crucial for American 
vitality. To retain its strength, the United States had to “devise ways of utilizing the nation’s 
human resources skillfully and with a minimum of wastage.”144  For this effort, Educational 
Testing Service sought to develop a “census of human abilities.”145  Such a census would serve 
as “an inventory of the characteristics required for the performance of important tasks,” and 
“bring to light the aptitude areas in which our talent shortages are most critical and would 
provide a basis for realistic planning on a nationwide scale, in peace or war.”146  By building off 
of preexisting test batteries, Educational Testing Service could thus harness American 
brainpower into the most effective pathways, regardless of geopolitical climate. This census of 
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abilities—much like other national censuses—was not an instrument for Americans to 
understand themselves, but for the American state to extract resources.  
Sensing the frightening potential implications for a census of human abilities, Chauncey 
softened this imagery by discussing the ideal uses for standardized testing. Chauncey assured 
readers that standardized tests should not be “considered the end-all and be-all” for any course, 
and that teachers should “not feel under compulsion to adapt their courses to the content of the 
test.”147  Indeed, Chauncey asserted that “by providing teachers with folios of test items,” ETS 
could provide teachers the choice (or at least, the semblance of choice) in testing material while 
ensuring students would be assessed on a breadth of skills.148  Finding “the field of testing […] 
exceedingly broad and the opportunities for ETS almost limitless,” Chauncey posed ETS’s 
mission in urgent, optimistic, terms.149  Giving ETS the widest possible mandate—asserting “it is 
appropriate for ETS to use its facilities in any situation where tests and related techniques can be 
of assistance”—Chauncey staked the nonprofit’s mission as both educational and 
governmental.150  This mission held faith that testing could “aid in the guidance of students and 
in their self-understanding.”151  Students were not given tests in order to foster self-actualization, 
but instead, to demonstrate their worth to the state: testing broadly and frequently, could help 
channel youth into educational tracks, from elementary to post-secondary testing. 
Educational Testing Service asserted its mission included measuring abstract skills useful 
for both the classroom and the workplace, and by its second year, the organization began 																																																								
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developing a battery of guidance tests for high school and college students that blurred the lines 
between measuring academic and non-academic qualities. Building off existing standardized 
tests, ETS aimed to create a battery for gauging “permanent aptitude and achievement factors,” 
including typical examinations for “verbal, quantitative, spatial, mechanical, visualization, and 
induction reasoning skills,” as well as tests for carefulness, “perceptual speed, finger dexterity, 
eye-hand coordination, numerical computation, fluency of expression, [and] speed of 
judgment.”152  ETS supplemented this quest for an omnibus guidance battery with plans to 
design individual tests for aspiration, overstatement, and persistence. For these single-topic 
exams, ETS detached concepts from strictly educational parameters, instead defining aspiration 
as “the way an individual adjusts his goals following success and failure on various tasks,” and 
persistence as the “tendency to continue a task despite monotony, fatigue, or discouragement.”153  
As with the guidance battery, these exams focused less on students’ self-actualization than with 
assessing their readiness for the labor market—for determining how well a young adult would 
function within a workplace.  
The Korean War heightened the relationship between federal defense objectives and 
higher education institutions—and also confirmed ETS’s function as a broker for essential state 
needs. Weeks after the war began, U.S. Commissioner of Education Earl J. McGrath sent letters 
to higher education administrative officers, assuring them that, while the National Security 
Resources Board had no set plans at the moment, advisory committees had already been 
assembled to consider “the part education is to play in the present emergency.”154  By early 																																																								
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August, Selective Service System Director Lewis Hershey drafted working guidelines for student 
draft deferrals: men with at least sophomore standing who had planned to enroll for subsequent 
coursework in a timely fashion, and whose “scholastic standing placed him among the upper half 
of his class” qualified to have their enlistment in the armed forces postponed.155  But the 
parameters for collegiate draft deferment, disseminated to higher education administrators in the 
Defense Information Bulletin, continued to change throughout the early part of war, as the state 
continued to recalculate which human resources were too vital to the American brainpower 
needs to send into conflict.156  By September, 1950, the Selective Service expanded educational 
deferment quotas to include “male optometry, premedical, preosteopathic, preveterinary, 
preoptometry and predental students.”157  McGrath stressed such deferments were “an effort to 
carry out the desire of the Congress to provide the fullest possible utilization of the Nation’s 
technological, scientific, and other critical manpower resources.”158  Men in college—
particularly those on scientific fields of study—were a privileged class, as their trained skills 
turned them into a valuable human resource necessary for American Cold War military efforts. 
Standardized tests were central to how the state sought to preserve brainpower through 
draft deferments. Psychologists argued that the Army General Classification Tests (AGCT), 																																																																																																																																																																																		
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which had been designed to sort millions of men by intellectual capabilities during the Second 
World War, could be used a template for determining which segments of the population would 
be most useful to the nation as trained brains. As researchers maintained, those with the most 
socially valuable careers—and presumably the greatest amount of brainpower—tended to score 
in the uppermost level on the AGCT. Why not, then, administer a similar scholastic aptitude 
exam to collegiate men to determine who should have their military induction postponed?159  
This line of reasoning gained official state support after President Truman issued an executive 
order in late March, 1951 authorizing the Director of Selective Service “to prescribe such 
qualification test or tests as he may deem necessary” to ensure that a “registrant's activity in 
study may be considered to be necessary to the maintenance of the national health, safety, or 
interest.”160  Citing insufficient manpower reserves in comparison to Soviet capabilities, the 
Selective Service believed it had to make the most of “our superiority in scientific and technical 
know how” by using the “approximately 1,000,000 male, nonveteran students in colleges at 
present” in the most efficient manner.161    
The Selective Service entrusted Educational Testing Service with creating a flexible 
sorting device that would maximize both military manpower and American brainpower. The 
Selective Service asserted ETS was a trustworthy gatekeeper because it was a “nonprofit, 
nonstick organization […which gave] more than 1,100,000 tests during a typical year,” many to 
governmental agencies—in other words, it was already too big and too entwined in the workings 																																																								
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of the state to avoid.162  On April 2, 1951, the Selective Service System announced ETS’s test for 
determining which college men would receive deferments: the Selective Service College 
Qualification Test (SSCQT). Rather than thin out college enrollments, ETS created the SSCQT 
under the premise that most college men would possess a level of scholastic aptitude consistent 
with average scores for college men on earlier standardized tests.163  By standardizing the 
SSCQT for a general population, most draft-eligible college men would conceivably clear the 
minimum threshold for academic deferment. What would fluctuate, then, was not the quality of 
men in college but the degree to which the American state needed to trade off brainpower 
development for military manpower demands. Although the considerable majority of collegiate 
men were already ineligible for the draft—having served in the Second World War, disqualified 
by their 4F qualification, or already bound to service through their enrollment in the Reserve 
Officers’ Training Corps—the SSCQT standardized the level of brainpower the state deemed 
worthy for postponing military service.164  Responding to criticism that this deferment system 
undemocratically privileged a select few, U.S. Commissioner of Education Earl J. McGrath 
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insisted the fairest treatment involved using “the services of each man at his own highest level of 
competence.”165  By administering an exam with a threshold that could be raised or lowered 
depending on military demands, the armed forces devised a method for the state to manage 
brainpower as it did other vital national resources.  
ETS familiarized college students and administrators with the logic of the SSCQT by 
releasing an explanatory bulletin in advance of the first series of test dates. The bulletin 
instructed men who hoped to qualify for deferment to detach and send a postcard application 
(postage not included) to Princeton, New Jersey, complete with Selective Service Number and 
preferred examination locations. ETS would then sent applicants an admission ticket, for which 
men would sit for one of three test tests in May or June, 1951. ETS assured hopefuls that the 
SSCQT examined their “ability to read with understanding and to solve new problems by using 
[their] general knowledge,” foundational skills that were “necessary for success in fields which 
require advanced training.”166  Because the company designed the SSCQT to measure scholastic 
aptitude rather than any specific field of college-level learning, sample questions focused on the 
ability to make inferences, draw comparisons, and summarize data. Because the textual content 
in SSCQT questions was arbitrary to the actual skills tested, test candidates would find little 
success mining reading passages and charts for later recall; the Armed Forces did not care 
whether a man knew about ancient philosophers or earthquakes, but they did care whether he 
could make sense of a short passage or grammar question involving some random topic. This 
type of official preparatory material had to fulfill two seemingly contradictory roles: reduce 
anxiety by assuring test-takers the exam measured overall thinking skills while, at the same time, 																																																								
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suggesting that there was no way to cram for such a test. Such an approach to SSCQT test 
familiarization, in which the test’s designers gave potential test-takers just enough practice for a 
test one could not specifically practice for, would become the standard approach for test 
designers over the following several decades. 
The armed forces tempered their use of the SSCQT as the means for determining draft 
deferments by also considering class rank. Collegiate men who tested poorly on the SSCQT but 
ranked high enough in their class could qualify for a deferment. How well a man needed to rank 
or test depended on his year in college. Because military officials presumed that graduate school 
required considerably higher scholastic aptitude than undergraduate training, graduating college 
seniors had to produce the highest SSCQT minimums for deferment. Freshmen, meanwhile, 
needed better class standings for deferments, as most men who successfully completed their first 
year of college tended to complete their degree: a deferment in this case would ensure a man had 
a chance to develop and hone his brainpower uninterrupted. But since the correlation between 
men’s class rankings and their SSCQT scores were not exact—many displayed higher scholastic 
aptitude than their grades suggested, and others performed stronger in school that their test 
scores predicted—this dual provision allowed far more draft-eligible collegiate men to qualify 
for deferments. Except for the East South Central United States, at least 60 percent of draft-
eligible men qualified for deferments either by their class standing or SSCQT score; for men 
majoring in engineering, physical sciences, mathematics, or biological sciences, the deferment 
qualification rate was greater than 70 percent.167  Using class rank alongside SSCQT scores gave 
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the armed forces greater latitude in preserving brainpower without discrediting the traditional 
and more straightforward method of assessing academic achievement. 
By providing a uniform measure for determining merit, the SSCQT helped the American 
state reorient the relationship between education and civic duty. Because the number of men 
suitable for military service was always much smaller than the millions of men legally required 
to register for the draft, the armed forces had to reconsider the grounds upon which a man could 
legitimately seek deferment. The underlying logic of educational deferments—that a man’s 
education belonged to the nation before it belonged to him—made it easier for the state to back 
away from paternity deferments, which placed a man’s family duties before his civic 
responsibility. By allowing higher education deferments, the military could guarantee men with 
demonstrable brainpower would not be squandered on the battlefield, all while avoiding 
responsibility for the factors that prevented many black men and white southern men from 
attaining such deferments. Advocates of educational deferments conceded that, of course, the 
SSCQT or any other scholastic aptitude test would fail to detect all of the nation’s best 
brainpower: American society had already shuttered many young men’s educational 
opportunities.168  The solution to this broader brainpower problem, psychologists and 
psychometrists maintained, was to design and administer many more tests. 																																																																																																																																																																																		
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Test Early, Test Often: Guidance Counseling, Gifted Youth, and Scholarship Contests 
Standardized testing gained traction at a moment when certain types of smartness came 
under suspicion. Although intellectualism had long existed in friction with mainstream white 
American society—which often extolled genius and ingenuity while maintaining an anti-elitist 
political culture and evangelical popular culture—Cold War politics added additional rationale 
for distrusting trained experts. Academics became objects of suspicion, and critics used the 
image of the egghead as shorthand for intellectual fecklessness: too smart for his own good, too 
caught up fussy theoretical details to see reality as it was, too fragile to get the work done 
himself. In the fervid torrent of McCarthyist anticommunist rhetoric, expertise became linked to 
femininity, homosexuality, blackness—and, above all, disloyalty. Brainpower, left unbridled, 
could be used to disastrous ends. Standardized test developers insisted that their products could 
be used to steer youth toward meaningful and productive lives in service to state and society. In 
effect, standardized tests could create loyal experts. The trick, these developers maintained, was 
ensuring school systems employed a robust testing program, so that guidance counselors 
received steady objective information about their charges. By testing early and often, school 
systems could cultivate a great deal of brainpower with enough built-in surveillance to allay the 
fear talented students would turn into eggheads.169.  
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Educationists encouraged guidance counselors to treat standardized testing as part of a 
holistic approach for steering youth toward fulfilling careers and productive citizenship. Aiming 
to quickly professionalize the growing national pool of school counselors, specialists created 
guidebooks to counsel practitioners on testing methods. These books often advised guidance 
counselors to learn foundational statistical concepts, as well as actually take the tests they 
administered to students; without a working knowledge of aptitude tests or test design, 
counselors could misuse aptitude test results to disastrous ends. Some guides even provided 
readers case studies. One 1950 guide led readers through the extensive casework of two fictional 
counselors. Using a combination of standardized tests and psychological insight, Miss Brandon 
and Mr. Erlandson helped dozens of maladjusted young adults overcome their dysfunctions. 
Whether guiding Charles to consider switching his engineering major to a pre-law track, or 
referring Jane to a reading specialist to improve her poor grades, Miss Brandon and Mr. 
Erlandson always incorporated results from standardized aptitude tests and vocational batteries 
into their diagnoses. As such guidebooks suggested, standardized test batteries and 
assessments—whether the Strong Vocational Interest Blank, Minnesota Vocational Test for 
Clerical Workers, Bell Adjustment Inventory, Bennett Test of Mechanical Comprehension, or 
Ruder Preference Record—provided insights that student’s grades or stated aspirations could not. 
Through these guidebooks, specialists established the idea that millions of Chucks and Janes 
were far more likely to find success and happiness when guidance counselors tempered their 
professional opinions with the wisdom of test scores.170 																																																								
170 Shirley A Hamrin and Blanche B Paulson, Counseling Adolescents (Chicago: Science Research 
Associates, 1950, 15th printing 1965). See also: C. Gilbert Wrenn and Willis E. Dugan, Guidance Procedures in 
High School: Some Recommended Procedures Based Upon a Survey of Present Practices in Minnesota 
(Minneapolis: University of Minneapolis Press, 1950); Lester D. Crow and Alice Crow, An Introduction to 
Guidance: Principles and Practices (New York: American Book Company, 1951); Lester Nicholas Recktenwald, 
Guidance and Counseling with Psychometric Principles: A Basic Treatment (Washington, D.C.: Catholic University 
of America, 1953); Raymond N. Hatch and Paul L. Dressel, Guidance Service in the Secondary School (Dubuque: 
 98 
 Gifted students, who had the most potential brainpower to give to the state but were most 
prone to squander it, proved a particular obsession for guidance counselors, psychometric 
researchers, and standardized test designers. The College Entrance Examination Board (CEEB), 
one of the leading developers of academic standardized tests, collaborated with the National 
Science Foundation (NSF) in 1955 to analyze how the American education system could reduce 
the number of gifted and talented youth who avoided higher education. The resulting report, 
Encouraging Scientific Talent, distanced intelligence from intellectualism: smart youth did not 
have to grow up to become eggheads. Indeed, intellectual strength did not come at the cost of 
other abilities. CEEB noted uncommonly bright individuals—whether speaking about, in their 
terms, the categorically superior, intellectually gifted, or true geniuses—also typically possessed 
greater emotional poise and physical strength than their average-minded peers. But, the board 
warned, the talents of society’s most intelligent members also faded with age. Leaning on 
previous studies that examined when people in mentally-demanding careers made their greatest 
discoveries, CEEB suggested the American educational system kept scientifically-gifted 
individuals in school too long to contribute to society as much as they could have if left to 
progress through courses at their own pace. To CEEB, the gifted were precious social assets who 
“contribute[d] more than their share to the welfare of society”—but only if allowed to 
academically achieve.171  Whereas gifted youth with high levels of academic achievement 
became “industrious, patient, honest, and conscientious” adults, those who did not reach college 
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turned “autocratic, blustery, stubborn, and conceited.172”  For CEEB, the bigger danger was not a 
man with his nose in a book, but a legion of intelligent Americans soured by wasted potential.  
To illustrate how many intelligent youth remained unmotivated and underserved by the 
American educational system, CEEB built its findings on standardized models of intelligence. 
Asserting “high intelligence is one of the most important requisites for a scientific career,” 
CEEB employed several IQ models to calculate how few qualified Americans fulfilled their full 
intellectual potential.173  Using the most generous existing estimates for academic giftedness—an 
IQ of 125, with a model that estimated 6 percent of all young adults met or passed that 
threshold—CEEB determined that about 130,000 people born in any given year had the mental 
capability to attain a PhD. Yet just short of 9000 people had earned a doctorate in the 1953-1954 
academic year. Unless those with stakes in the state of education made efforts to understand why 
relatively few highly intelligent American youth achieved as much as they could, the United 
States would continue to squander scientific brainpower. 
To address these concerns, CEEB authorized a national standardized test and 
questionnaire to determine American high school students’ level of scientific aptitude and 
educational motivation. On behalf of CEEB, Educational Testing Service developed and 
disseminated the National Study of High School Students and Their Plane to over 32,000 
twelfth-grade students at nearly 500 American high schools in early 1955. The survey contained 
two parts: a fifteen-minute, twenty question aptitude test, followed by a thirty-minute 
questionnaire about college plans. The aptitude test contained statistically reliable math and 
verbal questions from earlier Educational Testing Service examinations—and how well a student 
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did on the first test determined whether Educational Testing Service would analyze the second. 
Out of the entire pool of survey respondents, Educational Testing Service focused on roughly 
9,700 who had answered at least twelve of the aptitude questions correctly, assessing these 
students’ college plans to see what factors currently discouraged them from higher education. 
For most high-scoring students, the cost of college remained a potential dissuading factor; over 
half of all seniors reported that school expenses could keep them from pursuing higher 
education. What the questionnaire also revealed, however, is that a great deal of high-performing 
students, particularly boys, could be swayed toward pursuing a degree in science or engineering 
if offered a scholarship. Based on this questionnaire, CEEB estimated that, among that year’s 
1,265,000 public high school seniors, somewhere between 55,000 and 90,000 highly intelligent 
youth would have attended college had scholarships been available.174   More damning was 
CEEB’s calculation that an additional 100,000 capable high school seniors “with similar ability 
lack the interest or motivation of college,” regardless of any potential award program.175  By 
pegging its nationwide survey to a standardized test, however brief, CEEB standardized not only 
the methods for diagnosing the cause of America’s brainpower shortage but also the prescribed 
cure.  
CEEB placed scholarships at the center of its final recommendations for boosting 
American scientific brainpower—and, in doing so, redoubled its case for more wide-scale 
standardized testing programs. For any national scholarship program to have any heft, CEEB 
stressed, it must first be supported by “more widespread early identification and encouragement 
of gifted students,” particularly if such monitoring would allow individuals to complete their 
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education at an accelerated clip.176  Although the board did not provide a specific timetable for 
tests, it noted that existing studies suggested aptitude and achievement tests could be successfully 
used to scout scientific talent as early as the eighth or ninth grade.177  When paired with a 
network of well-trained guidance counselors, standardized tests could ensure that the 
scientifically and mathematical inclined are guided toward challenging classes.  
Scholarships provided an ideal vehicle for promoting the complex joint partnership that 
emerged in the early Cold War hunt for brainpower. Scholarships represented the idea that an 
alliance between the public good and private interests was not just attainable, but ideal for 
American education. Any widespread scholarship program would require schools supported by 
federal and state funds, corporations willing to sponsor awards, and colleges and universities 
eager to have their talent search brokered. Above all, a widespread scholarship program would 
require all parties to accept the idea that the best minds could be scouted and sorted through a 
system of standardized tests—that the students who received scholarships had already been 
guided through their education by a series of standardized assessments and vetted for their award 
by a series of standardized tests.  
The entities that would run postwar standardized test-based scholarship programs thus 
had to represent the interests of all stakeholders—public and private, corporate and academic—
without fully belonging to any. The most notable example of these efforts, the National Merit 
Scholarship Corporation (NMSC), marked a shift in corporate educational philanthropy. By 
sponsoring scholarship programs, corporations could indirectly invest in higher education while 																																																								
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also promoting business interests. Scholarship competitions’ dependence on standardized tests 
allowed corporate philanthropists to skirt around core economic and racial factors plaguing the 
cultivation of American brainpower. These programs, in turn, influenced the meaning of 
democracy in discussions of postwar American higher education. Meritocratic language and 
logic—in which standardized test scores represented a student’s investment risk rather than 
reflected systemic shortcomings—helped reinforce the idea of educational attainment as an 
individual effort. Within the logic of corporate scholarship programs, some students may have 
needed a leg up to attend college, but their test scores proved they already had the brainpower 
required for success.  
Corporate scholarship programs did exist before the Cold War, including contests geared 
to promote collegiate scientific study among talented youth. These programs typically involved a 
single corporation having a direct role in the funding and selection of award recipients. One 
notable example, the Westinghouse Science Talent Search, was a large-scale production 
involving a giant corporation (Westinghouse Electric), its philanthropic wing (the Westinghouse 
Educational Foundation), and a nonprofit that carried out testing operations (Science Search). 
Westinghouse and Science Search launched the talent hunt in 1942, awarding scholarships to 40 
high school students who displayed uncommon ingenuity, innovation, and workmanship—
characteristics that could be made profitable through advanced scientific training. Before 
winning these scholarships, however, students first took a science aptitude test, conducted by 
Science Service and administered to participants through officially sanctioned extracurricular 
science clubs. This two and one-half hour aptitude test included questions on engineering, 
anatomy, biology, chemistry (“Which of the following is not a use of the mineral quartz?”), 
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science history, spatial visualization, and reading comprehension.178  Science Service encouraged 
students to work through sample test questions printed in its publication Science News-Letter, 
even including an address to request the most recent Science Talent Search exam. Because the 
aptitude test had been designed to never elicit a perfect score, even by actual scientists, the 
organization felt no risk letting high school students toying with sample questions. Through the 
Science Talent Search, which it continued to sponsor throughout and beyond the Cold War, 
Westinghouse set a template for corporate scholarship funding. By relying on third-party 
aptitude test designers, companies could promote the shared interests of business and science 
while keeping the upfront cost of promoting talented youth to a relative minimum.179  The public 
relations boon these annual searches generated for Westinghouse (and for advanced scientific 
training in general) greatly outweighed the cost of the actual scholarship, all while establishing 
standardized testing as a key method for quickly determining the very best in the talent pool. 
Large-scale scholarship programs truly took off, however, when third-party developers 
promised to coordinate talent hunts on behalf of multiple corporations for the general promotion 
of higher education. Created in September 1955, the National Merit Scholarship Corporation 
(NMSC) provided the means for corporations to centralize their educational philanthropy. 
NMSC emerged from the joint efforts of the Ford Foundation and Carnegie Corporation, which 
together contributed millions of dollars for scholarship funds and administrative costs. Upon its 
creation, NMSC immediately became “the largest independent scholarship program in the 
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history of American education.”180  NMSC’s initial Board of Directors reflected an aim to 
portray the interests of higher education as those of big business, with presidents of Dartmouth, 
NYU, and the University of Colorado sitting alongside those of Goldman Sash, Standard Oil, 
and Detroit Edison Company. To incentivize businesses participation, NMSC appropriated 8 of 
its initial $20.5 million in seed money toward corporate and individual donation-matching funds. 
Corporations who contributed to NMSC’s funds could retain naming rights for their scholarships 
while benefitting from an outsourced “professionally conducted national annual talent search.”181  
Sears, Roebuck & Company became an early corporate sponsor, offering over a half-million 
dollars for 100 Sears Foundation Merit Scholarships designed to cover a complete undergraduate 
education; Time, Inc. and other corporate entities soon followed suit.182  Some companies, such 
as the Stewart-Warner Corporation and General Foods Corporation, teamed with National Merit 
to provide scholarships for specific paths of study—mechanical and electrical engineering in the 
case of the former and physical sciences in the latter.183   
The two organizations that initially funded NMSC shared a belief that business could 
help solve the problems plaguing American education, particularly where state and society fell 
short. Despite venturing into education-related projects only at the beginning of the decade, the 
Ford Foundation found its sense of mission in what it perceived as inadequate federal 
educational support. The Foundation asserted the federal budget—which apportioned just 2.4% 
of the gross national product to education—was wholly inadequate, especially at a moment when 																																																								
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the number of children in American schools continued to grow with no projected end in sight. 
Even the most conservative demographic estimates indicated twice as many Americans would be 
enrolled in college between 1966 and 1971 than were enrolled in 1954—leaping from 2.5 to at 
least 5 million people—yet no long-term nationwide plans existed to expand the pool of 
American teachers and professors. Those who attended college would likely encounter 
professors whose wages, when adjusted for inflation, were lower in the mid-1950s than just 
before World War II.184  To the Ford Foundation, a decentralized educational system could not 
operate without some form of guardianship.  
To the Carnegie Corporation, far too many discussions about postwar education started 
from the misguided assumption that anyone who could go to college, should go to college. The 
organization maintained that this problem stemmed from a widespread superficial understanding 
of the relationship between intelligence and college readiness. College administrators and 
educational specialists had debated over the IQ needed for likely college success—108? 110? 
120?—without giving much attention to the actual logic of probability. A young woman with an 
IQ of 115 may have been in the upper fifth of intelligence among the general population, but her 
heightened capabilities did not necessarily guarantee that she would eagerly complete her 
studies, or know exactly what field she wanted to pursue, or even want to go to college in the 
first place. Likewise, a man with an IQ of 80 was far less likely than the average college-goer to 
complete his studies, but intelligence test scores alone did not account for the multiple traits 
needed to successfully earn a degree. In either case, focusing too much on the likelihood 
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someone with a certain IQ would complete college got in the way of actually “selecting those 
who can profit most from college.”185   
The Carnegie Corporation maintained that most criticism of contemporary education fell 
into a logical trap of confusing growing social expectations with genuine social good. Those who 
espoused equal educational opportunity often carried “the tendency arbitrarily to define college 
as a valuable experience”; insisting most people could use extended training, particularly 
vocational instruction, siphoned resources away from bright youth who would benefit from the 
type of liberal arts education that once served as the foundation of all higher ed.186  Unless 
experts and advocates carefully balanced the need to train more young adults with the need to 
provide a rich and challenging education, other social forces and stakeholders would strip 
American higher education of its greatest potential good. Without any examination of the issues 
colleges and educators faced, the United States risked “a lowering of intellectual standards, the 
smothering of individuality, and the assembly-line production of half-educated men and 
women.”187  As the corporation warned, a thoughtless approach to national higher education 
would create an  “enthronement of the ‘average’”—and only encourage democracy’s worst 
tendencies.188   
NMSC used standardized testing as its basis for scouting, assessing, and rewarding 
academic talent. To determine who would ultimately receive a National Merit scholarship, the 
corporation first proportionally allocated the number of scholarships available by state. The 																																																								
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corporation directed each participating school—over 10,000 in the competition’s first year—to 
allow the top 5 percent of its senior class to take a screening test. The corporation then used the 
results from this screening test to pare down the applicant pool to ten times the number of 
available scholarships. These remaining students were then invited to take the SAT. Based on 
semifinalists’ SAT scores, NMSC selected a pool of finalists—and after collecting their 
biographical information, school grades, and recommendations, the corporation decided who 
would receive an award.189  From the 58,000 students who participated in the initial talent hunt, 
NMSC chose nearly 5,100 semifinalists and granted 555 National Merit Scholarships.190  
NMSC’s approach to awarding scholarships normalized standardized testing by making it a 
participatory, incentive-driven activity that revealed more to colleges than academic and 
biographical information could alone.  
Although the corporation used test scores to determine who received scholarships, the 
actual amount of the scholarship depended on the perceived need of the student. Whereas some 
students received full coverage for four years of tuition and expenses, others received 
considerably smaller stipends. In either case, the corporation made payments to colleges and 
universities rather than to the students.191  By making the institution the point at where education 
was subsidized, the corporation also increased the incentive for universities to get on board with 
the program. Schools would not have to pay out of pocket to receive the best and the brightest, 
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thus encouraging them to participate in the program and, in time, actively spend resources on 
courting national merit finalists.  
While some early Cold War scholarship programs seemed to promote vastly different 
agendas than the National Merit program, many used standardized testing to reward students 
who, with college training, could boost American prowess while strengthening conservative 
social relations. Beginning in 1955, General Mills Foods administered the Betty Crocker 
Homemaker of Tomorrow Scholarship program, which aimed to “to focus national attention on 
the so-called ‘forgotten career’ of homemaking.”192  Like the National Merit program, the Betty 
Crocker Scholarship used a standardized test—in this case, a 50-minute, 150-question multiple-
choice exam—to determine winners at statewide and national levels. By providing young women 
the means to pursue college studies that would promote the science of homemaking, the Betty 
Crocker Scholarship pursued an objective similar to other corporate scholarship providers: 
harnessing brainpower to place men and women in positions that would ensure constant 
American progress with minimal social friction. Corporations used their scholarships to improve 
existing social structures—never to dismantle them.  
 Even so, some women awarded Betty Crocker scholarships didn’t conform to the social 
expectations they believed these prizes symbolized. Many women (including Massachusetts 
Senator and 1966 Betty Crocker scholarship recipient Elizabeth Warren) recalled the scholarship 
program as a pragmatic means to get into college when other methods weren’t possible, even if 
they had no personal interest educational experience in home economics. As with those teens 
who did well on the SAT, some of the women recalled simply being good at standardized tests. 
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Their test savvy proved the key to success, suggesting that standardized scholarship tests not 
only rewarded those who showed promise in a particular field of knowledge, but also those 
whose cleverness revealed a different, albeit unintentional, set of abilities. Although some 
corporate scholarship programs used standardized tests to help reinforce a particular worldview, 
many young Americans used the tests as an opportunity to springboard to a different, 
untraditional life path.193  
Realizing their award recipients could be treated as an unparalleled data set, the National 
Merit Corporation tracked the life paths of its earliest award recipients in order to see if their 
scholarships allowed the gifted to reach their greatest potential. In 1968, the organization 
released a study on the educational trajectories of its first two cohorts of scholarship recipients. 
Even among these men and women—ostensibly the most gifted young adults the nation had to 
offer in the mid-1950s—educational disparities persisted. Eight years after receiving National 
Merit scholarships, 6 percent of men had yet to receive a bachelor’s degree, and another 13 
percent had completed yet to complete any graduate work. Although these rates of college 
completion were drastically higher than the national average, the corporation mined into the 
backgrounds of award recipients to see what factors prevented these men and women from 
advanced studies—in other words, what issues were beyond the company’s responsibility. 																																																								
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Among women who received National Merit scholarships in 1956 and 1957, nearly one-third had 
yet to advance beyond undergraduate work by 1964. Gender cross-cut socioeconomic patterns: 
women who received scholarships typically came from better-educated families than men in their 
cohort, but women who continued onto advanced studies received considerably higher stipends 
than those who didn’t—a pattern reversed among men. Whereas women who left their studies to 
become homemakers overwhelmingly indicated a desire to continue school, the several dozen 
men who had yet to receive a bachelors degree “appeared to have relatively more than their fair 
share of emotional problems.”194  Through this longitudinal data, the Corporation was able to 
hold 95% as a natural statistical limit for the proportion of National Merit recipients who would 
complete college, all while posing broader social forces as the quirks of individuals and their 
families. The corporation remained as concerned with mitigating responsibility for scholarship 
recipients’ failure to achieve full their potential as it was with measuring what, exactly, a student 
could achieve after receiving the sudden advantage of a National Merit scholarship.  
Critics lambasted the National Merit Scholarship competition and similar business-
backed talent hunts for their perpetuation of class and racial inequities. Mapping the location of 
National Merit winners in several states, educationist Horace Mann Bond concluded that award 
recipients did not reflect the truest peak of young America’s talent but simply the brightest 
among whites of some considerable means. As Bond argued, the scholarship company ignored 
the sociocultural and economic factors that would allow well-educated middle-class white 
children to succeed. By allocating scholarships on a state-by-state basis, National Merit did 
nothing to discourage policies that limited educational equity for blacks and poor whites—and 
by maintaining the scholarship was awarded on the basis of talent, only reinforced the idea that 																																																								
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blacks were inherently less intelligent that their white counterparts. This idea would gain even 
more steam, Bond feared, as federal programs aimed to replicate the National Merit model of 
nationwide scholarship programs allocated on a state-by-state basis. Bond insisted the same 
results for a national talent-search could be achieved by using a different “‘diving rod’ for 
‘talent’”195: the average number of working toilets per household. For Bond, the competition 
“might better be called ‘States Rights, Upper Class’ Scholarships”—a criticism that did not 
disappear as the corporation attempted to highlight talented African-American youth through the 
National Achievement Scholarship program. 196 
Other critics of the National Merit program believed standardized testing would stifle 
society by relying on an overly narrow idea of talent. Analyzing the limitations of his own field, 
psychologist David McClelland maintained existing standardized testing devices were only 
equipped to measure ”academic excellence, skill in taking examinations, in following 
instructions and finding solutions to problems set by others.”197  Although this type of ability was 
needed for success in higher education, McClelland worried the growth of educational testing 
would only encourage Americans’ fondness for conformity. Widespread conformity would, in 
turn, discourage other kinds of extracurricular intelligence vital for American vitality, such as 
curiosity and entrepreneurism. For such critics, standardized testing programs stifled what higher 
education could provide by reducing talent to a specific quantifiable psychological concept.  
Scholarship competitions—and the language of merit—offered a way for corporations to 
help individuals’ chances of attending college without ever having to disrupt or challenge the 
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forces that kept many groups outside of the winner’s circle. More than the rhetoric of the 
educational elite, the language of merit reflected the way corporations approached postwar 
educational philanthropy: the best prospects would make themselves apparent, and would 
succeed with the right investment. These scholarship programs reinforced the idea that 
standardized tests made excellent sorting devices, easily making clear the vast majority of 
applicants who merited no genuine attention while also revealing the very few with superlative 
aptitude and abilities. Although these programs used biographical information and school grades 
to make their final decision, this data always followed the test scores: one’s identity was always a 
supplement to one’s numbers. Test designers and scholarship funders often acknowledged—and 
in their philanthropic capacity, tried to undo—trenchant socioeconomic disparities, but many 
scholarship programs often failed to account for those discrepancies when considering award 
winners. The logic of merit, that the best students would receive the best training, reconciled the 
gaps between the narrow abilities the tests measured, the brainpower demands corporate 
philanthropists aimed to satisfy, and cultural clout bestowed upon young adults who received a 
college scholarship. Merit presented the sense that test-takers arrived at an examination at a level 
playing field: after all, if tests measured aptitudes, there’s a limit to what accounting for external 
social differences could accomplish.  
Sputnik and the Federal Embrace of Testing  
It would take a geopolitical space crisis to fully cement standardized testing as a state-
sanctioned educational practice for promoting talent. Over the course of several weeks in late 
1957, the Soviet Union launched two artificial satellites into the earth’s atmosphere. These two 
artificial moons, Sputnik I and Sputnik II, sparked widespread concern over how the United 
States had fallen behind in technological supremacy. Americans used the surprise of the satellites 
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to probe how their national education system had failed to provide their children adequate 
training. The federal legislative response to the sputniks—the National Defense Education Act of 
1958—set a precedent for the type of intervention the federal government would make in 
educational agendas. In the process of codifying which testing programs it would support, the 
federal government also delineated its limited responsibility for the shape of American science 
education.  
The sputniks drove American educationists, corporate leaders, and technical experts into 
a fit of introspection: How had American science fallen short?  Pundits pointed to several 
systemic causes for American scientific shortcomings. In its comparison of American and Soviet 
education systems, General Electric blamed a widespread educational “doctrine of 
permissiveness” within a society that placed more emphasis on consumer spending patterns than 
educational expenditures.198  Atomic scientist John Dunning argued in a New York Times essay 
that, although “the Government cannot legislate scientists into being,” it had to move beyond 
“the conference-and-cliché method of planning policies” if United States were to ever outpace 
the Soviet Union.199  As the president of the New Jersey Education Association deduced, the 
Soviet satellites represented the American educational system’s long-term failure to build a corps 
of trained experts: 
“‘It is not hard—just a little less comfortable—to say we could 
rather have two American sputniks in the air that two cars in every 
garage.’[…]’But two sputniks in the air are the result of 2,000 or 
200,000 scientists in their laboratories. And scientists are made in 
elementary schools, as well as colleges.’”200 
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To determine how well American education stacked up against that of its main rival, the 
National Science Foundation (NSF) conducted its own study of the Soviet education system in 
the mid-1950s. Using available Soviet statistics and refugee reports, the NSF examined the full 
breadth and evolution of the Soviet schooling from the early Stalinist era to the immediate post-
Stalin moment. What set American and Soviet schooling apart, the foundation argued, were 
fundamentally different ideological beliefs about the relationship between education, society, and 
the state. Whereas American education prioritized humanities-heavy “training for the realization 
of the full capabilities of an individual,” the Soviet system valued a centralized “service-to-the-
state” model that created scientists and engineers who fulfilled the state’s research agenda.201  
Soviet scientific work, by extension, involved demonstrating and applying known scientific 
truths rather than challenging conventional wisdom or posing feasible alternative explanations 
for observed reality. The Soviet state instilled these core scientific and educational values 
through its polytechnic model for compulsory schooling, which mirrored Marxism’s opposition 
to the division of labor by training youth both mentally and physically. By valuing “productive 
work as an integral part of training,” polytechnic education offered the promise of immersive, 
integrative science instruction at every level of education.202  Even when Soviet schools fell short 
of what polytechnic education promised—which happened often, the NSF insisted—they 
instilled a political imperative for scientific study from an early age.  
Yet, the NSF warned against placing too much emphasis on the role of communist 
ideology in Soviet education. Focusing squarely on socialist indoctrination obscured the Soviet 
state’s primary aim to use education as a means for rapid industrialization. To assume Soviet 
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youth wholeheartedly believed the ideological aspects of their schooling would ignore an 
obvious reason for pursuing a career in the sciences: social prestige. Scientific careers offered 
better guarantees of higher wages and social comfort, albeit at the cost of enduring additional 
propaganda. By centrally managing job placement and benefits, the Soviet Union had 
inadvertently created an incentive system for occupational prestige divorced from overt Marxist-
Leninist rhetoric: the state will reward the brightest with the best jobs, so long as they remained 
loyal. Whether or all young adults sincerely believed the promises of the socialism, the Soviet 
state had created an education-occupation network that, above all, valued the production of 
scientists. 
As the NSF determined, both the American and Soviet educational systems possessed 
particular strengths for producing scientists and engineers, creating a virtual dead heat in 
brainpower production. Although the Soviet Union had far fewer young adults in its higher 
education system—the revolution hadn’t truly unmoored the peasantry from its rural agricultural 
base—proportionally far more Soviet students completed university studies in sciences and 
engineering than their American counterparts. While American students completed two more 
years of compulsory schooling than Soviet youth, they spent considerably less classroom time 
learning science and mathematics, a pattern even more pronounced when comparing each 
country’s collegiate programs for scientific studies. As a whole, American youth were more 
educated while Soviet youth had more proficiency in specific fields. Vastly different approaches 
to public education left the United States and Soviet Union fairly evenly matched by the middle 
of the twentieth century, and American educational policy choices would determine “whether 
within the next decade or so the scales will be tipped off balance.”203  Hesitate and be left behind.  																																																								
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Businessmen also staked in interest on where American brainpower fell short. During the 
mid-1950s, scientists, technologists, and psychologists from CalTech researched the potential 
drain humanity would place on resources over the next several generations. The team presented 
their findings to dozens of corporate executives and publishing their study in 1957. The 
published report, ominously titled The Next Hundred Years, made clear where the United States 
should focus its efforts for resource preservation: shoring up the massive erosion of potential 
scientists and engineers caused by premature dropouts. As the CalTech experts argued, American 
brainpower shortages didn’t stem from a low proportion of science and engineering majors, but 
from steep drop-offs at every stage of education. For every 100 students who entered grade 
school, the researchers observed, only 59 graduated high school and just 20 entered college. The 
13 young adults who completed a college degree—even the 3 who earned science and 
engineering degrees—did not reflect all the “technical brainpower” the United States could 
offer.204  “Educational attrition” took away between one-half and two-third of those capable of 
completing college, all while the Soviet Union produced scientists and engineers at twice the rate 
of the United States.205   
Despite the vast room for improvement, the experts behind The Next Hundred Years 
warned of the political limits to brainpower development. The nation could not follow the Soviet 
Union’s path to scientific prestige. Rigorous compulsory science education and state-managed 
job markets would boost the United States’ pool of trained brains, but would ultimately prevent 
“a world where people can lead lives of abundance and creativity within the framework of a free 
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society.”206   The authors insisted the United States could undo its impending science deficit 
simply by plugging in gaps where capable youth left school. By their calculations, American 
schools and businesses could jointly expand national technical brainpower by a factor of eight 
before approaching any natural population limits. By identifying how and when students become 
discouraged from advanced studies, private enterprise could devise ways to encourage 
structurally disadvantaged youth into participating in the American marketplace of ideas.  
To make the case that the United States possessed far more potential technical 
brainpower than it actually employed, the authors of The Next Hundred Years defined 
intelligence and ability through standardized testing models. Researchers used Army General 
Classification Test score distributions to illustrate the rate of educational attrition between high 
school and college. Asserting AGCT scores were roughly equivalent to individuals’ IQ scores, 
the authors drew several conclusions about untapped American brainpower. Even though AGCT 
score for college graduates was 120, far less than half of the population with that level of 
aptitude completed higher education. An even smaller fraction of Americans with the average 
aptitude found in science and engineering graduates pursued such studies. Such a steep drop-off 
wasn’t a natural phenomenon, the authors insisted, but the inevitable result of a secondary school 
system that employed unqualified math and science teachers while neglecting to guide talented 
youth toward challenging coursework. Addressing the dearth of women scientists and 
engineers—a gender gap far more pronounced in the United States than in the Soviet Union—
could effectively double American technical brainpower. By leaning on standardized test score 
models, researchers could identify social causes for squandered American brainpower, and in 
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doing so, emphasized the United States was not destined for second place so long as it genuinely 
managed its human resources.207 
The Eisenhower Administration, meanwhile, anticipating the following year’s midterm 
election, leveraged the shock of the sputniks against the ongoing desegregation crisis in Little 
Rock, Arkansas. Despite initially aiming to keep the integration of Central High School outside 
of partisan politics—indeed, being sour to the idea of educational desegregation in itself—
Eisenhower hoped to use Little Rock as a symbol for the Democratic Party’s inability to 
understand the United States’ role in the postwar world. Being caught unawares by the sputniks 
may have been bad, but Democrats’ willingness to flaunt judicial rulings only helped create 
scenarios that played to Communists’ strength. A party that pledged to cut taxes while resisting 
integration, the administration warned, failed to understand the depths of America’s scientific 
shortcomings as well as the impact images of white resistance would have in newly independent 
unaligned nonwhite nations. As Vice President Richard Nixon warned, the sputniks were not “‘a 
scientific stunt’” but a sign that the federal government, under continued Republican leadership, 
needed to aid the development of American scientific brainpower.208 
Proclaiming “a severe blow—some would say a disastrous blow—[had] been struck at 
America’s self-confidence and at her prestige in the world,” The Congressional Committee on 
Labor and Public Welfare held a series of hearings during the first three months of 1958 to 																																																								
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consider how the federal government should revise its approach to scientific education 
support.209  Throughout the hearings, senators grappled with the boundaries of the federal 
government’s responsibility for education. Whereas South Carolina Senator and virulent 
segregationist Strom Thurmond routinely used his time to insist the federal government had no 
authority in the state of American education—the word “education,” after all, appeared nowhere 
in the Constitution—others on the committee were more interested in finding a line for federal 
involvement without breaching traditional local authority. The solution, many witnesses testified, 
would include merit-based scholarships for promoting science education and funds for helping 
states develop widespread standardized testing and guidance programs. As Health, Education, 
and Welfare Secretary Marion Folsom argued, providing matching funds for state testing 
programs would allow communities to better guide youth through school in ways that served 
local needs and upheld local values. To Folsom, the idea that federal assistance for identifying 
and supporting talented youth would lead to centrally dictated education was “a groundless fear 
of an imaginary danger.”210  The secretary also assured the committee that a national scholarship 
program would be a better use of federal funds than an extensive educational loan program; 
merit-based awards would “put a little more prestige in the intellectual level of achievement” and 
stimulate college attendance among talented youth more fruitfully than any model for economic 
redistribution.211  Through these hearings, Congress aimed to settle on an approach that would 
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change the shape of American science education without triggering suspicions of federal 
intervention or social control.  
The resulting National Defense Education Act (NDEA) cemented this middling federal 
approach, ensuring that the government would not interfere in the content of instruction while 
also setting an agenda and incentives that would inevitably alter the shape of American 
education. Within this environment—neither radically transformed nor structurally untouched—
standardized testing thrived. Title V of NDEA not only provided explicit provisions for testing, 
but also promoted a national educational environment that would give greater weight to 
standardized testing. Title V allocated state educational agencies sixty million dollars over a 
four-year period “to assist them to establish and maintain programs of testing and guidance and 
counseling.”212  States were eligible to receive funds if they developed testing programs for 
public school secondary school students that would “identify students with outstanding aptitudes 
and abilities,” the results from which would them be used by guidance programs to steer 
exceptional youth into demanding college-preparatory high school coursework.213  The title also 
provided an additional 28 million dollars for colleges to design guidance and counselor training 
programs, so that those working in secondary schools could better steer their charges toward 
nationally meaningful life paths. When combined with NDEA’s other provisions—hundreds of 
millions for student loans, grants for states for science equipment, and a new National Defense 
Fellowship graduate study program, among others—Title V cemented a general approach to 
scouting talent, in which standardized testing programs would help satisfy national needs without 
breaching traditional educational authority or embedded discriminatory behavior.  																																																								
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Sensing the guidance provisions allowed by Title V would confuse laypeople, the 
Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW) eventually published a primer for parents, 
teachers, and administrators explaining the basics of educational testing. The Department 
stressed that any testing program was “not an end in itself, but rather a valuable tool” guidance 
counselors and educators could use to adjust youth toward ideal paths of study and lines of 
work.214  The booklet advised those without technical expertise to adopt a moderate opinion of 
testing: neither the cure for all society’s ills nor a pseudoscientific racket. Instead, the department 
assured readers that, when designed correctly, standardized objective tests were devices for 
making reasonable judgments about a person’s behavior or ability to perform. Good standardized 
tests went through an extensive construction process—with designers drafting several times as 
many test questions as would appear on the final version, and publishers arranging numerous 
experimental administrations in order to actually standardize a test. A well-constructed 
standardized test ideally targeted a very specific, clearly delineated skill set. As the department 
suggested, trained guidance professional would never use results from one standardized test to 
make judgments about a student’s other capabilities, nor use a single standardized test score to 
project a student’s entire educational and employment future. Rather, the department stressed, 
standardized tests should be seen as an integral part of a student’s cumulative record, which 
would ideally “begin with information about the pupil before he enters school and continue until 
he has been our of high school at least 5 years.”215  As school districts began to adjust to Title V’s 
provisions, HEW aimed to convince parents and teachers that the best approach to standardized 
testing was to use many, many more tests.  																																																								
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While the federal government promoted the benefit of comprehensive standardized 
testing programs to parents and teachers, the College Board sought to deepen its relationship 
with colleges and students. Ironically, the organization did so by first encouraging college 
officials to deemphasize the role standardized test scores played in admissions decisions. 
CEEB’s aim was not to lessen the importance of its exams in college admissions, but to heighten 
their value by stressing their technical limitations. The SAT and College Board achievement 
exams scores were only truly useful admissions tools when used alongside high school grades, 
and when treated more like a range than an exact measurement of educational aptitude.216  CEEB 
also decided to grant colleges permission to disclose test scores to students for the first time. The 
move, effective for all scores after December 1958, seemed to be a way to placate students’ 
curiosity while pressuring schools not to use secret test scores as a convenient way to maintain 
racially segregated campuses.217  By 1959, the organization developed a new standardized test 
specifically for high school juniors: the Preliminary Scholastic Aptitude Test (PSAT). The 
College Board maintained the PSAT would “give the junior a forecast of his senior-year 
performance on the [SAT],” and encourage him to make better-reasoned college plans sooner.218 
CEEB stressed, however, that the new test would not make high school juniors familiar enough 
with the format of aptitude tests to game the system, as only senior-level courses provided the 
mathematical and verbal material needed to noticeable raise scores. The organization instead 
suggested that college hopefuls may as well familiarize themselves with the SAT with a 
preliminary version of the exam because, by its own projections, all degree-granting colleges 
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would require some sort of entrance examination before the end of the next decade.219  For the 
College Board, standardized admissions tests were becoming nearly unavoidable—and if higher 
education was increasingly pegged to the idea of successful citizenship, then preliminary and 
supplementary standardized tests could only help students adjust their ambitions accordingly.  
Well before the Eisenhower administration responded to Sputnik, the federal government, 
extra-governmental educational organizations, and corporations began building a network 
dedicated to catching the United States’ brightest youth and steering them toward scientific and 
engineering careers that would secure American geopolitical supremacy. Sputnik did not spark a 
commitment to science and mathematics so much as solidify the direction multiple stakeholders, 
both private and public, took in harnessing brainpower for geopolitical ends. Scholarship 
programs allowed corporations to use standardized tests to cull talent while promoting the merits 
of American capitalism. Standardized testing also allowed the federal government to dodge 
accusations of centralization at a moment when some alleged it had superseded traditional local 
control for education. Rather than restructure U.S. education, standardized testing became the 
netting that bound all vested parties together. Where the rhetoric of American democratic 
brainpower fell short, standardized testing provided a convenient solution.  
Although standardized test designers noted the limited statistical usefulness of their 
products, they also developed a rhetoric that stressed standardized testing could create 
tremendous social good. The more popular standardized testing became, the more opportunities 
arose for students, parents, educators, administrators and policymakers to draw from this 
psychometric optimism and make outsized conclusions about what standardized tests meant and 
measured. These tensions between expert, layperson, and corporate understandings of what 																																																								
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standardized tests could do created an educational culture in which standardized tests easily 
became associated with bigger political and cultural forces. Test scores became shorthand for an 
individual’s worth to the state and the quality of American brainpower: a symbol for the fate of 
the America’s future. What became difficult to accept for many, then and now, was the basis by 
which educational aptitude was defined. If standardized tests measured natural talent, then the 
United States had failed to steer the majority of its brightest youth into college. But if 
standardized tests measured the skills that came from years of schooling, then test scores 
provided clear proof of how deeply racial and class inequities shaped social educational 
disparities. Despite experts’ specific understanding of test validity and reliability, aptitude 
remained a slippery concept—and one the public would continue to invest with multiple, often-
contradictory meanings.  
The use of standardized testing as a means for harnessing brainpower persists—but, more 
frequently, international standardized tests have served as way for Americans to fret over 
whether their youth will maintain geopolitical preeminence through scientific innovation. The 
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) issues a multi-subject 
standardized test to hundreds of thousands of students in several dozen countries every three 
years. Along with other capabilities, the Program for International Student Assessment (PISA) 
gauges the complex mathematic and scientific problem-solving skills of teenagers in 
participating member countries. Although the United States spends disproportionately more 
money on students than most other PISA participant countries, American students continually lag 
behind their Asian and European counterparts on the math and science portions of the 
standardized test. While the geopolitical dimension of PISA scores remains less tightly bound to 
any particular state—Estonia, Singapore, or Finland seem far less threatening than the Soviet 
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Union did—the fear remains that American brainpower is withering on the vine.220  So, too, 
remains Americans’ faith that standardized tests can help them make sense of their place in the 
world.  			 	
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CHAPTER THREE: MAPPING MARGINAL MEN: STANDARDIZED TESTING 
 
AS A FORM OF RACIAL SOCIAL CONTROLIN THE POSTWAR STATE 
 
 
 Race is a defining feature of American society, but its persistence as a categorical marker 
for social disparity is too often attributed primarily to the misdeeds of individual actors. Race, by 
this circular logic, depends upon the racism harbored by racists. The burden of proof for the 
presence of racism thus becomes whether or not a person openly admits that racial ideology 
fueled their actions, thereby turning racialized motivation into incomprehensible malice. When 
unmoored from their socioeconomic bases, race and racism thus seem analytically impenetrable: 
ineffable mysteries only combatable through the politics of affect. Yet what fuels the usefulness 
of race as a hierarchal system for social sorting—and, in turn, gives currency to racial ideology 
and racist actions—are the institutions and organizations that give nation-states a sense of 
continuity and legitimacy. State-sanctioned structures carry out projects that entrench and justify 
racial difference in everyday life, and give anchorage to the various ways groups and individuals 
make their own versions of racial meaning. At each level, racial ideology shapes a reality in 
which the fact of race is self-evident. The tension that keeps race afloat is thus not between fact 
and fantasy—ideology creates its own logic—but between the conservative impulse of the 
nation-state and the profound flexibility and variety in individuals’ racial interpretations.221 
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 The salience of race persists even when the state has backed away from overtly racial 
policies. This persistence occurs because the state depends upon technologies—such as 
standardized testing—that are built upon and contribute to racialized frameworks for 
understanding ability and social utility. Postwar institutional desegregation was one such 
moment in which the state abandoned racist policies while maintaining the racialized technology 
of standardized testing. Over a several-year period following the Second World War, the United 
States Armed Forces integrated its troops, marking one crucial early moment in the dismantling 
of legal racial segregation within American institutions. Certain branches—namely the Army—
underwent more extensive overhauls of their race-based personnel management policies. In 
addition to gradually integrating its troops, the Army also abandoned restrictions to the amount 
of black soldiers within its ranks at any given time. After a year of consistent pressure from 
President Harry Truman’s Committee on Equality of Treatment and Opportunity in the Armed 
Services, Army leaders agreed to abandon this racial quota. In its place, the Army adopted a 
quota based on the Armed Forces’ standardized aptitude entrance exam: the General 
Classification Test (GCT). By replacing the racial quota with a GCT quota, policymakers used 
standardized testing to forge a postwar social order that, on the surface, prioritized ability over 
race—but in effect used standardized testing as a means to avoid disrupting too much of the 
existing white supremacist social order. By allowing some viable channel for deeper black 
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participation in the armed forces, however limited, the Truman Administration could satisfy its 
aim to integrate and modify the military without creating too much discontent within military 
leadership at a vital moment in American statecraft. These actions would set a precedent for the 
postwar state, in which standardized testing would continue to use as a seemingly race-neutral 
device that nonetheless reinforced the perception that black men were marginally useful to both 
state and society.  
Racial Ideology, the GCT, and Desegregation 
 The ways in which the American state mobilized for World War Two and sorted men for 
military service depended upon psychologists’ ability to maximize manpower within prevailing 
racial ideology. Although the Selective Service Act of 1940 established a superficially 
nondiscriminatory draft policy—establishing quotas only for geographic divisions—the Army 
carried out white-only drafts in many regions, and continued to segregate its forces even after 
public pressure from black journalists and political leaders compelled the Roosevelt 
Administration to make several administrative concessions. Military segregation endured even 
after Executive Order 8802 prohibited defense industry workplace discrimination, an order made 
effective when black women pressured federal agencies and labor unions to ensure 
manufacturing corporations did not weasel out of nondiscriminatory hiring practices. Throughout 
the war, the American state used the language of manpower to thread the logic in which 
nondiscrimination policies and segregationist practices could occur simultaneously.222 
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 During the war, psychologists and Army leaders amassed a tremendous amount of data 
about men’s military usefulness by subjecting millions of incoming recruits to the Army General 
Classification Test (GCT). For the Army, GCT data became a useful tool for valorizing 
American democratic principles in contrast to Axis racial ideology. In an omnibus report on 
black soldiers, the Army Service Forces’ Military Training Division asserted that assumptions of 
black Americans’ mental inferiority premised on the Army Alpha and Beta test data were not 
only scientifically unsound but also reminiscent of the very fascistic rhetoric the United States 
was currently combatting. In the ensuing quarter-century, the Army asserted, testing devices had 
improved, and the GCT provided “ a quick and reasonable dependable measurement of an 
enlisted man’s working level and ability to learn,” no more and no less.223  By posing the 
differences in black and white aptitude test scores as a matter of job readiness—without ever 
suggesting which parties, exactly, were responsible for maintaining racially disparate educational 
funds and job opportunities—the Army could congratulate itself on not falling prey to the race 
science of a previous generation, all while avoiding casting blame on any politicians who kept 
white supremacist structures intact. The Army, as it portrayed itself, was an institution that 
granted equal opportunity of service: it was not the Army’s problem to fix the lack of 
opportunity elsewhere in American society. 
 Some of the chief psychologists behind the GCT held less overtly nationalist analyses of 
the exam—but they nonetheless established a connection between a man’s standardized test 
scores and his worth to society and the state. After the end of conflict, War Department Chief 
Psychologist Walter Bingham published general findings about the GCT’s reliability in 
predicting a recruit’s eventual military successes in Science magazine. Bingham insisted the test 																																																								
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data illustrated a clear general pattern: the lower a man’s GCT score, the less likely he would 
successfully complete a job training course with at least average marks, and the greater 
likelihood he would “prov[e] to be more of a burden than a help during mobilization.”224 Yet, the 
sheer number of men who took the GCT—about 10 million—allowed Bingham to make broad 
generalization about a massive population while also noting sizeable exceptions. While about 
5,000 men who lacked grammar school educations still received high enough GCT scores to earn 
the highest possible Grade classification, this sizeable number of men was still one half of one 
tenth of one percent of all men examined. This unprecedented amount of score data thus allowed 
the armed forces—and the American state—to be convenient with how it discussed population 
statistics, toggling between percentages and numbers depending on which sense of type of figure 
would better serve state needs. 
 During World War II, American military leaders assembled to determine how to make 
the best use of black personnel, setting the foundation for using standardized testing data to 
uphold white supremacist power dynamics. One military committee, led by Assistant Secretary 
of War John McCloy, considered how to juggle the dire need for able-bodied men, regardless of 
race, with the seeming intellectual shortcomings many black recruits displayed in their low GCT 
scores. Nearly half of all black recruits scored in the lowest GCT score category (Grade V), 
compared to nine percent of their white counterparts. In an aborted scheme, the McCloy 
Committee planned to replace low-scoring black personnel with higher-scoring men, relocating 
Grade V men to labor troops. The committee reasoned this reshuffling would create little friction 
among low-scoring black soldiers, as “the majority of Negroes falling into Grade V [were] from 
the South where they have been accustomed to performing common labor under immediate 																																																								
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white supervision.”225  Disagreements between the Army’s Ground and Service Forces 
eventually undid this plan, yet the McCloy Committee’s model reflected a willingness to trade 
upon existing racial power dynamics—black men in menial tasks overseen by powerful white 
men—in order to ensure the military ran as efficiently as possible.226 	 Although the McCloy Committee’s redistribution plans failed to take shape during the 
war, some members spent time just after the end of hostilities considering where black men 
would fit into the postwar defense system. In a late August 1945 memo to his superior, McCloy’s 
assistant Davidson Sommers recommended the “eventual non-segregation and assignment of 
Negro troops solely on the basis of ability.”227  Yet Sommers referenced GCT scores to claim 
that, overall, black soldiers were poorly equipped for Army demands when compared to white 
soldiers. This claim, Sommers reassured McCloy, did not need to be premised on “racial 
theories,” as black soldiers’ relative “lack of educational, occupational, and social opportunities 
[was] a sufficient explanation.”228  By asserting that environmental factors created black recruits’ 
low aptitude test scores, Sommers hinted at the Army’s institutional resistance to abolish its 
racial policies. If the Army provided one of the few consistent social opportunities for black 
Americans within a broader racial system designed to subordinate them, then the abolition of 
racial controls would provide an even more compelling case for black men to serve in the armed 
forces. The Army would thus make itself responsible for providing what other American 																																																								
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institutions and systems refused to do, at the risk of diluting its overall talent pool. Yet in his 
proposed solution—using GCT scores as a barrier for entry—Sommers also acknowledged that 
the opposition would be both internal and external. Although most parties agreed that black men 
would continue to have a role in securing the postwar American state, any changes that 
threatened the institutional characteristics of the Army risked upsetting at least some of its 
constituent groups.  
 Several months after the dissolution of the McCloy Committee, the War Department 
assembled a new panel to revise its use of black troops in the uncertain postwar period. The 
panel, led by Army Chairman Lieutenant General Alvan Gillem, released their recommendations 
as a circular memorandum in April 1946. Within Circular 124, the Gillem Board established the 
unenviable position the Army believed itself to be in. Postwar defense required maximum 
possible manpower, but “the manpower available, of itself, [varied] in quality.”229  Black soldiers 
were far more qualified during World War Two than their counterparts in World War One, and 
the Army prided itself on offering additional training and education opportunities otherwise 
unavailable for black troops outside of the military, but considerable gaps between the quality of 
manpower black and white troops brought upon entering service endured. The Army felt an 
institutional responsibility to continue serving as a conduit for opportunity—but it also aimed to 
prevent wasting resources on improving the manpower of too many black men. Hence, the 
Gillem Board announced that, in order to attain “maximum utilization of the authorized 
manpower of the nation in the event of a national emergency,” the Army would accept black 
troops at a ten percent quota, approximate to the proportion of black Americans in the general 
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population.230  Black soldiers, however, would remain in segregated units, and black units with a 
disproportionate amount of men with low GCT scores would receive additional supervisors. The 
Army positioned itself as an institution for black advancement—but as an institution, it also used 
numerical and testing quotas to set a firm boundary for how much change it would accept.  
 The Army sought to normalize Circular 124 among troops while also limiting its own 
responsibility for sustained institutional segregation. The War Department publication Army Talk 
devoted a three-part essay to the new policies mandated by the circular, designed to be read 
aloud and discussed in organized group settings. Deeming the issue of black manpower a 
“special problem,” Army Talk detailed “the Army’s concerns with matters of race as they relate 
to its effectiveness and its status in a democracy.”231  As the newsletter explained in digestible 
segments, the Army did not hold any policy of racial hierarchy, but simply maintained 
segregated troops as a matter of organizational tradition. The essay’s writers insisted that the 
Gillem Board did find certain racialized military structures detrimental to national security. The 
postwar peacetime army had to be treated as “our war machine in miniature”—and overly large 
black units overseen by white officers would wreck efficient American combat.232  While the 
Army held a position of equal opportunity, it declared itself “not an agency of social reform in 
matters either of race, racial relationship, or anything else.”233  As the Army hoped to instill 
among its personnel, the military was not the party responsible for society’s larger 
shortcomings—nor was it responsible for addressing those issues at the risk of efficiency.  
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 As the Army made the policies within Circular 124 an accepted institutional norm, it also 
complained to the Defense Department that it endured unfair testing and racial standards 
compared to the other branches of the military. After hearing various arguments and responses 
from the Army, Navy, and Air Force, Secretary of Defense James Forrestal issued findings on 
the how feasible it would be for the Armed Forces to maintain uniform GCT caps. The Army 
alleged that the 1948 revision of the Selective Service Act forced it to accept an unfair amount of 
marginal manpower compared to other branches; while the Navy and Air Force could refuse men 
with GCT scores below 87 and 90, respectively, the Army was bound by law to accept men with 
at least a score of 70. The Army also demanded that other military branches adopt a uniform 
quota for black personnel, insinuating that the Navy’s resistance to racial quotas conveniently 
obscured the fact that it employed only 4 black officers within its ranks, compared to 1000 
within the Army. Forrestal agreed that the Army bore a disproportionate burden employing 
marginally useful men, but concluded that the branch “has many vital, but ‘dirty,’ jobs in 
wartime that compare unfavorably in creature comforts, danger and interest to jobs in the Navy 
and Air Force”: the Army would invariably attract the least acceptable men because it needed 
more of them to do the most unsavory work.234  Further, Forrestal acknowledged that creating a 
uniform GCT standard would help the Army’s manpower, “but at a cost to the Navy of 9%, to 
the Air Force of 10%, and to the National Military Establishment as a whole of 3%.”235  Because 																																																								
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black soldiers remained disproportionately clustered in lower GCT score brackets, the peacetime 
burden for black personnel had to be shouldered largely by the Army. As Forrestal remarked, the 
existing peacetime military, unprecedentedly massive as it was, still had to represent “the 
nucleus of a future wartime force,” and the manpower burdens faced by one branch could not be 
altered to the detriment of the entire armed forces’ manpower output.236 
 But broader geopolitical pressures compelled the federal government to push further on 
nondiscriminatory military policy. For the Truman Administration, systemic racial 
discrimination and segregation had become Cold War rhetorical weapons—a source of 
international criticism and scorn by enemies and allies alike.237  To combat one aspect of this 
geopolitical quandary, President Truman issued Executive Order 9981 in July 1948. The order 
mandated “equality of treatment and opportunity for all persons in the armed services without 
regard to race, color, religion or national origin”—with all necessary changes to take place “as 
rapidly as possible.”238  To help all branches of the military reach this goal, the executive order 
also established the President’s Committee on Equality of Treatment and Opportunity in the 
Armed Services, a seven-member advisory group authorized with determining and 
recommending desegregation policy. Truman designated former Solicitor General Charles Fahy 
to chair the new committee. The president filled out the group with members that straddled 
educational, corporate and civil rights interests, appointing to the committee the presidents of 
Oberlin College, General Cable Corporation, and A.J. Donahue Corporation, as well as the 																																																								
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executive secretary of Urban League and the publisher of the Chicago Defender.239 Those on the 
Fahy Committee recognized the geopolitical esteem the United States risked by maintaining 
segregated forces. In a letter to Cleo Blackburn, superintendent of Indianapolis’s African-
American social service center Flanner House, James Evans lamented “that the world denies us 
recognition which would otherwise justly be ours” were the military desegregated—adding that 
most Americans remained unaware of “the devastating effects of this deplorable situation on the 
prestige of America abroad.”240  President Truman established his aim for concrete, thorough, 
expansive policy at a brief introductory meeting with the new committee, Secretary of State 
James Forrestal, and Defense Department leaders the following January. Truman envisioned that 
the committee would go beyond examining existing military barriers to carrying out his 
executive order, but also related federal bureaucratic procedures that could also gum up military 
desegregation. Through this committee, the Truman Administration could partially address a 
prevailing domestic concern that had become an international spectacle.  
 Some in the Fahy Committee quickly realized that the only effective line of reasoning to 
convince the armed forces to desegregate would be an argument about manpower. In early 
March 1949, the committee’s executive secretary, E.W. Kenworthy, warned Fahy about the 
potential pitfalls in appealing to broader principles. Whether framing military desegregation from 
the perspective of constitutional authority or as a matter of practical politics, the president’s 
capacity to act as Commander in Chief was checked by Congress’s responsibilities to oversee 
military policy and appropriations: an executive order and committee report alone would carry a 
weak mandate. Kenworthy also dismissed using the moral high ground embedded in 																																																								
 239 Eben A. Ayers, Assistant Press Secretary, press release, September 18, 1948; RG220 Records of 
[President’s Committee], Box 9: Truman Library. 
 240 James C. Evans, letter to Cleo Blackburn, February 9, 1949; RG 220 Record of [President’s 
Committee], box 4. 
 137 
foundational American legal texts because, from the military’s perspective, the lofty ideals of the 
Bill of Rights had nothing to do with effectively winning wars. Where the committee could 
instead force the Army’s hand is by confronting them on the inefficient use of black manpower. 
By deferring to racial models of intelligence and failing to create a cadre of black leadership 
during peacetime, Kenworthy reasoned, the Army rushed into combat with large, unsupported 
black units. This created low morale and panic among black troops—and ultimately unfavorable 
service records when compared to the conduct of black soldiers allowed to serve within white 
regiments on the Western Front. By appealing to efficiency, the Committee could “find a side 
entrance” to changing Army policy that relied on the military’s own alleged priorities.241  
 In its initial report, issued late March 1949, the President’s Committee premised its 
recommendations on the belief that the armed forces and the postwar state could only succeed 
through “the maximum efficient use of manpower.”242  If the increasingly technical qualities of 
war rendered manpower an abstract quality detachable from any particular man, then a soldier’s 
race should have little bearing on their job detail: black or white, men were vessels for 
manpower and brainpower. Hence, the President’s Committee recommended that the Army 
remove discrepancies between black- and white-unit organization that effectively barred black 
troops from certain military occupational specialties (MOS). The President’s Committee also 
recommended that the Army no longer use race as a factor when assigning men to Army Schools 
courses, nor for assigning men to units once they’ve completed advanced training. Above all, the 
President’s Committee recommended that the Army abolish its 10% quota for black troops. If the 																																																								
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Army wanted to maximize manpower, it needed to do so on the basis of aptitude and not racial 
composition. 
 The Army, meanwhile, adopted various tactics to make its ranks whiter. Between May 
1948 and March 1949—a period without any immediate demands for troops—the number of 
Army officers and enlisted personnel grew by nearly 95,000, to roughly two-thirds of a million 
people. In that same ten-month window, however, the number of black officers and enlisted 
personnel grew by only 3,500 men. While technically still accepting more black men, the Army 
effectively thinned out the proportion of black men in its ranks to almost exactly ten percent. But 
this adherence to the racial quota did not extend to upper rank: black officers still comprised less 
that two percent of the officer corps.243  By April, the Army used the racial quota to halt black 
recruitment outright. Assessing that its proportion of black soldiers remained unacceptably high, 
the Army declined black volunteers, all while lowering its GCT minimum to increase the pool of 
potential white recruits. The Army also extended these race-based personnel policies to its 
protocol for reenlistment. Although all soldiers had twenty days to reenlist in their same position, 
the Army granted white soldiers an additional three-month window to reenlist at the same pay 
grade; black soldiers who missed the first window were barred from reentry “until the Negro 
quota [was] open.”244  Yet the Army did not gather any GCT scores for black men they turned 
away, let alone any sense of whether low-scoring white men were accepted into the army in lieu 
of higher-scoring black hopefuls. The racial quota had already predetermined these dismissed 
black men were numerically beyond what was the acceptable burden of the national security 
state. 																																																								
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 The Army resisted abandoning its racial quota by instead demanding that all three 
branches of the military adopt a uniform cutoff for the General Classification Test. At the time, 
the Navy used a GCT cutoff score of 90, arguing that the technical demands of modern naval 
defense meant it could not employ the services of men with below-average scores—nor, by 
deduction, below-average intelligence. The Army countered by contending that, were it to 
abandon its racial quota without being allowed to adopt a higher GCT cutoff, a disproportionate 
amount of intellectually deficient men would flock to Army recruiting stations. The Fahy 
Committee found this line of reasoning unacceptable, citing the Air Force’s policy of using men 
with lower scores, and instead recommending low GCT cutoffs across all three branches in order 
to cull all possible useful manpower.245 
 To make sense of the Army’s insistence on racial quotas—and how standardized testing 
fit within the racial logic of its revised personnel management systems—the Fahy committee met 
with several military officials in late April 1949. As departmental and Selective Service officials 
explained over the course of several hours, the GCT had become just the first of several 
standardized exams that determined the line of work an incoming recruit would eventually be 
assigned. After clearing the Army’s peacetime GCT quota—with lower-scoring hopefuls 
needing to earn a higher physical rating to pass muster—recruits endured a battery of ten 
aptitude assessments as part of their induction process. Each test within the battery measured 
some combination of ten capabilities, including pattern analysis, shop mechanics, and clerical 
speed. Following this series of exams, recruits then took the Army Activities Preference Blank, 
another standardized inventory designed to objectively gauge the fields of work a person was 
most attracted to. Army intake officers compiled the results from a recruit’s Preference Blank as 																																																								
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well as the average skill scores from each aptitude test to determine which set of jobs he should 
be assigned. For the Army, the GCT worked as a manpower-harnessing device when it was used 
as the first in a series of standardized assessments.246    
 Despite this new system, the War Department officials interviewed by the Fahy 
committee continued to assert that race remained a meaningful category for sorting and limiting 
Army troops. When asked why the Army continued to segregate its GCT figures by race, 
department officials evaded a concrete answer, only noting that GCT scores figures remained 
categorized by race because all Army data was divided in that fashion. When members of the 
committee then suggested a soldier’s level of education would be a more meaningful frame for 
analysis, one military representative, Roy Davenport, rattled off a series of statistical extremes to 
suggest race remained a more meaningful basis of categorization: 
However, you might be interested to know that of those individuals 
who reported some schooling, for whom the records show some 
schooling but not completion of grade schools, three tenths of one 
per cent of the whites scored in Grade 1, 35.5 per cent in Grade 5. 
For the colored two-tenths of one per cent in Grade 1 and 73.1 per 
cent in Grade 5. […] At the other end of the scale, those who had 
completed college, for the whites 47.5 scored in Grade 1 and no 
individuals were reported as scoring in Grade 5. For the colored, 
6.4 per cent scored in Grade 1 and 1.5 per cent scored in Grade 
5.247 
 
The committee’s executive secretary, E.W. Kenworthy, pressed on, asking Davenport whether 
non-segregated units would create fewer occupational pathways for black soldiers—that is, 
whether the Army felt segregation beneficially limited job competition. Even then, Davenport 
deferred to test score figures: over a third of all white men scored in the two highest score tiers 																																																								
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on the GCT, while fewer than 4 percent of black soldiers did so.248 Through an avalanche of 
statistical data absent of any sense of scale or scope—percentages and comparisons without 
tangible numbers for anchorage—the army used GCT scores as a means to justify its racial 
quotas without having to provide racially motivated rationales for those restrictions: numbers, 
after all, don’t lie. 	 The Secretary of the Army separately took great pains to stress that, among the four 
services in the Armed Forces, his branch made the greatest efforts to include black Americans. In 
a May 1949 memo to Secretary of Defense Louis Johnson, Acting Secretary of the Army Gordon 
Gray outlined the sheer numerical advantages black Americans had in the Army when compared 
to the Navy, Air Force, or Marine Corps. Gray stressed that, numerically speaking, black Army 
servicemen totaled “more than triple that of the Air Force or Navy and almost double that of all 
other services combined.”249  Further, black soldiers had far more pathways to attain a 
noncommissioned officer rank than their counterparts in other branches of the Armed Forces. In 
Gray’s estimation, his branch was not the one to blame for the Armed Forces’ underutilization of 
black Americans.  
 Gray also used General Classification Test score patterns to defend the relatively small 
number of black commissioned officers in the Army, but his faulty math exposed the trouble 
many non-specialists faced when attempting to make sense of testing patterns. Grey conceded 
that black commissioned officers were relatively rare—numbering about 1,300, or just 1.65 
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percent of all Army officers. The secretary argued, however, that this relative dearth of black 
commissioned officers was not a product of discriminatory policy but a mere byproduct of the 
General Classification Test. At the time, the Army required a minimum GCT score of 110 for 
any soldier to be considered for a commissioned officer position. For every black soldier who 
scored at least 110 on the GCT, 6.5 white soldiers met the same qualification. Grey then 
convoluted these score patterns to justify the Army’s use of a racial quota: multiplying the 
existing percentage of black commissioned officers by the racial ratio of soldiers who scored at 
least 110 on the GCT would “equal competitively to a 10.7 per cent ratio, or slightly in excess of 
the total Negro strength ratio.”250  Whether in good or bad faith, such gibberish mathematics 
allowed the Army to use the aura of statistics to stand by its racialized personnel policies.  
 The Army’s use of specious calculations for justifying its low levels of black 
commissioned officers reflect officials’ compulsive fear of the branch being overwhelmed by 
black men with low intelligence. Gray once again used GCT score patterns to justify to his 
superior the Army’s reluctance to abandon its racial quota. Whereas other branches of the Armed 
forces were “in the fortunate position of being able to maintain an enlistment standard of 90 GCT 
and higher,” the Army was restricted by the Selective Service Act to use a GCT cutoff of 70 
before calling upon the draft.251  Black recruits were much more likely that white counterparts to 
receive low GCT scores, and the group of potential recruits with scores between 70 and 90 was 
thus included a disproportionate amount of black recruits relative to the general population. For 
Gray, the Army faced the burden of accepting those men who were not intelligent to get into 
other military branches—and the relative strength of the army corps was thus compromised by 
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this dilution of manpower. In the absence of a racial quota, Gray forecasted the Army would 
shoulder the immense burden of accepting black men who other branches deemed unfit to defend 
the American State, warning that “an Army of even 15 percent Negroes suffers a jeopardizing 
decreases in efficiency.”252  By expressing GCT scores as a representation of military manpower, 
efficiency, and cooperativeness, the Army could present its racial quota as the soundest way to 
open opportunity for black soldiers without risking defensive chaos.  
 Although the Fahy Committee remained flummoxed by the Army’s resistance to abandon 
the racial quota, its response to the Army’s third series of proposals revealed the limits to the 
postwar state’s sense of racial justice. In a July 6 memo to other committee members, Executive 
Secretary E.W. Kenworthy accused the Army of having “the same disregard for efficiency as for 
equal opportunity.”253  Although the Army’s proposals to eliminate racial quotas in training 
divisions considerably expanded the ability for black soldiers to reach specialized training, its 
insistence on maintaining racially segregated military units rendered any manpower gains moot. 
Kenworthy found the Army’s plan to apply its 10 percent racial quota within certain military 
occupations even more disastrous because it made “numerical representation the criterion of 
equal opportunity.”254  For the Fahy Committee, postwar defense had to be premised on 
efficiency. Eliminating the racial quota and desegregating units were not primarily matters of 
redressing social injustice, but instead, means for ensuring that the military’s internal 
organization, training procedures, and promotion protocols placed the most capable men in the 
correct places.  																																																								
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 At the end of his memo, Kenworthy suggested a potential solution for the Army’s 
stubbornness: replace the racial quota with a General Classification Test Quota. If the Army 
resisted abandoning the racial quota was because it feared its ranks would be overrun with black 
recruits, Kenworthy reasoned, then a quota based on GCT scores could effectively keep the 
Army from adopting black men it deemed undesirable without resorting to overtly racial 
methods. The Army could set a cap on the number of men it would accept with GCT scores 
between 70 and 90; as monthly recruitment reports from the Army confirmed, a disproportionate 
amount of black recruits earned scores within that range compared white counterparts.[cite]  As 
Fahy would eventually suggest to the Army, the cap would be based on the “the normal 
distribution in the Army as revealed by the operation of Selective Service during the war”—in 
other words, using preexisting test data to set the parameters for what the Army would continue 
to consider acceptable degrees of intelligence.255 The Army could also use other standardized 
aptitude tests to solve the problem of reenlisting men with low GCT scores. Men with marginal 
scores on both the GCT and the Aptitude Area I test could be barred from continuing their 
service beyond the initial term. Kenworthy posited that this new quota “would not be racial 
discrimination, but a defensible procedure for keeping the Army from having a heavier 
percentage of Class IV men than there is in the population.”256  By shifting the basis of the quota, 
the Army could outwardly redefine who was marginally useful to the state—and thus whose 
presence had to be strictly monitored and regulated. 
 The Fahy Committee also gathered its own population figures to deduce that the Army’s 
fears of being disproportionately filled with black recruits of low intelligence had no statistical 																																																								
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bearing. Kenworthy used current population data and existing GCT score patterns to see under 
what circumstances the Army would become at least 30% black. For the Army to reach that 
proportion, it would have needed just over 200,000 black voluntary enlistees among its troops. 
Yet, statistically speaking, fewer that 140,000 physically healthy black men in the national 
manpower pool would have scored over 70 on the GCT. Even if the Army shifted from voluntary 
to mandatory service, the Army mathematically could not be saturated with the amount of black 
men that it feared unless it abandoned the GCT or expanded its age range for service.257  In case 
of national geopolitical emergency, the authorized size for military branches would likely 
expand, even further reducing the odds black men would represent a disproportionate share of 
Army strength.  
 Still, Kenworthy acknowledged that the difficulty for the Army—and the difficulty in 
convincing the Army to adopt a test-based quota—hinged on how it would manage black 
soldiers whose test scores prevented easy placement. After drafting the committee’s interim 
report, Kenworthy detailed to Fahy the infrastructural problems that could result from 
abandoning the racial quota. The “professional privates” whose scores barely qualified them for 
service would be easy to place in a new system: in the same types of menial jobs their aptitude 
scores indicated would be the best use of their manpower.258  So, too, would be black soldiers 
who scored highly on the GCT, as desegregated training schools and unit placements would also 
ensure the Army was making the most of their capabilities. But Kenworthy remained flummoxed 
by the considerable number of black soldiers “who have higher scores, and who are now in 
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Negro combat units, but who do not have the qualifications for school.”259  Dismantling these 
units immediately would create an organizational nightmare, by Kenworthy’s estimation. 
 For several months, the Fahy Committee and the Army lobbed proposals and 
counterproposals at one another, each side using different statistical interpretations of available 
American manpower to determine the degree to which a GCT quota could be trusted by itself to 
control the proportion of black troops. The committee cushioned its insistence on abolishing the 
racial quota by suggesting that the Army could accept fewer marginal-scoring men if it simply 
accepted more men with higher scores. The GCT quota would thus not be a rigid quantity to fill 
but, instead, a ceiling. Army General Counsel Karl Bendetsen argued that department should 
retain its 10 percent racial quota, but only for the men with the most marginal set of GCT scores. 
Fahy dismissed this offer as an “absurd” way to curb black recruitment. One Army statistician 
warned that there were “2,000 to 3,000 Negroes over [GCT score] 80 ready, willing and able to 
join the Army and Air Forces every month”—which, in the absence of a racial quota, would lead 
to black troops comprising up to 31% of the Army’s strength.260  Kenworthy took the same raw 
figures, Army intake caps, and potential GCT quota to determine black soldiers would comprise 
no more than 11% of all new recruits. (Soon after the Army realized the committee had 
somehow procured these figures, Kenworthy met a major dismayed that the department did not 
heed his advice to “never on any account submit figures to the Fahy Committee.”)261 In a press 
release, the Army reiterated that its decision to offer training for all men who qualified for 
Military Occupational Specialties, regardless of race, would reamin the full extent of its revised 																																																								
 259 Kenworthy, May 5 memo for Fahy, p. 2. 
 260Austin J. Bonis, memo to Col. [John] McFadden, “Negro Percentages in the Army,” September 23, 
1949; RG 220 Record of [President’s Committee], box 8. 
 261 E. W. Kenworthy, memorandum for Chalres Fahy, re: “The Status of Discussion with the Personnel and 
Administration Division on the Quota,” October 25, 1949, p. 1; RG 220, box 2. 
 147 
policy.262  By mid-November, Bendetsen admitted to Kenworthy that the Army’s predictions 
were “based on the Army’s over-all military experience in forecasting enlisting tendencies and 
trends and not on any specific experience”—but, nonetheless, nothing short of a numerical quota 
would suffice.263  Numbers became a rhetorical weapon, not for their specificity but their ability 
to be malleable enough to support vastly different scenarios.  
 The quota debate came to a head in late November, when the Army attempted to thwart 
the Fahy Committee’s ambitions by instead proposing amendments to Circular 124 that would 
eliminate some, but not all, racialized limitations. The Army motioned to remove racial 
restrictions occupations and training schools, while retaining segregated units and racial quotas. 
Kenworthy observed that the GCT would make these changes effectively “meaningless”: if black 
soldiers typically received low GCT scores, then black-only military units would retain a relative 
lack of occupational diversity, undermining the amount of manpower they could provide the 
Army.264 Unless the Army was willing to place black soldiers into existing white units based on 
occupational demands as well as ensure the most capable black soldiers entered service by 
enforcing a GCT quota—both measures the Army still refused to consider—then personnel 
organization and management would remain effectively unchanged.265 
 As stubborn as the Army remained in its extended discussions with the Fahy Committee, 
it soon officially abandoned its race-based personnel policies. At the beginning of 1950, the 																																																								
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Army stipulated that black soldiers would henceforth be placed in units by basis of their 
qualifications rather than by race, and soldiers serving in mixed-race units would be integrated 
both on and off the job.266  Even so, Fahy still prepared statistical material to show how a GCT 
quota would aid the Army’s desire “for eliminating the perennial low-scoring men, both white 
and Negro.”267  By early March, Fahy received word that the Army would drop the racial 
quota—a couple months ahead of the publication of the Committee’s final report.268  Although 
segregationist practices endured for another several years, the Army no longer used race as a 
precondition for entering service or the types of work one could do.269 
 For the Fahy Committee, the Army’s racial quota and race-based personnel policies were 
unjust devices that punished individuals’ capabilities based on broad statistical data about an 
entire segment of the population. By denying talented black men entrance into the Army while 
also retaining “professional privates,” the Army squandered the potential depth of its 
manpower—the wasteful effects of which multiplied by keeping black soldiers out of most job 
tracks and in occupationally-homogenous units. The Committee advocated that the Army replace 
its racial quota with a GCT quota to guarantee that the brightest men, regardless of race, would 
be able to contribute their manpower. Yet this maneuver also established the racial logic of the 
postwar security state. Race may have been removed as an explicit condition for who could and 																																																								
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could not belong in the armed forces, but it remained foundational to the meaning made out of 
standardized testing data used to determine aptitude and ability. By shifting entrance caps from 
race quotas to GCT score minimums, the armed forces redirected how it used race to designate 
who was marginally useful, a policy shift that would reverberate in the postwar American state 
and society. 
Standardized Testing as a Means for Postwar Racial Social Marginalization 
 
 The Army’s use of GCT testing as a means to appear nondiscriminatory while 
maintaining a broader racial social order set a foundation for subsequent educational actors to 
use standardized testing as the means for designating black brainpower as marginally useful to 
state and society. This pattern developed over decades from several directions. During the 1950s 
and 1960s, psychologists began to fret about the potential social harm posed by underachievers, 
reinforcing in the process whiteness as an invisible norm for psychological types. 
Psychometrically speaking, an underachiever was someone who scored high on standardized 
aptitude exams but whose performance on standardized achievement tests was relatively 
lackluster. In other words, their measured capabilities noticeably outpaced their measured skills. 
Psychologists leaned on standardized aptitude and achievement tests in their assessment of 
underachievement because, by their lights, teachers frequently incorporated irrelevant and 
subjective factors when determining the relationship between students’ capabilities and effort. 
(Some notable researchers, namely educational psychologist Robert Thorndike, did stress that 
poor test design and statistical knowhow often created an exaggerated sense of 
underachievement among youth.)270  Although distinct from juvenile delinquents, underachievers 
and other gifted youth were more prone to deep-set emotional turbulence, and who, without 																																																								
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proper intervention, would prove to be a societal drain in adulthood. Guidebooks advised 
counselors and parents alike how to encourage underachieving youth, overwhelmingly boys, into 
finding meaningful life paths.271  Because earlier standardized tests such as the GCT had already 
placed black test-takers—and by extension black Americans in general—at the threshold of 
socially useful intelligence, the underachiever was a figure whose whiteness was unspoken but 
always presumed. If black youth by and large scored relatively low on standardized aptitude 
tests, particularly aptitude tests that reflected white middle-class educational experiences, then 
their relative level of achievement became hard to gauge. Whereas black underachievers would 
remain relatively invisible for another couple decades, white underachievers became a popular 
midcentury psychological phenomenon.272  
 What rendered black underachievers invisible for so long was a deep social-scientific 
pathologization of black families that portrayed educational disparities as a symptom of cultural 
and genetic shortcomings. This argument hinged on the insistence that low educational 
attainment among African-Americans, even if it reflected centuries of structures and systems 
designed to maintain a black underclass in the United States, primarily illustrated blacks’ 
unwillingness to achieve due to genetically-eroded substandard intellects.273  This psychological 
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pathologization of black intellect depended upon a resurgent interest in standardized intelligence 
tests during the late 1960s and 1970s. In particular, certain psychologists argued that IQ testing 
was a meaningful way to deduce the heritability of intelligence, and by extension, the persistent 
gaps between white and black Americans’ capabilities. For Arthur Jensen and his acolytes, the 
United States’ economy and security increasingly relied on technological knowhow, which likely 
required IQ levels not typically found among black citizens. Black families transmitted both 
harmful cultural values and diminished mental capabilities to their children—and no amount of 
social policy or intervention could meaningfully enrich black youths’ mental faculties. Society 
failed its low-intelligence citizens, these researchers argued, when it attempted to educate them 
as one would white, middle-class youth. For these psychologists, the humane and socially 
beneficial solution for low-intelligence youth would be to nurture those mental capabilities they 
did exhibit. Equal education opportunity, then, was the byproduct of misplaced white liberal 
guilt—a sentiment that caused more harm than good.274 																																																																																																																																																																																		
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 Some black parents did, however, successfully challenge the use of standardized testing 
as a diagnostic method that overemphasized intellectual disability among black youth. On 
October 16, 1979, after years of intermittent litigation, the United States District Court for 
northern California made a decisive ruling against state special education practices in the case 
Larry P. v. Riles, calling the fundamental premises of standardized aptitude testing into question 
in the process. Larry P. v. Riles stemmed from a complaint filed at the beginning of the decade 
against the San Francisco Unified School District.275  Parents of black students who had been 
placed in special education tracks for the “educable mentally retarded” (EMR) believed the 
standardized intelligence tests used to assess their children were fundamentally flawed. The 
litigants alleged that the cultural and racial biases built into these standardized tests—and which 
fueled their misinterpretations—led to a disproportionate amount of black students receiving an 
EMR diagnosis. Whereas African-Americans comprised 10 percent of California’s population in 
the 1970s, black youth made up a quarter of the students in EMR classrooms.276  Because 
students placed in EMR classes received severely limited educations compared to their 																																																																																																																																																																																		
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mainstream counterparts, the effects of a low standardized intelligence score snowballed 
throughout a youth’s schooling. Black students who already came in with educational 
disadvantages were thus more likely to be marked as EMR, placed into separate education tracks, 
and leave school without many of the skills necessary for successful independent living.  
 In his decision, District Judge Robert Peckham used the history of intelligence testing to 
determine that standardized aptitude tests were racially and culturally biased instruments, and 
thus designed for discriminatory educational practices.277  As Peckham deduced, racial ideology 
drove the meaning made out of test scores. For decades, black children typically scored about 
fifteen points lower on IQ tests than their white counterparts. Yet, as virtually every expert 
witness testified, even if researchers came to an agreement over what intelligence was, existing 
intelligence tests could not measure intelligence directly. Peckham declared the state’s method 
for identifying youth as EMR ultimately violated black children’s civil rights as well as denied 
them equal protection under state and federal law. The judge thus maintained that standardized 
testing became a method for the state to beg the question of black intelligence: education 
officials already presumed that black youth displayed disproportionately lower intelligence more 
frequently than white children, and the evidence provided by biased testing instruments 
confirmed that presupposition.278 
 Despite some legal limitations on how governing authorities could use testing to 
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marginalize its black citizens, white Americans used the logic of standardized testing to resist 
educational admissions policies designed to undo systemic racial disadvantages. For many white 
Americans, affirmative action educational policies were—and remain—synonymous with 
reverse discrimination.279  Standardized testing gave the fantasy of reverse discrimination 
evidentiary heft: How fair was it to deny white students educational opportunities when, 
according to standardized admissions tests, they had greater likelihood for success than admitted 
minorities with considerably lower test scores?   
 The connection between standardized testing scores and the logic of reverse 
discrimination gained momentum through the Supreme Court case Regents of University of 
California v. Bakke.280  Allen Bakke, a white engineer who sought admission to UC Davis 
Medical School, filed suit against the California state university system after being denied 
admission in 1973 and 1974. Although multiple factors minimized Bakke’s odds for 
admission—his relatively late application in one cycle, a low interview score by a member of the 																																																								
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admission committee, his relatively advanced age (medical schools at the time were loathe to 
admit students in their thirties)—Bakke and his lawyers decided to focus on his whiteness. 
Bakke’s counsel argued that his solid MCAT scores, among other metrics, proved he would be a 
far more capable medical student than any of candidates chosen to fill the sixteen spaces UC 
Davis reserved for minority applicants. This racial quota, Bakke’s counsel reasoned, unfairly 
reduced their client’s chances for admission because only eighty-four spaces were available to 
Bakke and other white applicants. Bakke’s counsel insisted that, by denying white applicants a 
full opportunity for admission while also allowing minority applicants a chance to fulfill a quota, 
UC Davis violated Bakke’s rights to equal protection and nondiscrimination established by the 
14th Amendment and Civil Rights Act of 1964. Although the Supreme Court’s ruling in Bakke 
was disjointed and convoluted—colleges and universities could consider race as a positive 
attribute in admissions, but could no longer use quotas and quota-like practices to guarantee 
minority candidates would have a presence in student bodies—it did reinforce the idea that 
standardized test scores marked genuine capability. By extension, affirmative action opponents 
could more easily use the Bakke ruling to accuse colleges and universities that actively aimed to 
undo intergenerational educational discrimination through their admission polices of engaging in 
tyrannical, anti-empirical social engineering.281  
 Even in subsequent Supreme Court cases that upheld more holistic collegiate affirmative 
action practices, jurists continued to portray standardized testing as a technology that revealed 
true capabilities in light of liberal educational activism. In Grutter v Bollinger, the court affirmed 																																																								
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that the University of Michigan’s narrow consideration of race as a categorical positive in law 
school applications was an acceptable practice, neither falling into the quota trap nor violating 
white applicants’ 14th Amendment rights. In his dissenting opinion, however, Justice Clarence 
Thomas upheld the use of the standardized law school admission test (LSAT) as a worthwhile 
gauge of students’ readiness for advanced studies. If collegiate practices such as legacy 
admissions already made the concept of meritocracy a farce, Thomas reasoned, then law schools 
should employ the LSAT as they see fit—so long as those practices did not correct for well-
known racial differences in test scores. Even in the majority opinion, Justice Sandra Day 
O’Connor asserted that LSAT scores could not be eliminated outright for law school admissions 
because “they are important (if imperfect) predictors of academic success in law school”282  As 
with Bakke, a certain standardized test had already become a stable unit of information used by 
virtually all accredited degree-granting graduate programs for a specific profession. Thus, even if 
jurists and educators alike felt that the LSAT (or MCAT or GMAT) had its predictive limits, the 
basis by which people could be admitted by other categorical or socio-historical factors was 
limited to the extent that the LSAT (or MCAT or GMAT) served as a de facto unit of objective 
information. Holistic affirmative action admission policies thus held test scores as clear data, 
however limited and qualified, against which supplementary applicant information could be 
weighed. Indeed, the qualified use of standardized test scores strengthened their educational 
utility. Now universities could portray LSAT, MCAT, GMAT and other post-baccalaureate 
admission exam scores as a component with checks and balances in a just admissions system.283 																																																								
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 The final action that solidified standardized testing as a method for maintaining black 
social marginalization was the development of minimum competency testing in the late 1970s 
and early 1980s. Minimum competency testing emerged mostly in southern states amid the 
backlash to mandated desegregation, as well as in response to growing concerns that students 
were leaving high school functionally illiterate and innumerate. State-level school systems, 
heightening their capacity as an intermediary between the traditional local nexus of control and 
the growing federal role in education, introduced minimum competency tests as a way to monitor 
high school students’ mastery of fundamental skills. In several states, these standardized basic 
skills tests became the determining factor for whether a high school senior received a diploma. 
Such minimum competency exams often focused on fundamental reading skills that state 
educational officials believed students ought to have developed over the course of their 
education. Yet, as some pundits at the time worried, such tests may have instead encouraged 
early cohorts of students to drop out before facing a final competency exam.  
 More often, as seen through a series of Florida court class action suits filed by black 
students and their parents, minimum competency testing regimes failed to accommodate for 
early cohorts of black students who received substandard segregated elementary education and 
who did not benefit from any early intervention programs or secondary school curricula geared 
toward ensuring mastery of basic reading and mathematical skills. Although these legal 
challenges delayed the timetable for when minimum competency testing could be used as a 
prerequisite for matriculation, the use of such tests nonetheless created, as Scott Baker argues, an 																																																																																																																																																																																		
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educational landscape in which the burden of education shifted from the school system to the 
student. High-stakes standardized accountability testing placed the onus of functional illiteracy 
and innumeracy on the products of the school system—students—rather than the system itself. 
This shift allowed state-level politicians to avoid the onus of increasing educational spending in 
ways that would upset white constituents. The surface-level neutrality of accountability testing 
programs rendered social marginalization as individual shortcomings. Because the system was 
no longer overtly discriminatory, test scores could offered the sheen of fair and genuine 
measurements of students’ skills—and whatever shortcoming black students faced on such 
exams were no longer the problem of school systems.284 
 Accountability standardized testing regimes persist, more ingrained into curricular design 
and pedagogical practice than ever. What also continues is the burden placed on black students 
for their persistent low test scores, without any meaningful intervention into educational funding 
policies that leave students in majority-black schools comparatively ill-equipped to master 
material on such standardized tests. Because accountability regimes often peg school funding to 
standardized test scores, students in chronically underfunded areas—typically majority-black 
urban schools—are compelled to accept testing regimes in order to prove they merit social 
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investment, even if the resultant school funding hinges on “teaching to the test” practices 
detrimental to robust learning and development. The consequences for not accepting these 
testing regimes—or rather, failing to perform to these standards—often involve public 
disinvestment from problematic schools, the introduction of profit-driven charter schools, and 
the collapse of educationally-oriented community investment.285  Through such testing 
mechanisms students are forced to play along with the charade of equal educational opportunity 
without ever being provided the economic means that could make equal opportunity possible, let 
alone desirable. Black students thus often have the most to lose in accountability testing systems.  
 Meanwhile, researchers continue to examine the phenomenon of the achievement gap 
between white and black students on standardized tests, without interrogating the racial 
pathologization that undergirds such as idea. Psychologists and pundits repeatedly question why 
black students fare poorly on annual accountability exams, often anchoring their explanations in 
sociocultural rationale rather than economic explanations. By ignoring the economic foundations 
for standardized testing disparities—and, by extension, the way race is concomitant with 
economic inequality in American society—educational pundits continue to locate low black test 
scores as a phenomenon explainable by students’ ineffable blackness. As such, black students 
who perform outside the expected band of marginal performance continue to evade 
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psychological diagnosis: black students are still markedly less likely to be diagnosed as gifted. 286  
Black nerd subcultures, meanwhile, are examined for the phenomenon of “acting white,” as 
though black Americans could not conceive of fandom and passionate study otherwise.287  The 
concept of the achievement gap has, meanwhile, endured its ability to dislocate black students 
from the structural bases for their disadvantageous standardized testing scores. The logic for the 
achievement gap emerged in the early postwar period, when the American state began to shift 
from overtly racist institutional policies toward technologies that maintained, to a considerable 
degree, the country’s foundational racial order. Standardized testing allowed a psychometric 
sheen for racial disparities in the military and, eventually, higher education—all while absolving 
the state from culpability in the persistence of a black underclass. Race-patterned score gaps, 
whatever the psychometric nomenclature, continue to be made the burden of black students 
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rather than the product of standardized testing regimes that naturalize white middle-class 
educational opportunities as an ideal norm.  
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CHAPTER FOUR: BAD AT MATH: STANDARDIZED TESTING, 
MATHEMATICS ACHIEVEMENT, AND GENDER POLITICS 
 
 Over the past several decades, the relationship between girls and mathematical 
achievement has gone from being seen as a largely unremarkable fact of life to a chronic social 
problem. Girls who are good at math pursue degrees and careers in mathematical fields less 
frequently than boys with similar talents. In the early postwar period, functionalist theory 
chalked this phenomenon up to sex roles: society ran more smoothly when men and women 
pursued life paths that fit commonly-accepted sex roles, and those who bucked those trends must 
have some abnormal qualities to their personality. Along with second-wave feminism came a 
thorough examination of why women remained in the margins of math and science—and many 
argued that the actual problem was the widespread social belief in mathematical talent as a 
distinctively masculine trait. Yet the belief persists among many researchers that something 
innate, some small bit of genetics, holds girls back from mathematical excellence. As these 
arguments stormed within academic and mainstream circles, the number of women pursuing 
high education vastly expanded. Women now earn the clear majority of postsecondary degrees, 
yet remain a minority in math and related subjects—with no clear consensus on why this 
phenomenon continues.  
 All along the way, standardized testing provided the fuel for researchers’ arguments 
about the true reason girls had considerably different experiences with math than boys. For some 
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researchers, standardized test data provided a way to show that social attitudes toward proper 
feminine behavior made otherwise talented girls disinvest in mathematics during adolescence. 
For others, standardized testing data illustrated that girls were rewarded for behavior and 
obedience in the classroom rather than talent, and that boys naturally had a numerical edge 
among the most mathematically gifted youth. Some held an ambivalent position between these 
two extremes—but argued that the blunt-force misuse of standardized test scores by college 
admissions officer and scholarship organizations essentially reinforced whatever social problems 
already existed by denying mathematically talented young women equal education opportunities. 
None of these positions, however, seriously questioned the use of standardized testing in itself. 
Critics of the findings gathered through one standardized math test would instead use other 
standardized testing data to stake a competing claim. Standardized testing data thus became an 
increasingly valuable currency in the ongoing argument about what, exactly, limited girls’ 
mathematical achievement—an argument unlikely to go away anytime soon as educational 
policymakers and pundits consider how the United States can best develop experts in STEM 
fields.  
Gender Ideology, Postwar Science, and Functionalist Theory  
 Gender is a foundational power relation in American society. Gender not only includes 
the social meaning of perceived biological differences—those which transform males into men 
and females into women—but also the laws, policies, practices, and symbolic representations that 
enforce a power dynamic in which men possess control over women. This system is typically 
rooted in the idea that society should reflect a presumed natural order in which heterosexual 
couples reproduce (both themselves and their values), and in which women’s primary 
responsibilities revolve around children and the home. Gender thus not only involves the power 
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dynamics within interpersonal relations, but also the mechanisms used to give societies order and 
structure, as well as the cultural productions borne from social relations. As an ideology, gender 
is pervasive but incomplete—filled with inconsistencies, contradictions, and variations at all 
levels. Gender persists because it is replicated, however messily, at every social level, through 
institutions and with other forms of power, such as race or class. Gender also persists because of 
the repercussions for deviating too far from social norms: homosexuals, transgender and 
genderqueer people, masculine women, and feminine men have historically faced legal, 
occupational, and physical punishment for their actions and identities. Hence gender persists as a 
power dynamic because its malleability and incompleteness also makes it resilient.288  
 The modern American state has served an important but peculiar role in altering gender 
norms. On the one hand, the post-1945 American state has been a source of enumerated rights 
based on sex and gender, whether by federal legislation (the 1964 Civil Rights Act, Title IX of 
the Education Amendments of 1972), or judicial decision (Roe v. Wade, Griswold v. 
Connecticut, Obergefell v. Hodges). On the other hand, specific constitutional protections of 
rights on the basis of sex remain absent, despite a nearly successful push for the Equal Rights 
Amendment in the 1970s. The federal protections that do extend to equitable private sector 
treatment—namely, the Lily Ledbetter Act of 2009—only provide extended timelines for the 
right to file suit against discriminatory companies rather than mandate equal pay for equal work. 
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The federated structure of the United States, meanwhile, creates different gender-based rights 
and regulations based on where they live. The ability to push back against gender-based 
discrimination is complicated when an aggrieved class inhabits multiple marginalized social 
categories (e.g., black women) because American law—and by extension, social institutions 
related to the law—often cannot account for the unique state of discrimination borne from 
intersecting identities. The state, as a political entity, thus plays a role in the politics of gender, 
but in a haphazard and variable fashion reflective of the idiosyncratic features of American 
federalism.289  
 Experimental science has likewise been a historically powerful tool for maintaining and 
reinforcing gendered social relations. As a historical phenomenon, science remains attached to its 
social contexts, as does its practitioners. The scientific appeal to objectivity does not erase the 
political contexts for certain lines of inquiry, the basis of credibility, or burdens of proof. 
Scientific inquiry often naturalizes social gender disparities in several ways. Scientists often use 
male bodies (and, more specifically, white male bodies) as the default in their research—
inadvertently relegating female bodies as defective variables or ignoring them altogether. 
Scientific research has also been used as the means to justify preexisting gender stereotypes and 
subordination; such research begs the question, but typically shields itself with a scientific appeal 
to objectivity in order to dodge claims of logical fallacy. These practices are reinforced by 
journalistic and layperson treatments of scientific studies that either exaggerate the results of a 
study or insert a gendered interpretation where none had explicitly existed before. The enduring 																																																								
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result is that scientists persistently seek to explain gendered differences through biological rather 
than social causes. These explanations often also ignore the relationship between society and 
biology—namely, how long-term conditions for a certain social group may create observable 
biological peculiarities. Instead, non-genital organs are often assigned a sex and treated as 
though they exhibit discernably male or female tendencies. Above all, the human brain becomes 
gendered—“the male brain,” “the female brain”—in a way that often presumes that a brain’s 
capacity is predetermined by prenatal sexual development. The gap between scientific research 
and its nonscientific discussion thus frequently turns the brain into a sexed organ.290  
 Sitting at the intersecting gender politics of the state and scientific discourse, postwar 
American state-sponsored science maintained a complicated relationship with women in the 
field. Women did enter higher education in larger numbers after World War II, but their 
participation in scientific fields of study was complicated by social policies that privileged 
educating male veterans, as well as persistent social beliefs that limited women’s advancement in 
the workplace. Those women who did secure roles in the emerging postwar state-science 
complex—by and large women from the white middle class—often had to assure colleagues and 
broader society that their participation in basic and applied research would not come at the cost 
of their responsibilities as wives and mothers. These women scientists and engineers, working 
largely between first- and second-wave feminism, instead emphasized the importance of their 
trained brains to the state. Deemed “technocratic feminists” by the historian Laura Micheletti 
Puaca, many early postwar women engineers and scientists emphasized that their brainpower 																																																								
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was as useful to national security as that of their male counterparts. Yet, by insisting a 
“’Woman’s Place Is In the Lab, Too,’” these technocratic feminists could also subtly assure 
colleagues and the general public that they were not opposed to traditional feminine spaces.291  
While these women made tremendous headway gaining acceptance in their field, they also 
operated largely without workplace protections or positions of power within their disciplines—
ultimately limiting the way individual achievements benefited women within their fields, or were 
even recounted within the historical record. 
 Postwar social science, meanwhile, remained wedded to functionalist theory, which 
influenced the types of questions researchers asked about their human subjects. Within 
functionalist logic, social differences between men and women were not a problem but, rather, a 
core feature of society itself. Functionalist theories upheld “the status quo in sex role allocation, 
differentiation and reward”—that is, the maintenance of distinct sex-based social roles.292  Boys 
and girls, then, needed to be socialized appropriately in order to fulfill social expectations—
expectations rooted in sustained, naturalized, sexualized differences between men and women. 
As seen in one 1955 U.S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW) publication on 
raising adolescents, the family unit was at once an incubator of appropriate roles and an arsenal 
against subversive ideas. HEW encouraged parents to “forestall criticism of a youth by helping 
him build up interests that will make him acceptable to his peers,” lest they risk their son to “be 																																																								
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considered a ‘sissy’—something any normal boy shies away from.”293  Tomboys who refused “to 
see satisfactions in the feminine role they [were] expected to play,” had been, like their sissy 
counterparts, failed by their parents and risked dismantling social order.294  Functionalist theory 
helped blur the line between what aspects of sex roles were natural and which were social 
constructs by suggesting that, in the end, parsing the difference was not productive. 
 Midcentury social scientists carried these ideas into their research on mathematical 
achievement, often naturalizing the difference between girls’ and boys’ math skills in the 
process. The very idea of achievement was frequently discussed in gendered terms: the social 
problem of the underachiever was often framed as an issue largely faced by boys and men. (One 
trade paperback went so far as to assert “80 percent of children with educational problems are 
boys.”295)  Although researchers typically found that girls fared better in many verbal 
standardized tests, boys scored better in certain mathematical standardized tests, particularly 
those involving spatial reasoning and arithmetic reasoning. Some psychologists who did not find 
sex differences in achievement test scores openly questioned whether their own findings were 
baseless or if the test-makers had already reformatted their test without anyone’s knowledge.296  
Psychologists also observed marked sex differences in school achievement—while girls 
outperformed boys in grade school, men fared better than women in college—but also suggested 
that the “cultural artifacts” which created these trends were not at odds with a well-functioning 
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society.297  Girls performed better in math class because teachers rewarded cooperation and 
obedience, traits that boys had difficulty expressing at earlier ages. The solution for these 
problems in math achievement, some psychologists reasoned, was not to create sex-neutral 
pedagogy, but simply to have boys start school a year later: educational institutions would thus 
allow the underlying natural order of things to run more smoothly.  
 Some early postwar psychologists tried to make sense of women who bucked trends by 
faring better on math standardized tests than verbal ones. This sometimes involved the use of 
personality inventories to determine whether girls who did well on standardized math tests were 
also abnormally masculine.298  In one early postwar study, women at Santa Barbara College who 
scored disproportionately high on the quantitative components of the American Council on 
Education Psychological Examination were then administered the Minnesota Multiphasic 
Personality Inventory (MMPI).299  The researcher conducting the study, William Altus, 
categorized questions on the MMPI by their potential for revealing personality oddities, and 
compared the answers of mathematically minded women to their verbal-minded schoolmates. 
Altus deduced from the responses that a young woman skilled at math “tends statistically to be a 
somewhat more anxious, straightlaced, conventional, dysphoric person who dislikes to read”—a 																																																								
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lavender-tinted obsessive-compulsive type who, “beneath their Pollyanna-ish, conventional 
façade, [has] considerable anxiety and some prickly-pear attitudes.”300  In this line of thinking, 
women who learned differently than typical women—who learned like men—had to have been 
socially and psychologically abnormal.  
Mathematical Feminism and Biological Essentialism in the Second Wave 
 During the late 1960s and early 1970s, feminist and liberationist politics began to change 
the kinds of questions many researchers asked in their work—and, in turn, mainstream 
publications influenced the way their audiences perceived academic examinations of socially 
radical questions. This often led readers to encounter feminist ideas through a filter of detached 
journalistic skepticism. Consumers of Psychology Today could, for example, read an article on 
observable differences between baby boys and girls—one peppered with observations that the 
nature-versus-nurture debate “now sets off furious blasts among interest groups from women’s 
liberation to gay liberation.”301  Readers could also find this swirl of journalistic coverage and 
rhetorical dismissiveness in the pages of Time, which devoted many column inches during the 
time to actions of prominent feminists. Kate Millett could, at once, be on the cover of Time and 
regarded as “the Mao Tse-tung of Women’s Liberation” within the feature story.302  Writers for 
the magazine portrayed Shulameth Firestone and Elizabeth Janeway as women with good 
premises but extremist conclusions—and observed that “[m]any of the new feminists are 
surprisingly violent in mood, and seem to be trying, in fact, to repel other women than attract 
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them.”303   This journalistic approach to women’s liberation—as Gloria Steinem would 
characterize it, an effort to “[report] it as a small, privileged, rather lunatic event instead of the 
major revolution in consciousness”—helped cultivate a public that became more aware of gender 
politics while calling into question the legitimacy of its tenets.304  
 Federal actions also changed the gender dynamics of educational policy and 
organizational culture during the 1970s. The broadest, most substantive changes came through 
Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, which was eventually signed into law by 
President Gerald Ford in May 1975.305  The title pegged equal educational opportunity to federal 
financial funding: schools at every level of education had to commit to nondiscriminatory 
practices if they wanted to keep receiving money.306  This requirement extended not only to 
curricular and extracurricular offerings, but also admissions, housing provisions, and retirement 
annuities. Title IX also created a new level of educational bureaucracy—the Title IX 
Coordinator—and mandated that such officials be easy to identify and access, whether at an 
individual university or in a state education agency. Yet the vast majority of state educational 
agencies failed to create Title IX bureaucratic structures within the one-year timeline mandated 
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by the law.307  Although the federal government had created policy protecting the education of 
women, not all components of higher educational bureaucracy were quick to comply. 
 These broader social, political, and educational changes made it possible for certain 
researchers to challenge prevailing assumptions about why girls failed to find equal footing in 
mathematics. Some—particularly the University of Madison–Wisconsin mathematics 
educationist Elizabeth Fennema—used standardized testing data as the means to question the 
actual roots of sex differences in girls’ mathematical achievement. Before releasing her own 
research, Fennema had already tapped into the broader emergent feminist critique of schools as 
sites that reinforced sexist social hierarchies. Fennema engaged in conversations sparked by 
other educational writers who argued that, contrary to the prevailing notion that schools were 
spaces for girls to shine, existing educational curricula had been “denying girls and women the 
right to full development of their cognitive and emotional abilities.”308  Fennema believed that, 
through “cold empirical data,” feminist researchers could clearly illustrate that every aspect of 
American education—from elementary school through college—contained material, attitudes, 
and practices that kept women from seeing themselves as mathematically-minded beings.  
 In 1974, Fennema published a meta-analysis designed to challenge the prevailing 
assumption within both academia and the greater public that girls simply were not as capable at 
mathematics as boys. In a meta-analysis, researchers comb through previous studies on a topic, 
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often conducted over a number of years and with many particular focuses, and use statistical 
techniques to synthesize findings in a way that makes a more potent statement about what 
research suggests in general. Looking through fifteen years’ worth of educational research, 
Fennema wanted to address two core questions: What, if anything, did studies indicate were 
actual differences between girls and boys in mathematics achievement?  And what did the 
research suggest were the root causes of any differences?  Fennema did not want her meta-
analysis to be misinterpreted as some hunt for the exact age at which girls became naturally less 
mathematically capable than boys. Instead, Fennema used the method of meta-analysis to make a 
feminist critique of the American educational system: girls’ diminished math skills were a 
symptom of learning environments that held little value in the idea that women could participate 
as equals. If the aggregate research indicated that boys had better math skills than girls, Fennema 
argued, then American educators had “a moral responsibility as well as an economic necessity” 
to thoroughly redesign American mathematics education to eliminate sex bias.309  Only then 
could girls live up to actual natural potential.  
 Fennema’s meta-analysis, printed in the Journal for Research in Mathematics Education, 
revealed no deep-seeded differences in girls’ and boys’ mathematical skills. The existing 
research on children up to the third grade showed “no consistent significant differences” in sex-
based mathematical capabilities, and studies on students between fourth and ninth grade were too 
erratic to make any meaningful overarching conclusions.310  Among later grades, the only clear 
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point at which boys outperformed girls in mathematics was in standardized achievement tests 
administered to high-school seniors—and, even then, only one study had produced such results. 
In that study, conducted by Margaret Backman in 1972, sex marked a greater distinction between 
achievement test scores than ethnicity or socioeconomic status. Backman nonetheless cautioned 
against assuming these differences had any biological component, given that “the social 
implications of the physical differences [between males and females] can play an important role 
in the development of characteristic abilities.”311  Even the scant pieces of research Fennema 
could find suggesting boys out-tested girls in math already came with the disclaimer that nothing 
about the results was strictly a matter of biology. 
 Fennema deduced that the only reasonably clear trend was that high school boys had 
greater tested strength in “higher-level cognitive tasks”—leading her to conclude that this late-
developing difference must have stemmed from a series of social causes.312  As Fennema noted, 
girls were less likely to take as many math courses as boys, while boys were more likely to drop 
out of high school; these concurrent phenomena created high schools in which boys who 
remained often had more extensive mathematical instruction and thus tested better on 
standardized tests and in studies. For Fennema, the social basis for these differences meant that 
sexism pervaded both American education and mathematics-education research. The 
presumption that girls would eventually fare worse than boys in mathematics created lazy 
research methods and destructive classroom practices that held teenage girls back from their full 
potential. At the very least, teachers and researchers who understood that girls may approach 																																																																																																																																																																																		
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math differently than boys yet found no incentive to develop new learning methods only 
reinforced the ideas that girls’ approach to the subject was abnormal, unorthodox, and imprecise. 
 Fennema soon teamed up with University of Wisconsin–Madison psychologist Julia 
Sherman to develop an instrument for measuring girls’ comfort with mathematics. Using a grant 
from the National Science Foundation, the researchers developed the Fennema-Sherman Scales 
in 1976 to empirically gauge girls’ perceptions of parent and teacher interest in their math 
studies, their levels of confidence and anxiety toward math, and “the degree to which [they] see 
mathematics as a male, neutral, or female domain.”313  Fennema and Sherman sought to measure 
the factors that kept girls out of advanced math classes in high school despite displaying similar 
aptitude to boys when given standardized math tests at earlier ages. The pair built their namesake 
scales partly in reaction to published findings from the recently developed National Assessment 
of Educational Progress (NAEP), which indicated that marginal differences in math skills 
between 9- and 13-year-old boys and girls ballooned into gaps that could “only be described as 
overwhelming” by young adulthood.314  Even though NAEP asserted that the score gap was “the 
result of different but systematic cultural reinforcements for the sexes,” Fennema and Sherman 
argued that the study suffered from poor sampling techniques and, worse yet, the results had 
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been misreported in broader circles as a sign of boys’ natural superior mathematical minds.315  
The Fennema-Sherman Scales, by contrast, could provide empirical evidence on mathematical 
attitudes that would be less prone to interpretive mangling among nonexperts.  
 Using their scales, Fennema and Sherman made the case that attitude was everything, at 
least when it came to achievement in mathematics. Fennema and Sherman argued that girls 
pulled back from taking additional math classes in later grades “because mathematics is 
perceived as a male domain” in broader society.316  Girls instead gravitated toward fields of 
study that reflected socially sanctioned sex roles. This conditioned avoidance of mathematics led 
girls to pursue fewer extracurricular activities that strengthened their spatial reasoning skills as 
well as underestimate their problem-solving skills—social phenomena misread as a natural 
phenomena when comparing girls’ and boys’ performance on relevant standardized test 
questions. Conversely, when Fennema and Sherman compared standardized math test 
performances for boys and girls who took a similar number of math courses, significant 
differences between the two groups evaporated. Although other factors, particularly 
socioeconomic status, altered the attitudes girls and boys held toward mathematics, Fennema and 
Sherman maintained that girls’ measurably lower confidence in learning math and stronger belief 
in mathematics as a men’s field provided a clearer basis for test score gaps than any alleged 
natural differences.317 																																																								
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 As Fennema and Sherman argued for the social basis of girls’ mathematical 
demoralization, other women in mathematics created work for youth, adults, and colleagues alike 
that showcased women’s longstanding contributions to the discipline. These efforts emerged as 
women mathematicians formally organized during the early 1970s. Realizing that American 
academic mathematical associations paid little attention to the small amount of women within 
their ranks, American University professor Mary Gray and several other women mathematicians 
created the Association for Women in Mathematics (AWM) in 1971. The AWM spent part of its 
early years not only holding well-attended panels on women’s historical contributions to 
mathematics, but also printing biographical and thematic essays on women mathematicians in its 
newsletter, such as “Lady Lovelace and the Analytical Engine,” “Emmy Noether: Twentieth 
Century Mathematician and Women,” and “Women in Combinatorics.”318   
 Other researchers eventually developed biographical anthologies for broader audiences. 
Some anthologies, particularly those created by mathematics educator Teri Perl, integrated 
biographical sketches of past and present women mathematicians with short activities related to 
their innovations. In Perl’s workbooks, readers examined parabola diagrams after learning about 
Hypatia of Alexandria, folded various three-dimensional models following an essay on Grace 
Chisholm Young’s contributions to plane geometry, and translated decimals into binary numbers 
after reading the stories of the women mathematicians of the Masdison Academic Computing 
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Center. While other authors created less interactive biographical anthologies, they shared a 
similar belief: the accomplishments of the women highlighted in these collections should not be 
taken as a sign that anything resembling gender parity in the field of mathematics had been 
achieved. Rather, these women became preeminent mathematicians amid a modern Western 
“feminine mathique” that placed mathematical proficiency “at variance with one’s 
womanhood.”319  Their deep influence on mathematics, these authors emphasized, should be 
viewed as a reminder of the countless women discouraged from the field. How many Sophie 
Germains or Sonya Kovalevskys could have existed in the absence of patriarchal institutions and 
social mores?  
 Not all researchers ascribed to a social model for girls’ mathematical shortcomings, 
however. Fennema and Sherman’s main critics, the educational psychologists Camilla Persson 
Benbow and Julian Stanley, offered a competing hypothesis based on their observations of 
academically gifted youth during the early 1980s. Although Benbow and Stanley accepted 
Fennema’s claim that gender-related mathematical differences could be observed in early 
adolescent students, the pair argued that such differences stemmed from girls’ “less well-
developed mathematical reasoning ability.”320  The pair argued that girls did not do worse than 
boys in mathematics because they took fewer math courses—but, instead, that girls took fewer 
math courses because they had inferior math skills, a fact reflected by their test scores. For 
Benbow and Stanley, “superior male mathematical ability” was most likely “an expression of a 
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combination of both exogenous and endogenous variables,” but differences in the math courses 
teenagers took carried no weight.321 
 The pair also used standardized testing data to build their competing claim. The 
researchers analyzed the SAT performances of roughly 10,000 junior high-aged girls and boys, 
all of whom had taken exam as part of the long-term Study of Mathematically Precocious 
Youth.322  Benbow and Stanley maintained that measuring younger adolescents’ mathematical 
capabilities through the SAT would eliminate the need to control for differential coursework; 
gifted junior high girls and boys were far more likely to have identical math classes than their 
senior high counterparts. Although gifted boys and girls performed equally well on the verbal 
portion of the SAT, boys consistently outperformed girls on the math portion of the standardized 
test. Further, boys in the study were far more likely than girls to receive high math scores on the 
SAT (at least 600 on the classic 200-800 scale)—and in any given cohort, the highest-ranking 
boy earned anywhere from 30 to 190 points more on the SAT math section than the highest-
scoring girl.323  When students from earlier cohorts later took the SAT for college admissions 
purposes, the same general pattern held: boys continued to outperform girls on the math section. 
If the nation’s most academically gifted youth continuously produced gendered score gaps on the 																																																								
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SAT math section before any of the students had a chance to differ in their math class choices, 
Stanley and Benbow concluded, then Fennema and Sherman’s hypothesis did not hold up. 
Whether of not such boys eventually took calculus more frequently than girls could not change 
the fact that a foundational, partially innate, difference was already in place. 
 Benbow and Stanley’s study, published in Science at the end of 1980, soon received 
criticism from various scientists, psychologists, and educational researchers. Science published 
an assortment of these critiques several months later. Some writers, such as the physicist Carl 
Tomizuka and consultant Sheila Tobias, argued that boys and girls’ willingness to participate in 
the study was itself the byproduct of gendered social attitudes toward mathematics. If girls were 
typically more reluctant to join math programs for gifted youth, and often discouraged from 
participating in extracurricular activities that sharpened math skills, the pool of students available 
for the study had already been markedly socially influenced before early adolescence. Other 
critics, particularly the scientists Elizabeth Stage and Robert Karplus, found fault with the 
assumption that students who took similar courses had similar experiences in the classroom: girls 
and boys had been shown to receive considerably different treatment in math instruction even in 
elementary school. The mathematician Edith Luchins and psychologist Abraham Luchins 
questioned why, knowing how difficult it would be to control for pervasive cultural factors, 
Benbow and Stanley did not focus instead on designing question types that would eliminate sex 
differences in math test performance. One Department of Education employee wondered what, if 
anything, the SAT genuinely revealed about mathematical ability. The math section of the SAT 
consisted largely of word problems—a question type prone to content bias. The employee 
lamented that, more than anything, Benbow and Stanley’s convenient depiction of the SAT as a 
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test of mathematical reasoning only contributed to the rhetorical laziness with which researchers 
generalized their findings:  
“Should we ever discover a genetic and organic basis for 
mathematical ability, we can be certain at a minimum that some 
girls will have more ability that almost all boys—a subtlety that 
keeps getting lost in our ‘Boys are more or less X than girls’ 
language.”324 
 
 Benbow and Stanley chastised their critics for failing to understand the nuance within 
their findings. As the two researchers insisted, “superior male mathematical ability” and “greater 
male ability in spatial tasks” should not have been misinterpreted to mean boys were “inherently, 
intrinsically, or genetically abler” than girls—just that endogenous factors could be one of 
several reasons boys outperform girls on the SAT math section and spatial reasoning tests.325  To 
Stanley and Benbow, questions about earlier forces that discouraged girls from participating in 
the study evaded the numerical reality that fewer girls qualified—and those girls who did qualify 
for the study earned lower average scores and lower peak scores than the boys in their cohorts. 
Benbow was far more blunt in her statements to popular media about the meaning of her and 
Stanley’s research. Insisting that the observed test score data was accurate—that the numbers did 
not lie—Benbow stated that the backlash to her research stemmed from a discomfort with the 
truth: women could not “’bring themselves to accept sexual difference in aptitude,’” much less 
help girls “’accept it and go from there.’”326 For Benbow and Stanley, Science had not provided a 
																																																								
 324 Susan Chipman, in “Letters: Mathematical Ability: Is Sex a Factor?” Science 212, no. 4491 (April 10, 
1981): 116. Other letters referenced in this paragraph can be found in the same letters section.  
 325 Camilla Persson Benbow and Julian Stanley, response in “Letters: Mathematical Ability: Is Sex A 
Factor?” 118. 
 326 Camilla Persson Benbow, quoted in “The Gender Factor in Math: A New Study Says Males may be 
Naturally Abler than Females,” Time 116, no. 24 (December 15, 1980). See also: Dennis A. Williams and Patricia 
King, “Do Males Have a Math Gene?” Newsweek, December 15, 1980: 73. 
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space for meaningful criticism but “a forum for subjective judgments and anecdotal evidence.”327  
By their logic, the math portion of the SAT had captured irrefutable data—something calculable 
and therefore true—that feminist politics willfully ignored.  
 Benbow and Stanley’s line of reasoning held value at a moment when sociobiology 
revived the idea of primordial bases for human social patterns. Stemming largely from the work 
of insect biologist E.O. Wilson, sociobiology argued that the most useful starting point for 
understanding human behavior is to observe similar behaviors found in other animals, and to 
consider the evolutionary and preservationist purposes for certain social phenomena. As Wilson 
suggested in the infamous final chapter of his 1975 work Sociobiology: The New Synthesis, “the 
time [had] come for ethics to be removed temporarily from the hands of the philosophers and 
biologized.”328  Altruism, territoriality, and homosexuality made far more sense, Wilson noted, if 
one first accounted for the behavior of chimpanzees and other mammals. Wilson’s arguments, 
along with those made by contemporaries such as David Barash and Mary Midgley, sparked a 
wave of contentious debates within scientific circles—soon morphing into a verbal slugfest in 
which sociobiology’s critics accused its supporters of being quasi-fascist eugenicists, and its 
defenders dismissed detractors as groupthink leftist conformists. Although sociobiology did not 
necessarily advance wildly novel ideas, it built upon the previous generation of sociological 
functionalist theory to offer an even more essentialist explanation for social sex roles: men and 
women were, in many ways, no different than the males and females of other species, whose 
social patterns also follow from the reality of sexual difference.329  More generally, it added 																																																								
 327 Benbow and Stanley, “Letters,” 121. 
 328 Edward O. Wilson, Sociobiology: The New Synthesis (Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard, 1975), 
562. 
 329 Sociobiology Study Group of Science for the People, “Sociobiology: Another Biological Determinism,” 
Bioscience 26, no. 3 (March, 1976): 182, 184-6; Edward O. Wilson, “Academic Vigilatism and the Political 
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weight to criticisms of feminism. If women’s liberation had the right ideas, critics mused, why 
hadn’t these changes already come to fruition?330  While sociobiology did not directly influence 
Benbow or Stanley’s research, the theory gave currency to academic arguments at the time that 
suggested deep-wired biology played some unavoidable role in the differences between men and 
women—that social forms followed biological function.  
 Benbow and Stanley followed up their initial report with additional studies that held the 
SAT as the most accurate gauge of sex-based differences in mathematical reasoning ability. The 
researchers repeated their analysis of precocious adolescent performance on the SAT with a 
second, larger group of boys and girls. The same patterns Benbow and Stanley observed with 
their earlier subjects reappeared. Far more boys than girls earned high scores on the math section 
of the SAT, and the ratio of boys to girls grew more severe as the level of performance 
increased.331  Benbow and Stanley also analyzed the high-school math coursework, later SAT 
performances, and college majors of first-year college students who had participated in their 
earlier Study of Mathematically Precocious Youth. Overall, these students’ average SAT scores 
were now roughly 200 points higher than the national average for college-bound high school 
seniors—but the gap between men and women’s SAT math scores had inched even wider than 
what had been measured in their early adolescence. Although the young men and women had, on 
																																																																																																																																																																																		
Significance of Sociobiology,” Bioscience 26, no. 3 (March, 1976): 183, 187-190; Nicholas Wade, “Sociobiology: 
Troubled Birth for New Discipline,” Science 191, no. 4234 (March 19, 1976): 1151-1155; David Smillie, “The 
Challenge of Sociobiology,” American Psychologist February 1979: 187-188; and W.R. Albury, “Politics and 
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 330 For one contemporary example of a writer musing over feminism’s inability to overhaul certain career 
patterns among women and assuming biology must play some role in that lack of change, see: Samuel C. Florman, 
“Engineering and the Female Mind,” Harper’s February 1, 1978: 57-63. 
 331 Camilla Persson Benbow and Julian Stanley, “Sex Differences in Mathematical Reasoning Ability: 
More Facts,” Science 222, no. 4627 (December 2, 1983): 1029-1031. Among nearly-identical pools of seventh-grade 
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average, taken over four years’ worth of math courses in high school, men typically began taking 
advanced math classes earlier than women and took more extensive coursework, particularly 
calculus. Despite this, gifted girls typically received slightly better class grades than boys, and 
were more likely in their first year of college to declare a major in mathematical sciences. 
Benbow and Stanley nonetheless concluded that, “[i]f one is interested in the question of why 
women do not pursue careers in mathematics and science as frequently as men do,” one had to 
make use of data which provided a logical explanation for such phenomenon.332  For Stanley and 
Benbow, only the gap in math SAT scores and what it suggested about innate differences offered 
that.  
 The two also dismissed the claims of researchers who challenged the usefulness of the 
SAT over other standardized math tests. What ensued was an argument over what, really, 
different standardized math tests measured and whether an individual’s performance on one type 
of standardized math test gave any meaningful data about the skills measured by a second 
standardized math test. Educational sociologists Aaron Pallas and Karl Alexander reconsidered 
the differential coursework hypothesis, arguing that sex-related differences in SAT math scores 
more likely reflected the factors that kept girls out of advanced math classes rather than whatever 
skill differences already existed by the time girls and boys entered high school. Pallas and 
Alexander tested their hypothesis by calculating what factors caused a test score gap to emerge 
between when ninth-grade boys and girls took School and College Ability Test (SCAT) to when 
they took the SAT as high school seniors. The pair determines that test score gaps developed 
																																																								
 332 Camilla Persson Benbow and Julian Stanley, “Consequences in High School and College of Sex 
Differences in Mathematical Ability: A Longitudinal Perspective,” American Educational Research Journal 19, no. 
4 (Winter 1982): 619. 
 185 
largely in high school and were largely “due to the sparse quantitative programs of study 
typically pursued by girls.”333  
  Stanley and Benbow countered Pallas and Alexander by pointing out, exasperatedly, the 
incompatibility of the standardized tests used in the study. Of course Pallas and Alexander found 
no sex-related test score gap in the SCAT only to see one emerge in the SAT: the tests measured 
drastically different aspects of mathematical ability. Performances on the SCAT, which was 
thick with word problems and focused on computations and arithmetic concepts, could not be 
used to gauge how test-takers fared on an algebra-dense test such as the SAT.334  When 
challenged more bluntly by other researchers to defend the interpretive significance of high SAT 
scores, Benbow asserted that superior math scores on the SAT “[related] closely to success in 
high-level, fast-paced mathematics and science courses, to educational acceleration, and 
(especially) to the choosing of careers requiring excellent quantitative ability.”335  The SAT 
remained useful for Benbow and Stanley because it was the only standardized test to give a 
reasonably clear idea of gifted adolescents’ likely college and career paths.  
 As Benbow and Stanley published and defended their findings, the demographics of 
American higher education and labor were in the middle of several major shifts. In 1970, U.S. 
colleges and universities enrolled about 50% more men than women: 4.4 million versus 3 
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million. While men’s enrollment numbers rose throughout the 1970s, women’s skyrocketed, 
nearly doubling by the end of the decade. During the 1980s, women’s enrollment rates continued 
to grow as men’s stagnated. By the end of the 1980s, about 1.25 million more women than men 
were enrolled in higher education. This broad shift, however, varied depending on students’ 
ages. Men outnumbered women in U.S. colleges at every measured age level in 1970—but by 
1980 men only outnumbered women among college students in their twenties. The only 
consistent point at which men outnumbered women at the end of the 1980s were among students 
aged 22 to 24. Despite the change in the composition of college students, the number of men 
who completed at least four years of higher education remained substantially higher than that of 
women during this period, even though more women had completed at least some college. 
Within a generation, women became the larger group on American campuses by a sizeable 
margin—but nonetheless remained less likely to have a four-year degree in hand by the time they 
reached twenty-five.336 
 The gender dynamics of the U.S. workforce also changed noticeably during this period. 
Between 1970 and 1990, the percentage of women over the age of sixteen in the U.S. labor force 
grew from roughly 43% to about 58%, while the percentage of men coasted downward from 
nearly 80% to 76%. During this same time period, the number of civilian men and women in the 
U.S. grew by nearly about 52 million—but as millions of women entered the workforce, millions 
of men left.337  When viewed alongside the rising age of first marriages during the same time 
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period, these labor and education figures suggest a partial—but very incomplete—change for the 
terms of successful young adulthood for many American women.338  Attending college and 
entering the workforce took more and more priority for many women over getting married.339 
Federal Fascination with the Gender Gap 
 By the late 1980s, the academic debate about “sex differences” in mathematical test 
performance had expanded into a broader discussion about the “gender gap.”  The argument had 
expanded beyond the causes of the differences between men and women’s mathematical and 
scientific capabilities, growing to include debates about why the differences endured despite the 
persistent attention paid to it. Standardized testing was central to this shift. As more students 
took more standardized tests, particularly in mathematics, researchers had more data to test 
hypotheses and offer explanations.340  Depending on the study, the gender gap in math 																																																																																																																																																																																		
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standardized test scores was either closing, holding steady, or resurfacing; girls were either 
continually underrated by tests or overrated in the classroom; comparing high school students’ 
standardized test performances provided a useful gauge for assessing social pressures on 
adolescents or ignored more meaningful differences established early in grade school; and 
women’s continued underrepresentation in math and science jobs was a profoundly social issue 
or a bit of feminist mythmaking. Because various researchers used different standardized tests to 
reach contradictory conclusions, testing data held currency for nearly all participants in the 
debate. Whether researchers and pundits believed standardized tests were biased tools that 
perpetuated social disparities, or that they were refined instruments that simply reflected social 
and educational problems, standardized testing data became a valuable commodity.341   
 During the late 1980s, the federal government also took an interest in considering the role 
standardized testing played in perpetuating the gender gap, as well as the general extent of sex 
bias in standardized tests themselves. In a three-panel hearing before its Subcommittee on Civil 
and Constitutional Rights, the House Judiciary Committee examined the role standardized testing 
played in the math and science gender gap. But the testimony did less to point to one clear 																																																																																																																																																																																		
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answer so much as indicate the sheer inextricability of standardized testing from the organization 
and economics of higher education. Among the first panel was Ms. editor Phyllis Rosser, who 
had written about standardized testing bias for both popular magazines and the National Center 
for Fair and Open Testing throughout the 1980s. Rosser asserted that the sheer volume of 
standardized tests used for admissions and scholarships created systemic sex bias in higher 
education. Over three million high-school students took one of three college-readiness 
standardized test (the SAT, ACT, and PSAT), and young women consistently earned higher 
marks in college courses than predicted by their test scores—calling into question the entire 
legitimacy of these exams. If the SAT were an accurate predictor of college-bound women’s 
first-year grades, Rosser argued, “girls would score 20 points higher than boys, rather than 61 
points lower.”342  This systemic under-prediction shut girls out of higher-ranking schools and 
scholarship competitions, eventually causing “a real dollar loss for females in later life, as they 
get less prestigious jobs, earn less money, and have fewer leadership opportunities.”343 
 Not all members of the subcommittee, however, found Rosser’s arguments equally 
compelling. Colorado Representative Patricia Schroeder—the only woman representative in the 
entire House Judiciary Committee—observed that her sixteen-year old daughter already had 
fallen prone to the disorienting effects of surprisingly low test scores: she and her friends began 																																																								
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“to wonder if their high school performance, or if they had charmed their high school teachers, if 
maybe suddenly they’re not as good as they used to be.”344  Schroeder found it unconscionable 
that guidance counselors would likely discourage her daughter’s friends and many other girls 
from applying to certain schools strictly because of these test scores, despite many having 
studied math well beyond what was tested on the PSAT, ACT, and SAT. Alan Slobodin, the 
subcommittee’s Republican minority counsel, remained dubious. Slobodin questioned Rosser to 
define what, exactly, bias was—“I mean, if there’s a one point difference, would you consider 
that bias? How about five points?”—and whether the overall impact of test score differences was 
negative given how some fields, particularly law, had recently experiences a massive surge of 
women.345  How, Slobodin wondered, could these standardized tests be biased if two-thirds of 
their developers are women?  And what if the classrooms themselves produced biased results?  
Although the subcommittee officially deemed the issue of sex bias a topic worth further 
examination, some members remained unconvinced the issue was as drastic as some witnesses 
professed.  
 Rosser submitted with her testimony a reading comprehension passage to illustrate the 
depths to which bias against women pervaded standardized testing content. The short passage, 
taken from the June 1984 version of the SAT, focused on the anthropologist Margaret Mead’s 
depiction of sex roles in food production. Although test-takers were asked to consider the short 
passage’s intent, form, and tone, the passage itself was riddled with several logical 
inconsistencies. The passage’s author chides Mead for making “such a dubious generalization” 																																																								
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about commonly-observed gendered divisions in food preparation—but only after directly 
quoting Mead’s insistence that such divisions “’can be modified, and the modifications provide 
proof that the pattern itself is not something deeply biological.’”346  The author then proposes 
that two patterns actually exist: the basic pattern Mead described, and “one in which food is 
produced by the men with relatively little help from women,” which the author deems “the 
female and male systems of farming.”347  This argument not only was logically needless, as it did 
not depart from Mead’s quoted statement or the idea of sex roles in itself, but also muddied the 
lines between biological and social functions by deeming the variations “male” and “female.”  
Faulty logic aside, Rosser’s bigger concern remained the multiple effects such a passage would 
have on girls who took the SAT. In one of the few instances girls encountered a women 
researcher on a standardized test, they also saw her ideas discredited by an anonymous 
uncredentialed commentator. This experience, by Rosser’s estimation, would not only jar young 
women in the moment by possibly slowing them down and harming their test scores. Such an 
encounter could also have had an discouraging and enduring subconscious effect on their future 
paths of study.  
 The College Board and Educational Testing Service officials interviewed in the 
subsequent panel did not, unsurprisingly, share the same disdain for standardized testing as 
Rosser did. Their defense was that, if anything, standardized testing had opened more pathways 
for woman into colleges and universities than any other method. The gradual decline in women’s 
SAT scores was not a reflection of test bias, but of the expanding number of women who took 
the test. Between the mid-1960s and the early 1980s, women went from being the minority to the 
																																																								
 346 Rosser, document submitted to subcommittee, 17. 
 347 Ibid.  
 192 
majority of SAT candidates—and by 1987, the year of the subcommittee hearing, about 40,000 
more women than men took the exam. This broad trend, these officials stressed, “correspond[ed] 
exactly to the times periods in which the scores of women declined.”348  Because the test-taking 
population was self-selecting (students voluntarily took the exam, regardless of their skill level 
and without any prerequisites), the larger number of women taking the SAT also included more 
racial minorities and women from lower socioeconomic households. These newer test-takers’ 
lower scores were not a reflection of some inferior capacity, officials stressed, but of their lower 
readiness for college based on poorer educational opportunities. If anything, the officials noted, 
the SAT and other standardized admission exams predicted first-year success for women 
accurately while over-predicting the academic success for men. For ETS and the College Board, 
the gender score gap simply reflected a broad influx of new college-goers, using the SAT and 
other standardized tests to access a world previous closed off to them.  
 To counter allegations of test bias, the testing officials submitted several documents that 
detailed the processes Educational Testing Service and the College Board had developed during 
the 1980s to reduce gender stereotypes and analyze peculiar testing results. ETS formalized its 
Sensitivity Review Process several years earlier to ensure tests “contained questions recognizing 
the varied contribution that minority members made to our society” and that “there was no 
inappropriate or offensive material in the tests.”349  Frequently, ETS changed the descriptive 
material of a question for the purpose of diversification without altering the tested concept; 
revising a grammar question to include “a representational women’s reference” to the poet 
Gwendolyn Brooks did not affect the question’s core purpose of seeing whether students could 																																																								
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identify a comma splice. ETS also removed sexist stereotypes and language from its test 
content—depictions of mechanical incompetence, “aviatrix” and other feminized diminutives, 
use of “generic he,” among many others—unless contextually necessary.350  Although the 
College Board and ETS insisted that the SAT and other standardized tests had useful predictive 
capabilities regardless of the demographic group in question, they did acknowledge that some 
individual questions may have elicited wildly different results between certain groups of test-
takers and thus warranted “differential difficulty analysis.”351  For each of the 60 math questions 
on the SAT, ETS and the College Board conducted a differential difficulty analysis between 
white men and white women, comparing the percentage of test-takers in each group who 
answered correctly. The test-makers calculated that the correlation between what these two 
groups found difficult were extremely close, even if the overall gender gap in test performance 
remained persistent. For ETS and the College Board, the continued differences between men and 
women on standardized tests, through real, were not the result of either organization failing to 
scrutinize and improve their measurement tools.  
 The question of who, exactly, was responsible for the persistent gender gap became no 
clearer when the congressional subcommittee took statements from an MIT admissions director 
and a testing reform executive. As the admissions director admitted, women’s lower scores in 
math and science standardized admissions exams led to a consistent under-prediction of their 
final grade point average. The SAT had failed to determine that women at MIT had the same 
																																																								
 350 Educational Testing Service: The ETS Sensitivity Review Process: Guidelines and Procedures 
(Princeton, Educational Testing Service, 1986), 8, 18, 21-23; in congressional testimony at 223, 233, 236-238. 
 351 Thomas F. Donlon “The SAT in a Diverse Society: Fairness and Sensitivity,” College Board Review  
122 (Winter 1981-1982): 6; in congressional testimony at 143. 
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GPA as men, but lower dropout rates.352  Even so, the admissions officer maintained that 
standardized test scores ideally played a supporting role in determining which applicants would 
be accepted; although nonselective schools would have little reason to make test scores the key 
barrier to entry, selective schools typically used them as part of a more complex formula. Yet 
Denise Carty-Bennia, the executive chair of FairTest, stressed in her testimony that over one-
third of colleges and universities had a minimum SAT or ACT score required for admission. 
Schools kept these hard cutoffs, Carty-Bennia noted, despite the College Board’s insistence that 
a student could potentially retake the SAT and earn a score 130 points higher or lower than their 
original marks without any genuine statistical difference. (Even discounting this extreme 
example, most SAT test-takers had a normal variation of about 30 points in either direction for 
each half of the exam.)  When compounded with the number of scholarships premised on 
standardized test scores, a sizeable chunk of higher education admissions—not only who got in 
but also who was rewarded for their potential—had become based on an exacting, highly 
imprecise use of standardized tests that only reinforced existing social biases.353  This misuse of 
tests in admissions and scholarships passed the burden of back onto test-takers: the system may 
be unfair, but you also already knew the hurdle you needed to clear.  
 Although Congress’s investigation of the gender gap stopped short of intervention, some 
state-level governments amended their educational policies during the late 1980s to reduce the 																																																								
 352 Michael C. Behnke, statement to subcommittee, 284. The lower dropout rate is significant because the 
larger pool of women had the opposite effect than it did with SAT scores nationwide, in which a larger number of 
women led to lower average scores. It is also worth noting that the admission director, Michael Benhke, was also a 
Chairman of the New England Regional Council of the College Board and a member of the scholarship selection 
committee for the National Merit Corporation; see congressional testimony at 290. This is not noteworthy for being 
unusual so much as in the difficulty in completely separating testing bureaucracy from admissions bureaucracy. 
 353 Denise Carty-Bennia, statement to subcommittee, 297-301. As Carty-Bennia noted, the College Board 
advised admissions officials that “score differences of less than 66 points on the SAT verbal and SAT mathematical, 
respectively, [had] little significance” (300), a statistical grace window at odds with the admission procedures at 
many schools. 
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effects standardized tests had on girls’ and boys’ life paths. New York in particular restructured 
the way it used the SAT for its two largest college scholarship funds. As a cost-saving measure, 
New York State Education Department began using the SAT as the sole determinant for its 
Regents Scholarship and Empire Scholarship recipients during the late 1970s. After numerous 
complaints that this method discriminated against girls—who, despite being the majority of 
applicants, received well less than half of all state scholarships—the state temporarily switched 
to a formula that considered both SAT scores and high school grades. The state’s legislature 
allowed this method to lapse, leading to class action suit filed on behalf of girls throughout the 
state. The plaintiffs in Sharif v. New York State Education Department alleged that the use of 
SAT scores as the sole determinant for New York’s merit scholarships violated girls’ 
constitutional right to equal protection as well as Title IX provisions. The defendants maintained 
that grade point averages were an unreliable way to gauge which students merited a 
scholarship—particularly after many elite schools fudged records to ensure more of their 
students received Empire and Regents Scholarships, thus maintaining the prestige of their 
programs.  
 The presiding judge for the U.S. District Court of southern New York ruled in favor of 
the plaintiffs. Judge John M. Walker reasoned that New York’s use of SAT scores for 
scholarship funding was so far from the original intended use of standardized tests—and, even 
then, the SAT chronically underpredicted girls’ college achievement—that its sole use in 
determining Regents and Empire scholarship recipients violated girls’ equal protection and Title 
IX rights. Walker asserted that these violations occurred even if no discriminatory intent existed: 
good intentions were no defense for educational sex discrimination. The judge also noted, 
however, that New York could still use SAT scores to decide Regents and Empire awards if the 
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state also used other metrics, or that it could instead develop a standardized achievement test 
specifically suited for determining which students merited state funding. Even when states 
directly intervened in misuses of standardized testing that contributed to lifelong gender gaps in 
mathematical achievement, they never abandoned the idea that a fair standardized test could be 
developed to measure girls’ genuine math skills. Specific tests and the way they were 
mishandled may have perpetuated social gender disparities in math and science, but standardized 
math testing itself was too integral to the business of higher education to remove completely.354 
The Enduring Mystery of the Gender Gap 
 Decades after the debate about girls’ mathematical skills began, several key features 
persist. Most notably, the gendered gap between men and women’s relationship to math and 
science remains, despite continued shifts in the demographics of American higher education and 
the U.S. work force. Although women now outpace men in the number of postsecondary degrees 
they attain—accounting for over half of all doctorates, nearly 60% of all masters degrees, and 
about 57% of all bachelors degrees conferred in the 2013-14 academic year—they remain 
relatively underrepresented in certain scientific and mathematic fields. Whereas women receive 
more degrees in biomedical and psychological disciplines, men significantly outnumber women 																																																								
 354 Sharif by Salahuddin v. New York State Educational Department, 709 F. Supp. 345 (U.S.D.C. Southern 
District of New York), February 7, 1989; Kary L. Moss, “Standardized Tests as a Tool of Exclusion: Improper Use 
of the SAT in New York,” Berkeley Journal of Gender, Law & Justice 4, no. 2 (1989): 230-244, 
http://scholarship.law.berkeley.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1027&context=bglj (last accessed February 25, 
2017); James Barron, “New Scholarship Test Sought By Albany Education Official,” New Work Times May, 26, 
1988: B6; Mark A. Uhlig, “New York State Returns to National Tests for Scholarships,” New York Times October 6, 
1988: B1, B13; Nadine Brozan, “Suit Asserts Bias Against Women in State Schlarship Awards,” New York Times 
November 30, 1988: B6; William Glaberson, “U.S. Court Says Awards Based on S.A.T.’s Are Unfair to Girls,” New 
York Times February 4, 1989: 1, 50; and Philip S. Gutis, “New York Acts to Alter Awards of Scholarships,” New 
York Times February 7, 1989: B2. 
 The following year, girls received more Regents Scholarships than boys—which, despite being a rather 
slim majority, was the first time it had happened in the 77-year history of the award. The New York Department of 
Education had calculated that using only the (had it been allowed) would have given boys a slight, but not 
overwhelming, majority—with the inverse holding true if the state only took school grades into account. See: Sam 
Howe Verhovek, “Girls Take 51.3% in Regents Awards,” New York Times March 4, 1990: 28. 
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in computer science, engineering, mathematics, and physical science degrees; taken altogether, 
the gap within STEM fields has remained stagnant for the last several years.355  While women 
make up nearly half of the American workforce, as well as half of the college-educated active 
workforce, they only make up one quarter of workers in STEM occupations. Despite STEM 
occupations providing considerably higher wages and relatively smaller gender wage gaps than 
the average job, women with degrees in mathematics, engineering, technology or physical 
sciences remain “less likely than their male counterparts to work in a STEM occupation.”356  As 
STEM has grown into a prized, sometimes fetishized field of study, women remain a marginal 																																																								
 355 U.S. Department of Education, National Center for Education Statistics, Fast Facts: Degrees conferred 
by race and sex” https://nces.ed.gov/fastfacts/display.asp?id=72 (last accessed January 28, 2017); “Table 318.30: 
“Bachelor's, master's, and doctor's degrees conferred by postsecondary institutions, by sex of student and discipline 
division: 2013-14” https://nces.ed.gov/programs/digest/d15/tables/dt15_318.30.asp?current=yes (last accessed 
January 28, 2017); and “Table 318.45: Number and percentage distribution of science, technology, engineering, and 
mathematics (STEM) degrees/certificates conferred by postsecondary institutions, by race/ethnicity, level of 
degree/certificate, and sex of student: 2008-09 through 2013-14”  
https://nces.ed.gov/programs/digest/d15/tables/dt15_318.45.asp?current=yes (last accessed January 28, 2017); all 
from Integrated Postsecondary Education Data System (IPEDS), Fall 2014, Completions component.  
 Women now outearn men in college degrees regardless of race or ethnicity; the bachelor degree gap for the 
2012-2013 academic year ranged from 54% women among students of Asian descent to 65% women among 
African-American students (NCES, “Fast Facts”). Within biomedical and biological disciplines, women made up 
58% of all bachelors recipients, 57% of all masters recipients, and 53% of all doctorate recipients during the 2013-
24 academic year; in psychological disciplines, the respective figures were 77%, 80%, and 75%. In contrast, the 
same figures for computer science degrees were: 18%, 29%, and 21%; for engineering degrees: 18%, 24%, and 
23%; for mathematics degrees: 43%, 41%, and 29%; and for physical sciences: 39%, 38%, and 33% (NCES, Table 
318.30). Although the number of American students receiving degrees in STEM disciplines has grown substantially 
over the past several years—from about 472,000 during the 2008-2009 academic year to almost 604,000 in the 
2013-2014 academic year—the ratio of women to all STEM degree recipients has remained stagnant at and beyond 
the bachelors level, hovering between 31 and 35% (NCES, Table 318.45).  
 356 David Beede, et al., Office of the Chief Economist, U.S. Department of Commerce Economics and 
Statistics Administration, “Women in STEM: A Gender Gap to Innovation,” ESA Issue Brief #04-11, August 2011, 
available http://www.esa.doc.gov/sites/default/files/womeninstemagaptoinnovation8311.pdf; p.1. At the time of this 
report’s publication, women earned on average 79 cents to every dollar that men in did in non-STEM occupations; 
in STEM occupations, women earned on average 86 cents to every dollar a man did. Women in STEM occupations 
also earned, on average, more per hour than their non-STEM counterparts: $31.11 per hour versus $19.26 per hour 
(Beede et al, p. 7). For a sense of what the federal government considers a STEM occupation or STEM 
undergraduate degree, see: David Langdon, et al., Office of the Chief Economist, U.S. Department of Commerce 
Economics and Statistics Administration, “STEM: Good Jobs Now and for the Future,” ESA Issue Brief #03-11, 
July 2011, available http://www.esa.doc.gov/sites/default/files/stemfinalyjuly14_1.pdf, pp. 8-9. For a sense of how 
women and men trained in STEM fields face different initial career pathways, see: Catherine Buffington et al., 
“STEM Training and Early Career Outcomes of Female and Male Graduate Students: Evidence from UMETRICS 
Data Linked to the 2010 Census,” American Economic Review: Papers & Proceedings 106, no. 5 (2016): 333-338. 
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presence—exacerbating persistent wage gaps attributable to gender and race, particularly as the 
narrowing of those gaps has stagnated over the past decade.357  If standardized tests play some 
role discouraging or preventing women access into highly esteemed fields of study, then they 
ultimately hold some deleterious effect on women’s economic power. 
 As women continue to lag behind men in their pursuit of STEM degrees and occupations, 
researchers keep mining standardized testing data as a way to determine the onset and severity of 
the math and science gender gap. While many educational pundits continue to investigate the 
enduring SAT-M score gap, others have asserted that the SAT is too limited a test, administered 
at too late a stage in secondary education, to deliver a full set of observable differences. While an 
earlier generation of researchers used standardized testing data to fuel a debate about the core 
causes of the math and science gender gap, contemporary researchers are now more hesitant to 																																																								
 357 The degree to which wage differences can be solely attributed to gender—that is, clearly sexist pay 
differentials—remains a little hazy, but economists have done considerable work quantifying the gap while 
accounting for other variables. Economists and social scientists have also done considerable research accounting for 
the role race and ethnicity complicates the gender wage gap: minority women continue to make less than men of the 
same race or ethnicity, and markedly less than white men. The gap is also complicated by age: women in older age 
cohorts face a larger wage gap than their younger counterparts. The same goes for motherhood: mothers pay a price 
for having children, where men do not. How much of this is a generational issue (that is, women from older 
generations who made less that male peers double suffered from workplace environments without strong collective 
bargaining powers that could redress mid-career and late-career gaps, or which effectively penalized pauses in labor 
for motherhood) and how much of this is a built-in feature of workplace sexism (that is, women are systemically 
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any given stage, creating a snowballing wage gap as women age), remains to be fully calculated. This conundrum 
bears out for the figures from 2015, in which the median weekly income for men aged 45 to 54 was nearly $250 
higher than women in the same age cohort ($1040 vs. $799)—but men aged 16 to 24 already had a median weekly 
income $60 higher than similarly aged women ($510 vs. $450). Even in the most conservative estimates, a wage gap 
between men and women unattributable to any factor besides gender itself persists. See: American Association for 
American Women, “The Simple Truth About the Gender Pay Gap: Spring 2017 Edition,” January 2017, 
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https://www.bls.gov/opub/reports/womens-earnings/2015/pdf/home.pdf; Francine D. Blau and Lawrence M. Kahn, 
“The Gender Wage Gap: Extent, Trends, and Explanations,” Discussion Paper no. 9656,” Institute for the Study of 
Labor, January 2016, http://ftp.iza.org/dp9656.pdf ; Rebecca Glauber, “Marriage and the Motherhood Wage Penalty 
among African Americans, Hispanics, and Whites,” Journal of Marriage and Family 69, no. 4 (November, 2007): 
951-961; Joan R. Kahn, Javier García-Manglano and Suzanne M. Bianchi, “The Motherhood Penalty at Midlife: 
Long-Term Effects of Children on Women’s Careers,” Journal of Marriage and Family 76 (February, 2014): 56-72; 
and William M. Rodgers and Leslie S. Stratton, “The Male Marital Wage Differential: Race, Training, and Fixed 
Effects,” Discussion Paper no. 1745, Institute for the Study of Labor, September 2005, 
http://repec.iza.org/dp1745.pdf (accessed February 1, 2017). 
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point to a singular cause.358  Whether inspired by sociobiological models of development, 
convinced that capitalism fuels disparities more than culture or biology could–or simply 
unwilling to retread old arguments—researchers seem less certain to ascribe a singular cause to 
the gender gap. More potently, whatever the argument, standardized testing data remains a 
highly valued way to consider women’s worth to society. Test scores continue to serve as both a 
psychological and an economic form of data, serving as a monitor for how well girls with 
mathematical skills become women who fulfill the state’s STEM needs.  
 More than anything, the persistent gender gap in standardized test scores has made it easy 
for numerous Americans to continue suggesting that there must be something essential—
something innate and pure and true—about quantitative data that shows differences in men and 
women’s mathematical skills. The examples are both relentless and repetitive. In fact, what 
makes the contemporary period remarkable is how redundant the story has become. Consider, for 
example, Lawrence Summers’s remarks at a National Bureau of Economic Research conference 
in early 2005, in which the former Harvard president insisted “issues of intrinsic aptitude” 
contributed more to women’s underrepresentation in tenured engineering and science 
professorships than “socialization and patterns of discrimination.”359  For Summers, the 																																																								
 358 Muriel Niederle and Lise Vesterlund, “Explaining the Gender Gap in Math Test Scores: The Role of 
Competition,” Journal of Economic Perspectives 24, no. 2 (Spring, 2010): 129-144; Erin Cech and Mary Blair-Low, 
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Science and Technology,” Social Problems 57, no. 3 (August, 2010): 371-397; Katherine M. Finnigan and 
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 359 Lawrence H. Summers, “Remarks at NBER Conference on Diversifying the Science & Engineering 
Workforce” (Cambridge, January 14, 2005), Harvard University’s Office of the President website, 
http://www.harvard.edu/president/speeches/summers_2005/nber.php (last accessed April 7, 2014); Scott Jaschik, 
“What Larry Summers Said,” Inside Higher Ed 18 February, 2005, 
http://www.insidehighered.com/news/2005/02/18/summers2_18 (last accessed April 7, 2014). 
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“unfortunate truth” was simply that fewer women had intellects “three and a half, four standard 
deviations above the mean.”360  Or consider, similarly, the numerous studies over the past decade 
that have sought to make meaning out of test-based sex differences among the most extreme 
cases of mathematical talent. Even though many of these researchers ultimately discredit—or, at 
least, greatly minimize—the role biology plays in mathematical talent, they still feel obliged to 
frame their studies as investigations of the validity of biological essentialism. This framing 
suggests that, despite mounting evidence of the attitudinal and socioeconomic factors that 
prevent all but a few girls at select institutions from competing on a level mathematical playing 
field with boys, the idea that standardized testing data reveals genuine inborn aptitude still 
carries tremendous social cachet.361  By grafting essentialist gender politics onto standardized 
test data, and by treating numerical information as something untainted by social influence, 																																																								
 360 Summers, “Remarks.”   
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Americans still entertain the idea that biology is the clearest arbiter of talent—and that only the 
most extreme cases of measurable talent can be used to frame an argument about gender and 
society. In this way, standardized testing has helped ideology shape destiny.  
  	 	
 202 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER FIVE: THE BIRTH OF THE STUDENT-CONSUMER: STANDARDIZED  
 
TESTING, CONSUMER ADVOCACY, AND THE EDUCATIONAL MARKETPLACE 
 
 
 
 Standardized testing has become an evergreen item of scorn. Websites, think tanks, and 
periodicals devote considerable time and money producing commentary on the dangers of 
American education’s obsession with, and dependence on, standardized tests. Whether speaking 
of high-stakes statewide testing schemes or college admissions exams, standardized tests also 
seem increasingly unpopular among American parents and students, particularly those in the 
white middle class, among whom opposition to nationwide standardized tests often serve as a 
proxy for political beliefs. Yet, while pundits and the general public often share a disdain for 
testing itself, standardized test preparation remains as popular—and profitable—as ever. The 
market remains flush with guidebooks, practice tests, tutoring programs and even coaches, all for 
the purpose of improving standardized test scores. The current state of educational testing is 
anchored in irony: few seem to embrace the degree or types of standardized testing students 
endure throughout their education, but many seem willing to participate in the test-preparation 
marketplace in order to score as well as possible. The tests may attract considerable disdain, but 
the socioeconomic stakes for poor performance are too high for many to avoid participating in 
the test preparation market.362  
																																																								
 362 This chapter builds substantively off the research I conducted for my master’s thesis; see: Keegan 
Shepherd, “Selling ‘Dream Insurance’: The Standardized Test-Preparation Industry’s Search for Legitimacy, 1946-
1989,” master’s thesis, University of Central Florida, 2011. 
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 This chapter examines how this knotty relationship developed between the late 1960s and 
the mid-1980s. During this period, middle-class white Americans expressed their dissatisfaction 
with standardized testing in two key ways: challenging the legitimacy of testing practices 
through consumer advocacy networks, and purchasing the products and services of test-
preparation (“test-prep”) companies. Through both practices, standardized testing came to be 
publicly discussed as a consumable good. Testing companies, in turn, were posed as corporations 
subject to certain responsibilities, and test-takers (or, by proxy, their parents) were framed as 
consumers entitled to certain rights. Two groups of consumers ushered in these changes to 
standardized testing during this decade. On one front, young consumer advocates nurtured by 
Ralph Nader conducted a several-year investigation of Educational Testing Service (ETS)—by 
far the United States’ largest creator of standardized admissions exams. These consumer 
advocates, many of whom started as student activists, published their searing findings in 1980 as 
the report The Reign of ETS: The Corporation That Makes Up Minds. These consumer advocates 
also helped usher in New York’s truth-in-testing law, which mandated that test-makers divulge 
the correct answers and explanations for standardized exams. On the other front, standardized 
test-preparation (“test-prep”) entrepreneurs developed and expanded standardized test-
preparation operations, both in terms of geography products offered. The mixed findings of 
Federal Trade Commission (FTC) investigation into the ethicality of test-prep services offered 
the industry enough legitimacy to continue diversifying into the 1980s. 
 The functional relationship between standardized tests, test-makers, and test-takers 
changed considerably by the mid-1980s. Whereas testing companies once held colleges and 
universities as the key consumers of standardized testing—and students as the testing candidates 
whose results created the data needed for test scores to have any meaning—by the mid-1980s, 
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students held a more dominant role. Those who took standardized admissions tests were no 
longer students but student-consumers, who had the right to question the legitimacy of 
educational gatekeepers by invoking their right to quality products. But transparency laws and an 
expanding test-prep industry helped transform student-consumers’ satisfaction into a commodity 
in itself, creating an environment in which ETS and other test-makers bundled old tests for 
commercial publication, and test-prep companies increasingly staked their marketing on persona 
rather than content. This commoditized satisfaction did more to reinforce standardized testing as 
an educational gatekeeping device—and, in turn, cemented standardized testing as a key 
gatekeeping mechanism for the middle class. Test-prep devices and transparency measures made 
middle-class Americans feel a greater sense of ownership and participation in the test-taking 
process and thus solidified a pattern in which the clearest way to maintain intergenerational 
middle-class status was to score well enough on standardized tests to earn entry into a college or 
university socially designated as befitting one’s class status.  
 Focusing on this consumerist turn—found in both the rhetoric of the publication The 
Reign of ETS, the FTC investigation of test-prep companies, and the actions of both test-prep 
companies and test manufacturers following transparency laws—illustrates several curious 
features about the American middle class during the late-twentieth century. In particular, the 
emergence of the student-consumer reveals the slipperiness with which consumer advocates, test 
manufacturers, and test-prep companies alike have equated test-takers with the future middle 
class and consumption with higher education. Indeed, then and now, these three entities have 
accused each other of defending the interests of a narrow band of Americans—the white-collar 
middle-class—while hiding behind the idea of “public good.”  To this end, consumer advocates’ 
push for transparency in standardized testing operations illustrates a rhetorical slight-of-hand 
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between “the middle class” and “public interest,” insomuch as the problems of the former have 
been used to invoke the latter. This slippery language is much more than just word games, 
however. It reverberates throughout higher education policy debates, when the structural needs 
and privileges of the solidly middle class are used to dictate the priorities and ideals for the 
future U.S. higher education. 
Consumerism as a Framework for Understanding Standardized Testing  
 What typically complicates the historiography on standardized testing is that researchers 
are often woven into in the history of standardized testing itself. Nicholas Lemann, whose work 
The Big Test remains the most notable critical inquiry on the SAT’s impact on American social 
structure, was eventually appointed on a 2008 National Association for College Admission 
Counseling commission that higher education institutions scale back their reliance on 
standardized admission test scores when selecting students.363  After writing None of the Above, 
a searing indictment of the logical legerdemain Educational Testing Service used to validate its 
tests and operations, David Owen composed the forewords for two publications by the Princeton 
Review—a test prep company whose marketing angle was premised on dismissing the SAT as 
pseudo-scientific hogwash.364  Conversely, the College Board and Educational Testing Service 
routinely smudge the author-subject relationship with their numerous institutional histories and 
defenses of standardized testing methods.365   																																																								
363 National Association for College Admission Counseling, “Report of the Commission on the Use of 
Standardized Tests in Undergraduate Admission” (Arlington, VA: NACAC, 2008); Nicholas Leman, The Big Test 
(New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2000).  
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365 365  Some institutional histories from standardized test manufacturers include: Michael C. Johanek, ed., 
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Manuel Maldonado-Rivera, The History of the Puerto Rico and Latin American Office, edited by Michael Farah, 
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  A more stable historiographical foundation for this topic can be built on the history of 
consumerism and consumer advocacy—particularly postwar U.S. consumer action. Although 
Lizabeth Cohen and Lawrence Glickman disagree about the relationship between consumers, 
collective action, and public space in post-1945 America, both authors’ respective work show 
how the role of consumer has often also been wielded as a political position, to varying 
success.366  As Matthew Hilton has argued, some hesitance may exist in classifying consumers as 
political actors because postwar consumer activism—domestic, international, or transnational—
has not wedded itself cleanly to left/right political dynamics; consumers haven’t articulated a 
politics as definably partisan, or at least as easily outlined, as those espoused by postwar activists 
and social movement actors that historians and social scientists tend to cover.367  Postwar 
consumers continually used their position to exert political influence (albeit with periods of 
abeyance), and in the process defined public space and political action through the ability to 
consume or not.  
 During the 1960s and 1970s, a growing number of Americans began to express their 
social and political discontent from the position of wronged consumers. Consumption and 
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consumerism had long served as bases for Americans to frame their identity and air their 
grievances—from the rejection of chain stores during the Great Depression to the tactical 
boycotts of the Civil Rights Movement—but the consumer activism of the late 1960s and 1970s 
reflected a growing dissatisfaction with individually-felt repercussions of postwar Keynesian 
economics.368  The booming postwar economy may have created unprecedented wealth and 
marketplace options for the white middle class, but it also agitated many who felt they had been 
conned into wasting hard-earned money on expensive defective goods. Stuck participating in an 
economy premised on consistent consumption, in which their social status hinged on 
conspicuously embracing trends, but lacking any safeguards against bad-faith business practices, 
many consumers developed a sense of powerlessness and cultural estrangement. Such 
consumers, reasoned business researchers at the time, also believed the marketplace lacked 
norms or genuine meaning.369  Airing their grievances as consumers allowed many in the white 
liberal middle class to press for changes that would materially benefit their own status without 
either upending the market system or seeming like an imposition of values: What American 
doesn’t want quality goods?  Although this wave of consumerism had one foot in the politics of 
environmentalism and social justice—most notably, the sustained boycott of table grapes from 																																																								
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the Coachella Valley—such consumer activism was, in many ways, a way to signify social status 
and class values.370  Forgoing Di Giorgio grapes and avoiding appliances with low Consumer 
Reports ratings allowed in the white middle class to externally portray their self-perception as 
savvy, rational actors who simply wanted fair conditions in the marketplace, without tearing 
down the market altogether.  
 No figure epitomized this era of consumer activism—or had as much influence on how 
college students would articulate their grievances from the position of citizen-consumers—as 
much as the consumer advocate Ralph Nader. Nader relied heavily on the efforts of college 
students for his investigation of the Federal Trade Commission in the late 1960s. Nader believed 
college students could harness their advanced training to improve their conditions as both 
citizens and consumers through direct investigation, advocacy, action, and lobbying. This 
conviction inspired Nader to develop the initial framework for Public Interest Research Groups 
(PIRGs) in the early 1970s. PIRGs researched, lobbied, and litigated issues on behalf of students, 
using funds culled from tuition fees. PIRGs also took advantage of American education’s 
decentralized form, operating as state-level corporations that held offices at various college and 
university campuses. Although PIRGs ostensibly represented the various political interests of 
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college students, a few critics believed the fundraising schemes that kept most PIRGs afloat were 
themselves acts of consumer fraud. While some states let college students voluntarily pay PIRG-
earmarked tuition fees, others mandated that students must explicitly request their college stop 
assessing PIRG fees with their tuition, and others still gave students to ability to choose one way 
or the other. (As Nader’s friend-turned-enemy David Sanford noted, while the opt-out model of 
collecting fees made it possible for certain PIRGs to generate much larger revenues than 
counterparts with opt-in models, this form of “negative option” selling was more disingenuous 
that the book-of-the-month clubs Nader had already lambasted for using similar approaches.)371  
This varied state-by-state fee system left some PIRGs flush with funds, full-time attorneys, and 
staff, and others with less than $50,000 in annual funds by the mid-1970s.372  Whatever their 
funds, however, all PIRGs reported that most of their staff were volunteers—and whether or not 
their efforts reflected the politics of every student who contributed funds, PIRGs offered a venue 
for students to invoke their democratic rights and responsibilities as active, dissatisfied 
consumers.373  Nader’s PIRGs created a concentration of money, voluntary and paid labor, 
political agitation, and shared democratic-capitalist vision that enabled New York’s PIRG to take 
on the standardized testing industry in the latter half of the 1970s.  																																																								
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 Central as Nader’s PIRGs would eventually be to standardized-testing reforms, students 
developed other approaches during this period for challenging educational practices as wronged 
consumers. Notably, some students sought redress for their consumer dissatisfaction through the 
courts. These students who filed suit against educational institutions and school districts claimed 
they were victims of educational malpractice. These attempts to claim educational malpractice 
were buoyed by changes to the American legal landscape—most notably, the end of in loco 
parentis and the 26th Amendment—that made it much clearer for young adults to make legal 
claims on their own behalf.374  In such cases—namely, Peter W. v. San Francisco Unified School 
District and Donahue v. Copiague Union Free School District—students sued school districts 
after completing high school, claiming profound educational deficiencies that rendered them 
unemployable. Although both Peter W. and Donahue ultimately proved unsuccessful for the 
plaintiffs, they did establish a precedent that students and parents could at least imagine 
education as a consumable good whose practitioners, as in medicine, remained liable in instances 
of willful neglect.375  By extension, these lawsuits posed the student litigants as defective goods. 
An education was thus not necessarily the product in these lawsuits, but the process by which the 
students became valuable commodities in the marketplace. Although the Naderist approach 
would win out in changing educational practices (at least, in the short term), the elision between 
students as consumers of education and students as commodities produced by educational 
institutions endured. 																																																								
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 Educational malpractice also has a root in a series of court cases between Marjorie 
Webster Junior College and the Middle States Association of Colleges and Secondary Schools 
(MSACSS) during the end of the 1960s and early 1970s. MSACSS refused to grant accreditation 
to Marjorie Webster, which was one of about two-dozen degree-granting for-profit higher 
education institutions in the United States at the time. MSACSS claimed that for-profit 
institutions fell outside of the purview of accreditation agencies. Marjorie Webster filed suit, 
claiming that MSACSS’s refusal to consider accreditation detrimentally harmed their ability to 
attract new students, despite being in operation for nearly fifty years. The District Court of 
Washington, DC sided with Marjorie Webster in 1969, declaring that MSCASS’s refusal to 
consider accrediting the school solely on the basis of its proprietary status was an unreasonable 
restriction of trade. The district court judge ruled that MSCASS, through its accreditation 
process, “engaged in a quasi-governmental function,” thus “subjecting it to the restraints of the 
Constitution.376  Even if education was neither an explicit constitutional concern nor primarily a 
commercial realm, the restriction of accreditation amounted to a violation of Fifth Amendment 
due process rights in addition to Sherman Antitrust principles. This decision was overturned the 
following year. The DC Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that Sherman Antitrust regulations did 
not apply to the nation’s six regional accreditation corporations, no matter how vital the quasi-
governmental function they served, because protections against “incidental restraint of trade, 
absent an intent or purpose to affect the commercial aspects of the profession” was not 
transferrable to “the noncommercial aspects of the liberal arts and the learned professions.”377 
That is, the primary business of education was education and not business. The Supreme Court 																																																								
 376 Marjorie Webster Jr. Col., Inc. v. Middle States Association of Colleges and Secondary Schools, Inc., 
302 F. Supp. 459 (D.D.C. 1969), at 478. 
 377 Marjorie Webster Junior College v. Middle States Association of Colleges and Secondary Schools 432 
F.2d 650 (D.C. Cir. 1970). 
 212 
refused to grant certiorari, thus allowing the appellate court’s decision stay. While the courts 
were thus not opposed to proprietary schools per se, they ultimately decided that the corporations 
that performed quasi-state functions regulating national education had a primary responsibility in 
forging standards and not maintaining schools’ fiscal solvency. This primary responsibility of 
quasi-governmental educational corporations would later prove useful—but not entirely 
successful—for Educational Testing Service in its defense of certain testing practices.378  
 As the courts refereed the boundaries between education and business, the legislative and 
executive branches became embroiled in a several-year squabble over whether consumers 
required separate federal-level representation. Although Congress had created consumer 
protection measures since the 1920s, it pushed for more substantive bureaucracy during the late 
1960s and early 1970s. What undermined this congressional effort, however, was a switch from 
legislation proposing a cabinet-level department for consumers to bills proposing an independent 
Consumer Protection Agency. This switch—largely sparked by Ralph Nader’s testimony 
advocating for a more flexible and supervisory body than a department could provide—also 
inadvertently opened up competing consumer protection agency legislation as well as 
emboldened a minority of congressional members to filibuster to lengths that weakened support 
for popular bills.379  The executive branch also resisted approving such measures for a separate 
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Consumer Protection Agency, categorizing the effort as an exercise in government overreach. A 
government that too much influence on ensuring consumer satisfaction, Richard Nixon and 
Gerald Ford maintained, would be an overreach of government into business affairs. Making 
consumer advocacy a specific government responsibility would place government in direct 
opposition to the interests of business—and a marketplace told what to do by the state could not 
naturally develop the best possible solutions for its own consumer problems. Regulations and 
their resultant bureaucracy unduly burdened business leaders from being nimble enough to fix 
new problems as they emerged. A centralized consumer agency, by extension, would rob 
individual departments of the ability to manage relations with citizen-consumers in the scenarios 
most frequently encountered.380  The Ford administration in particular maintained that the best 
solution was requiring all cabinet-level departments and agencies to develop consumer 
representation plans so they could “determine where additional consumer input might be 
desirable.”381  From a conservative perspective, “consumer rights” could easily be used to cudgel 
business and government without ever representing what actual consumer interests. 
 Although the Ford Administration’s bureaucratically decentralized approach to consumer 
affairs won out, this effort also inadvertently synchronized various federal approaches toward 																																																								
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consumers of education. Because no single governing body had sole control over American 
education, any effort to maintain a distilled approach to educational oversight had to, ironically, 
involve considerable interagency coordination. Beyond the Office of Education, the federal 
bodies alone responsible for funding and maintaining postsecondary schooling included the 
Social Security Administration, Department of Defense, Department of Housing and Urban 
Development, Bureau of Indian Affairs, Department of Labor Immigration and Naturalization 
Service, Federal Aviation Administration, and Veterans Administration. The Federal Interagency 
Committee on Education (FICE) attempted to forge a standardized federal approach to 
educational consumers, publishing its findings and recommendations in 1975. FICE aimed to 
create consensus regarding who was a consumer of education, which rights they held distinct 
from other types of consumers, and what role government could play in addressing grievances. 
The subcommittee maintained that students held special consumer rights due to “the expensive 
and intangible nature of the services [they are] purchasing, and in light of the potential for 
consumer abuse in ‘future service contracts’ used by most schools.”382  As such, students needed 
specific consumer protection mechanisms—such as tuition insurance in instances of school 
bankruptcies, or loan forgiveness for fraudulent training programs—particularly when the federal 
government had already funded both students and the postsecondary institutions they attended. 
In the realm of education, a “buyer beware” approach would not only waste government funds 
but also diminish students’ eventual usefulness to the state. The subcommittee nonetheless 
insisted that protecting consumers of education had to involve public-private partnerships and all 
levels of governance. The federal government could not overtake the accrediting and licensing 
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responsibilities of existing private organizations—but this effort to share responsibility for 
educational consumers using existing systems still left students without a clear or direct path to 
file complaints against institutional misdeeds.   
 By the mid-1970s, then, the federal government was more primed than ever to treat 
students as a special class of consumer, but still lacked clear avenues for those complaints to be 
addressed. Students had attempted to build legal precedent for educational malpractice, but 
courts ultimately decided not to extent antitrust legislation or malpractice concepts to cover 
educational consumption. Consumers of education were instead treated as a special class of 
consumer, who were the shared responsibility of public institutions, state and federal 
governments, and private accreditation organizations. Where students interests became more 
directly represented were through Public Interest Research Groups—but these Naderite 
organizations often relied on convoluted tuition fees to fund actions on citizen-consumers’ 
behalf. 
Ralph Nader and Public Distrust of Educational Testing Service 
 As the broader legal and federal system reconsidered its relationship toward education 
and consumption, the American public grew increasingly critical of standardized tests—
particularly the SAT. In particular, many parties obsessed over the long, slow decline of average 
SAT scores. Between the mid-1960s and the end of the 1970s, the mean SAT score for American 
high school students dropped by 90 points, sparking a angst-riddled hunt for the cause of this 
declining national benchmark. The College Board launched its own series of investigations, and 
concluded that the seventeen-year score decline reflected two consecutive and related 
phenomena. During the 1960s, as high schools absorbed the first waves of the Baby Boom, an 
unprecedented number of young adults completed their high school education rather than drop 
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out beforehand. The organization argued that the sheer number of college hopefuls, particularly 
those from educationally underserved socioeconomic communities, gradually dragged down the 
overall average performance among high school seniors year after year. By the 1970s, as Baby 
Boomers continued to stretch the limits of available educational resources, many school districts 
reduced the rigor of their high school programs in order to manage large numbers of students 
without risking high rates of attrition. Declining SAT scores, argued the College Board, reflected 
what inflated grades, dumbed-down textbooks, and softer course requirements tried to hide: a 
growing number of American students who wanted to attend college were poorly prepared for its 
academic challenges. This argument followed from the College Board’s position on test 
coaching. Because the College Board insisted time and again that its tests were not coachable—
and that SAT scores were the reflection of the skills and abilities developed throughout a 
student’s years in school—any massive downward trend in test scores had to be reflective of 
shortcomings in American education at large. The test was “an unchanging measurement” in the 
College Board’s eyes, and any public dissatisfaction with test due to low scores was misplaced 
frustration toward broader social problems.383  
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 Most midcentury criticisms of standardized testing were not rooted in a consumer 
mindset. Critics such as Banesh Hoffman instead claimed exams like the SAT were fraudulent 
because standardized testing was a pseudoscientific enterprise. Hoffman, a physicist who once 
collaborated with Albert Einstein, turned his attention to the flimsy logic of standardized tests in 
the 1960s. For Hoffman, the very structure of multiple choice testing—the format upon which 
objective standardized testing had been built decades earlier—was a phony attempt to seem 
scientific. By asking test-takers to select the best among presented answers, test-writers could 
dodge complaints that none of the options were exactly correct. Rather than identify the most 
capable students, Hoffman maintained, standardized tests punished mentally nimble youth. 
Clever students with enough awareness to sense what test-writers wanted still wasted time and 
energy discerning the designated “best” answer from other worthwhile choices. Straddling 
logical precision and compulsive pedantry, Hoffman dissected standardized testing questions 
used in several high-profile exams in The Tyranny of Testing, accusing test-writers of knowing 
nowhere near as much as they or the general public presumed they did. Hoffman reserved the 
most scorn for Educational Testing Service. If ETS was the best standardized testing had to offer 
yet it still produced a considerable amount of deeply flawed questions, Hoffman argued, then 
less capable testing companies were truly dangerous. The “testolatry” which gripped American 
society would only punish the best and brightest through false expertise.384  
 By the mid-1970s, however, a consumerist criticism of standardized testing had 
developed, fueled mainly the efforts of student volunteers at the largest of Nader’s Public 
Interest Research Groups, the New York PIRG. Nader regarded Educational Testing Service’s 																																																								
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operation as secretive and unethical, and teamed with Princeton undergrad Allan Nairn to lead a 
several-year analysis of ETS’s business practices. Nairn, Nader, and the New York PIRG 
publishing their findings in 1980 as The Reign of ETS: The Corporation that Makes Up Minds.385  
Central to The Reign of ETS was how Nairn, Nader, and PIRG research assistants positioned 
themselves as dissatisfied consumers who aimed to make Educational Testing Service play by 
the established rules for consumer-corporation relationships. Nader set this tone in The Reign of 
ETS’s preface, persuading readers to view the consumer-corporation bond between American 
students and Educational Testing Service as thoroughly rotten. Above all, Nader primed the 
reader to see ETS as a corporation that thrived on “its long-standing policy to remain hidden 
from public view.”386  Nader deemed this policy of corporate secrecy as “inimical to the 
opportunities—both analytic and normative—which a democracy should provide all its citizens 
from all classes, races, age groups, and genders,” thereby not only accusing ETS of being anti-
democratic, but also staking as capacious a claim for citizenship as possible.387  Citizens were 
thus doubly burdened by ETS, subject to corporate services that heightened social inequities as 
well as anti-democratic practices that undermined the premises of their citizenship. Nader 
asserted that educational contexts alone could not fully explain why Educational Testing Service 
was so deeply entrenched in American society. Rather, “the consumer perspective [was] needed 
to examine the assumptions and consequences of contemporary standardized testing.”388  To this 
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end, Nader linked opportunity and democracy to the frame of consumerism, and established 
consumers as the most reliable actors for social analysis and institutional critique.  
 To built upon Nader’s introductory claims, Nairn and his associates posed a market-based 
relationship between ETS and the public that differed from the nonprofit’s self-portrayal. This 
first depended on redefining who, exactly, consumed standardized tests. Whereas ETS believed 
that its main consumer base consisted of the colleges and universities that used its testing data, 
and that students were only testing candidates, Nairn argued that the true consumers were the 
students or parents who purchased these tests. By redefining the consumer, Nairn also placed 
more emphasis on the act of test-taking (that is, how students used standardized tests) than score 
analysis (how schools used such tests). Redefining the primary consumer also, in effect, changed 
the actual commodity under exchange. For ETS, test data had value in its predictive validity and 
its reliability, or, how closely test scores correlated with a subsequent metric—almost always 
first-year grades—and how consistently any given test-taker would earn similar scores were they 
to take multiple administrations of the same test. As Nairn suggested through his use of 
numerous vignettes in which aspiring students were victimized by ETS practices, the actual 
commodity was the sense of self rendered through the test-taking process. Just as a great test-
taking experience could validate a student’s self-worth, a bad testing experience, even before a 
student ever received a score, could generate feelings of worthlessness: I am useless because I 
am stupid because my test scores are too low to go to college.389 
 To this end, Nairn’s redefinition of the consumer relationship in standardized testing also 
reoriented consumers as victims of a rigged system. Nairn posed test-taking as “involuntary 
consumption”: even though students ultimately had the choice to not take standardized 																																																								
389 Nairn, Reign of ETS, chs 1-2. 
 220 
admissions exams, such a choice would come to the serious detriment of their career plans.390   
Even then, students who took the test could have their plans derailed by an underwhelming 
score. Students, as consumers of tests, were caught in a “contract of adhesion” without any clear 
understanding of their contractual rights.391   Suspicious scores could be canceled by ETS 
without any recourse for affected test-takers—unless a student had limitless resources to go 
against ETS’s team of lawyers. Test-takers were not only victimized by psychometric logic that 
cast discontents as “those who simply have a painful time accepting their proper role in life,” but 
also by the well-funded and legally-protected means ETS used to keep psychometric systems of 
educational measurement in place.392 
 Underlying all of these claims was Nairn’s argument that Educational Testing Service’s 
tests did not measure students’ aptitude but, instead, reflected their class position. After 
illustrating that the SAT’s predictive validity was quite weak, even when combined with other 
predictors (such as a student’s high school record), Nairn used SAT score data to argue that only 
one clear correlation could be drawn with testing data: between a student’s test scores and their 
parents’ income. Regardless of region or ethnic group, the higher the score range, the wealthier 
the average household income. Nairn insisted this “score-income correlation” was “more a 
reflection of socio-economic status than their actual potential for future accomplishment.”393  By 
framing test scores as a reflection of class, Nairn in effect narrowed the range of critique; ethnic 																																																								
390 Nairn, Reign of ETS, 261. 
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and cultural biases were downplayed for the economic conditions that allowed students to have 
the specific type of education rewarded by ETS’s tests, a type of education historically reserved 
for white men privately-educated in the Northeast.  
 This score-income correlation also blurred who, exactly, was given the greater grounds to 
complain through their position as consumers: poor families, who often received the lowest 
scores but may have other identities through which to stake their testing grievances; or middle-
class families, whose relatively average scores generated a personal sense of mediocrity at odds 
with prevailing social narratives for middle-class success. As Nairn maintained, only the wealthy 
benefitted from ETS’s model of merit and aptitude, a model that did not match up with an ETS 
study that found “actual accomplishments outside the classroom did not correlate with income 
either.”394  By individualizing the rhetoric of test-taking—as a measurement of how one 
performed against all test-takers, devoid of demographic contexts—ETS could continue to 
commodify the self-assessments students generated through the test-taking process, all while 
evading claims of systemic bias.  
 Nairn maintained that ETS was able to have such tremendous influence because its rarely 
monitored nonprofit status granted it legal protection from consumer-focused scrutiny and 
complaint. Nairn particularly emphasized ETS’s long-overdue paperwork for nonprofit status in 
New York State, where the organization was based. As a non-profit, ETS operated “exempt from 
the scrutiny of the [Federal Trade Commission]”—and as an educational enterprise, it benefitted 
from weak federal oversight.395  (Although the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare 
would be split into the Department of Health and Human Services and Department of Education 
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by the end of the 1970s, this separate Cabinet-level upgrade didn’t necessarily come with 
tremendous additional federal-level controls over educational practices.)  Nairn argued that ETS 
was, for all purposes, a monopoly; other testing companies did exist, but they operated at 
nowhere near as large a scope or scale as ETS did. Because so many institutions and 
organizations—governmental, educational, and otherwise—relied on ETS-produced tests for 
hiring, admissions, and classification, the nonprofit existed in a realm beyond legal scrutiny. For 
Nairn, the scenario was bureaucratic absurdity: a virtual monopoly that evaded trustbusters, 
providing educational products outside the reach of federal government, with its revenues and 
operations protected by its nonprofit business designation. 
 The solution, as Nairn concluded, was to make ETS conform to the rules of business 
through transparency legislation—an effort also undertaken by the New York PIRG. Nairn 
detailed New York PIRG and State Senator Kenneth P. LaValle’s three-year effort to enact 
“truth-in-testing” legislation in New York State.396  Signed into law of July 1979 and effective 
the beginning of the following year, New York State’s Educational Testing Act of 1979 
positioned test-takers as student-consumers entitled to special protections. Primarily, the law 
mandated testing companies “give students specific information on what their scores meant and 
how their scores would be presented to academic and other institutions” as well as “provide 
students—on request—with a copy of the questions, correct answers and the student’s own 
answers thirty days after the scores had been received.”397  By requiring ETS and other test-
makers to adhere to certain regulations similar to other corporations, such truth-in-testing 
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legislation allowed students and parents to observe and challenge psychometric principles from 
the position of dissatisfied customers.  
 Although truth-in-testing became law in New York State at the turn of the 1980s, this 
victory not without pushback from test-makers. Claiming the law would undermine test security 
and create financial ruin through skyrocketing research and development costs, the Association 
of American Medical Colleges and American Dental Association threatened to stop providing 
their respective admissions exams in New York State. The AAMC later secured an injunction to 
prevent MCAT administrations in New York.398  The Psychological Corporation followed suit, 
pulling the Miller Analogies Test from the state. But despite test-makers’ full-throated 
opposition to statewide and national transparency legislation, ETS and the College Board—by 
far the two largest bodies in standardized testing—reversed their opposition to New York’s Law 
days before it took effect, deciding to follow disclosure procedures in exchange for significantly 
fewer test administration dates.399  Within a year, the College Board made disclosure a 
nationwide policy, following in the steps of the Law School Admissions Council and other 
bodies that oversaw admissions testing.400   
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 Other figures with a vested interest in college admissions remained critical of truth-in-
testing after disclosure legislation took effect in New York. Educational historian-turned-policy 
wonk Diane Ravitch lambasted New York’s truth-in-testing law as “consumer fraud” in itself.401  
Ravitch accused transparency advocates of having little sense of standardized testing’s expenses, 
thereby pushing for a situation that would only harm consumers in the long run. Testing 
companies would be forced to raise the price of entrance exams considerably in order to recoup 
questions lost by disclosure policies, effectively reducing poor students’ ability to even take 
standardized admissions exams. 
 Stanford Dean of Admissions Fred Hargadon was particularly critical of truth-in-testing 
legislation, and went so far as to suggest that the push for transparency was emblematic of 
middle-class moral bankruptcy. As quoted in the New York Times, Hargadon accused 
transparency advocates of shielding behind the cries of the underprivileged to cloak their 
concerns over the composition of the middle class: 
“’It’s one thing to make it on your own on merit. […] ‘It’s another, 
as parents, to have the same measures applied to your children. A 
lot of self-make people aren’t going to hold their children to the 
same standards they applied to themselves.’”402  
 
 New York Board of Regents member Kenneth B. Clark echoed these sentiments. (The 
Board of Regents was responsible for granting and overseeing ETS’s status as a nonprofit 
educational institution.)  Clark opined that the law’s provision for students to request and review 
testing materials was a “deceptive and meaningless exercise” that would only reveal the obvious: 
that test scores reflected class-based disparities in educational opportunity, disparities that 
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privileged students could broaden through their ability to access additional opportunities.403   By 
Clark’s assessment, truth-in-testing was a well intentioned but misguided “placebo,” one that 
erroneously aimed to solve the social inequities reflected in test scores by offering procedures 
students could only follow after the fact. The new protocols offered little more than a legally 
sanctioned way to vent frustrations rather than upend the system.404 
 One irony of the debate over testing is that, at the time, certain education writers 
suspected the fight over transparency signaled the end of standardized college testing altogether. 
New York Times education writer Fred Hechinger suspected the SATs would “almost certainly 
be an academic paper tiger within a few years.”405  By Hechinger’s estimation, colleges and 
universities had over-expanded to the point where they could not be too picky about who fills 
their classrooms, so long as their tuition checks cleared. Completing the SAT would become less 
of a hurdle to quality postsecondary education and more a minor nuisance, an examination with 
little value in itself except for those students who achieved statistically abnormal results. This 
“shift from selection to placement on the campus” would reinforce consumers’ wishes rather 
than fulfill institutions’ missions.406  Indeed, as ETS and the College Board endured several high-
profile scoring gaffes exposed by students who took advantage of disclosure policies, the 
standardized testing industry seemed prone for obsolescence: What good would standardized 
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tests be if they were riddled with errors and when college had become a literal and metaphoric 
buyers’ market?407 
The Legitimation and Expansion of the Test-Prep Industry 
 As consumer advocates pushed for greater transparency, standardized test manufacturers 
also felt increasing pressure from standardized test preparation (“test-prep”) companies. Test-
prep companies had offered courses and study aids for standardized college entrance exams since 
the beginning of the postwar period, but they were largely concentrated in the greater New York 
metropolitan area and New England. Nonetheless, the College Board devoted considerable time 
in the 1950s and 1960s commissioning studies that discredited the effectiveness of “test 
coaching,” claiming that the only effective form of test-prep was a thorough education. To this 
end, test-prep for college or postgraduate standardized test was ineffective because foundational 
skills had already been set years earlier: aptitude for college success had already been set far 
earlier in a student’s education.408 
 Despite the College Board’s insistence that coaching was a waste of time, test-prep 
companies benefitted from several shifts to the standardized testing and American educational 
practices during the late 1960s and early 1970s. Quite simply, far more young people were 
entering college than in the early postwar period, and colleges and universities increasingly 
turned to standardized admissions exams to make sense of their growing applicant pool. These 
colleges and universities—particularly those in the Southern and Midwestern parts of the United 																																																								
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States—increasingly turned to the American College Testing (ACT) Program as a standardized 
admissions exam. While this growing test market may have been stressful for the College Board 
and Educational Testing Service, it spelled security for the test-prep industry: more people taking 
more standardized tests, whatever the test, created a greater demand for college hopefuls to 
successfully clear the testing hurdle.409  
 Given the vast expansion of the college-going and college-hopeful populations during the 
previous two decades, as well as the spectacular claims that certain test-prep companies made 
about their ability to raise test scores, the Federal Trade Commission felt it necessary to probe 
the $60-million industry to assess its ethicality and legality. Although plans to investigate the 
test-prep industry were first announced in late 1976, the commission’s report would not be 
finished for another two and a-half years. The results, however, would directly alter the 
relationship between standardized test manufacturers, test-coaches, and the American public.410  
 Although the FTC’s Bureau of Consumer Protection sought to “estimate statistically the 
impact of commercial coaching on SAT scores,” the Bureau explicitly stressed its investigation 
could not be categorized as experimental.411  The bureau avoided using a group of non-coached 
students as a control group. While using a control may have elicited more statistically and 
scientifically sound results, the Bureau stressed that in this instance, a control group would have 
been financially and ethically unsound. The Bureau felt it could not “[deny] access to 																																																								
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commercial coaching to students who want[ed] it.”412  Should coaching have proven effective, 
parents may have been incensed over a policy that hobbled their children’s chances on the SAT.  
 At least one of the companies under investigation was reluctant to relinquish its 
clientele’s personal information, leading to arbitration in the United States District Court for 
Massachusetts. In Federal Trade Commission v. Stanley H. Kaplan Educational Center, Ltd., et 
al, the FTC petitioned the court to have Kaplan comply with its subpoena duces tecum.413  
Presiding judge D.J. Tauro deferred in part to the precedent set by FCC v. Schreiber, in which 
the Supreme Court decided that “courts should not substitute their judgment for that of 
regulatory agencies more familiar with the industries they are charged with regulating.”414  The 
court would thus not honor Kaplan and others’ request to prevent the subpoena because the FTC 
had a better understanding of what would be necessary for a thorough and valid investigation. 
 Once obtaining the files, the bureau worked around its investigative shortcomings by 
designing ersatz experimental and control groups. The bureau corroborated customer information 
for the two schools under investigation against ETS and College Board files for all SAT 
candidates who resided in the same postal-code hubs as the majority of the coaching schools’ 
clientele.415  The files for these coaching clients were then corroborated against ETS’s list of 
SAT candidates from the New York metropolitan area for all academic years between 1974 and 
1977. The Bureau winnowed this pool of identified coaching clients students from 1,568 to 
roughly 1,000, discounting clients who never took the SAT, took it outside the New York City 
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metropolitan area, or took the ACT instead.416  Finally, the Bureau forged a control group by 
randomly selected the SAT-score records for 2,500 un-coached students from ETS files. 
Although the investigation could not allow for a genuine experimental group, test coaching was 
prevalent enough in the New York metropolitan area by the late 1970s to create large simulations 
of experimental and control populations.  
 The investigators also used a standardized demographic device to clarify any preexisting 
discrepancies between their coached and uncoached groups. The bureau compared coached and 
uncoached students’ respective responses on the Student Demographic Questionnaire (SDQ), a 
voluntary survey administered during each SAT administration.417  Investigators determined that 
students who attended coaching schools tended to have higher course marks and PSAT scores 
than their un-coached peers. Coached students were more often than not “A” students in their 
English and math courses, while un-coached students were more often than not “B” students in 
these same subjects. The bigger difference between coached and un-coached students, however, 
could be found in their family’s income figures. Over two-fifths of the coached students came 
from families whose parental incomes exceeded $30,000 per year, while nearly one-half of the 
un-coached students came from households with incomes less than $18,000 per year. Even when 
accounting for self-selection factors that would encourage more youth from more affluent 
families to consider college (and thus be more likely to take the SAT), coached students were 
considerably more likely to come from uppermost socioeconomic brackets.418  
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 Investigators employed multiple regression analyses in order to best gauge the genuine 
impact of coaching on test scores. This statistical technique was preferred to others because it 
allowed the “ability to analyze the impact of one variable on another variable while [... holding 
constant] the effects of several other factors.”419  Given the sheer variance within the SAT 
candidacy in any given exam administration, the Bureau found it necessary determine the effect 
of test-prep on SAT scores by first controlling for gender, income, high school marks, class rank, 
high school type, PSAT scores, and distance between PSAT and SAT sittings.  
 The Bureau determined “that coaching was effective at one of the two schools”: Stanley 
H Kaplan Educational Centers produced, on average, a fifty-point increase in customers’ 
composite SAT scores.420  However, this assertion was somewhat misleading as the average rates 
of improvement attributable to coaching among the four different testing dates used in the study 
varied from 35.1 points to 71 points. When factoring in confidence intervals, the rate of 
improvement attributable to Kaplan’s coaching ranged from 31 to 67 points, and among 
individual test dates, confidence intervals ranged from 2 points to 96 points. The other coaching 
school under investigation, Test-Preparation Center, Inc., had drearier results. On average, 
students coached by Test-preparation Center had a mere 3.6-point improvement on their 
composite SAT scores, and their performances on the verbal section tended to slightly decline.421 
 The difference in test-coaching results between the two companies could be attributed to 
markedly different operating practices. Brooklyn-based Stanley H Kaplan Educational Centers 
refused to operate without preponderant control over its material—and the namesake owner went 
so far as to engage in nepotistic behavior during the early expansion of his business in order to 																																																								
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ensure that every office outside of New York City operated according to his standards. As seen 
in a 1975 ad placed in the New York Times, the Bronx-based Test-Preparation Center did not 
necessarily engage in such tight-knit management:  
PART TIME [:] Hi profit biz oppty [sic] created by & for 
educators. Administer and educational program in your 
community. Contact TEST-PREPARATION CENTERS, Inc., 
3701 Henry Hudson Pkwy, Suite ‘D’, Riverdale, N.Y. [:] 212- 
796-1076422 
 
For a “low investment,” one could manage a Test-preparation Centers branch.423  The company 
also directly courted teachers in the classifieds section of the Times, offering math teachers 
fifteen dollars per hour for part-time after-school work on Wednesday afternoons.424  Although 
the company openly advertising the wages it would pay its employees, it did not use its 
advertisements to specify how much its SAT-prep and speed-reading courses cost—only 
stressing there would be a “DISCOUNT for Early Registration.”425  
 Although the bureau asserted test coaching worked in at least some instances, it 
backtracked on this claim in the report’s second half. The investigators instead insisted the claim 
“that School A [Kaplan] ‘works’ and School B [Test-preparation] does not” was half-baked.426  
Any gains made by students enrolled in a test-coaching course had to be measured against their 
preexisting levels of underachievement. According to the investigators, if students did poorly on 
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the SAT “given their demographics and other personal characteristics” before being coached, 
then coaching may not have caused genuine improvement.427 More bluntly, if a coaching school 
led students to live up to expectations, then such improvement was not from genuine coaching. 
Such students purchased coaching through self-selection—that is, recognizing the range of their 
alleged capabilities and living up to them—rather than the desire to attain outstanding SAT 
scores.  
 Had the Bureau unequivocally reported that certain coaching schools could consistently 
produce genuine improvement in students’ SAT scores, Educational Testing Service might have 
found itself in an unenviable position. However, ETS may have been partially responsible for the 
tone of the Bureau’s final product. R. Jeffrey Smith alleged that the Federal Trade Commission 
was “[h]arassed by [ETS] and nervous about a document lending credence to a suspect 
industry.”428 The FTC decided to release the document only after a considerable delay and with 
several pointed caveats—and following the resignation of Arthur Levine, who oversaw the 
investigation.429  When questioned, Consumer Affairs staffers remarked that the findings did not 
“provide enough information to question the legitimacy of standardized tests themselves”; the 
study lacked a scientifically genuine control group of students, and thus could not be trusted 
beyond a minimal degree.430  
 However tepid, the FTC’s findings were enough for the test-prep industry to claim a 
measure of legitimacy. Following the report, Stanley Kaplan used rhetorical deference to give his 																																																								
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company extra credibility. By asserting “’cram courses do not help,’” Kaplan distanced his 
company from its competition, but also implied to the public that the test-prep industry should 
not be seen as a cohort of enterprises with a shared agenda or product, but merely a broad 
spectrum of companies dependent upon the continued use of standardized exams.431  Although 
the FTC study sought to determine if the test-prep industry had engaged in consumer fraud, the 
results may have ironically spurred some justification for certain test-prep companies to demand 
high prices for their goods: Kaplan charged over three times as much for SAT prep that Test-
Preparation Center, and even factoring in the amount of time spent in direct instruction, a client 
would have paid twice as much per hour at Kaplan.432  This per-hour cost comparison may seem 
somewhat misleading because Kaplan had devised dozens of hours of supplemental audio 
material students could use while at a Kaplan center. But, the use of such material was optional, 
as a client could use as much or as little of Kaplan’s Test-n-Tape system as he or she desired.433   
 Regardless, the FTC report may have reinforced and popularized Kaplan’s method of 
operation: one paid considerably more for test-prep when offered myriad possible ways to 
prepare using a company’s materials. One was no longer strictly a student, but a student-
consumer, whose purchase signaled not merely a desire to improve, but the monetary means one 
was willing to expend to reach those ends. If a student were to customize and fully use the 
supplementary material, then Kaplan and its analogues could reinforce the claim that they were 
engaging in long-term, multidimensional coaching—and that such holistic learning did not come 
cheaply. Conversely, clients who ignored the various additional materials could be dismissed as 																																																								
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careless students and thoughtless consumers, since the company’s numerous provisions 
mitigated that company’s burden in guaranteeing significant test score improvement.  
 As the test-prep industry benefitted from a boost to its credibility, it also became more 
competitive. During the 1980s, more test-prep companies gained national recognition—none 
more than The Princeton Review (“TPR”). Founded in New York City in 1981 by John 
Katzman, TPR held an openly antipathetic posture toward the SAT and similar standardized 
tests. Katzman maintained that how well or how poorly a person scored reflected nothing more 
than their ability to take that particular standardized test.434  The SAT was not an exam one 
should slavishly devote countless hours toward, Katzman assured customers, but an 
unremarkable and thoroughly predictable test that could easily be bested. For several hundred 
dollars, students took TPR courses to learn how to game the SAT’s structure in order to attain 
markedly higher scores.435  Both Katzman and his associate Adam Robinson had experience in 
the test-prep industry prior to The Princeton Review, both having worked at Bob Scheller’s test-
coaching company Pre-Test Review.436  But, by developing a corporate persona attractive to 
teenage cynicism, Katzman was able to expand his own business from a boutique Manhattan 
service for affluent students to a wildly successful set of nationwide franchises and trade 
paperback prep-books. This corporate persona, when coupled with its two-tier system of 
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expensive courses and inexpensive prep books, allowed TPR to serve the educational class 
demands of an elite clientele while still profiting from the aspirations of a middle-class book-
buyers.437   
 Even in its earliest advertisements, TPR used a glib and sarcastic tone to establish its 
stance toward standardized admissions exams. One early ad, printed in the New York Times in 
late summer, 1981, hooked readers with the remark “Some people have an Uncle on the 
Admissions Board…and some people have The Princeton Review.” 438  Although the ad noted 
that TPR courses were taught “by a staff of Ivy League alumni and undergraduates” using the 
latest computer technology, it remained silent on how an eight-week SAT prep course actually 
cost.439 Such ads subtextually commended potential clientele for not being from an older order of 
established money and power, while casually ignoring that these customers had enough 
disposable income to pay for boutique test-prep.440  TPR also reinforced this position through its 
slogan. By declaring itself “the nemesis of standardized testing” in early advertisements, TPR 																																																								
 437 Joshua Hammer, “Cram Scam: Fighting Educational Injustice for Fun and Profit,” The New Republic 
April 24, 1989: 15-18. Hammer noted that about 20,000 students took TPR courses among 1.7 million SAT test-
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York Times (1923-Current File), Sep 06, 1981. 1, 
https://search.proquest.com/docview/121596977?accountid=14745 (last accessed March 15, 2017).  
 439 Ibid.  
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could signal that it had no fondness for testing practices, while sidestepping the obvious fact that 
its existence dependent upon the sustained popularity of the SAT and other entrance exams.441   
 The Princeton Review also used its advertisements to set itself apart as cooler and more 
effective than its competition—particularly Kaplan. A series of TPR ads printed in 1985 
triumphantly declared “WE SCORE MORE!”442  Above this exclamation lay a bar graph 
representing the alleged improvement to students’ SAT scores after various test-prep methods. 
The Princeton Review’s 150-point increase not only dwarfed Kaplan’s modest 50-point gains, 
but burst through the graph itself. Ads from later in the decade took more direct jabs. One, 
printed in the Wall Street Journal in 1988, quipped “If You Can’t Afford The Princeton Review, 
Stanley Kaplan Is An Acceptable Compromise.”443  This line of advertising mocked those who 
chose inferior, understaffed, and outdated Kaplan SAT prep courses for the sake of maintaining 
their family budgets. TPR courted its clientele by posing its SAT courses as an investment with 
tremendous payoff—without ever suggesting that its target demographic could purchase classes 
without making a financial sacrifice, that Kaplan had the same target demo, or that all students 
consuming test-prep material had the same college (and class) aspirations. 
 Some TPR ads employed several clever techniques at once, including deceptive sources 
of praise. One 1988 ad in Wall Street Journal joked, “Not everyone tests well,” below which lay 
six comically drawn figures illustrating the evolution from chimp to modern man.444  Labeled 
“Week 1” to “Week 6,” the figures suggested TPR could help students become “highly evolved” 																																																								
441 Ibid. 
 442 "Display Ad 35 -- no Title." New York Times (1923-Current File), Feb 12, 1985. 1, 
https://search.proquest.com/docview/111241858?accountid=14745 (last accessed March 15, 2017). 
443 Display Ad, Wall Street Journal, August 24, 1988: 10; microfilm. For a reprint of this ad, please see: 
Display Ad, Wall Street Journal, September 14, 1988: 8; microfilm. 
444 Display Ad, Wall Street Journal, February 23, 1988: 10; microfilm. 
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test-takers. The ad copy included snippet endorsements from Rolling Stone and The Christian 
Science Monitor, appealing to the sensibilities of both clients and their parents. But the 
testimonial attributed to Rolling Stone was misleading. As printed, it stated: 
Rolling Stone reports, “Princeton Review Students are being 
admitted to college that wouldn’t have considered them 
before…When you raise a kid’s score 200 or 300 points, …you 
change his whole outlook about himself.”445 
 
These statements, while attributable to David Owen’s glowing profile of Katzman and Robinson 
for Rolling Stone, were not written by Owen but said by Katzman himself. The second ellipses 
simply erased any indication of who said what.446  For TPR, even self-generated praise could be 
turned into a marketing material. 
 By the middle of the 1980s, Katzman expanded TPR’s product line to include test-prep 
workbooks—courting a far wider consumer base than students who could afford expensive prep 
courses. Released in 1986, Cracking the SAT built off of TPR’s cynical corporate persona, 
attracting students who also believed the SAT was an obnoxious hassle but may not have shared 
the same Ivy League aspirations as the company’s earlier clientele. For ten dollars, any student 
could learn how to manipulate the mechanics and structure of the SAT to their own benefit, and 
editorialists praised the bestseller for “exposing the gimmicks and flaws of [… the] SAT.”447  To 
this end, any student who purchased Cracking the SAT could also feel as through they had tapped 																																																								
445 Ibid. See also: Educational Testing Service v. John Katzman and The Princeton Review, 631 F. Supp. 
550 (1986) 551, note 1; available via LexisNexis Academic, 
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into coaching secrets typically reserved for upper- and upper-middle class teens. Cracking the 
SAT offered the sheen of privilege without any of its material perks. 
 Cracking the SAT used a variety of rhetorical and pedagogical techniques to make its 
readers feel like savvy consumers who, with TPR’s help, could easily avoid the College Board’s 
tricks and traps. David Owen, who wrote the book’s foreword, insisted that preparing for the 
SAT was a way to safeguard against dimwitted admissions officers, who “won’t understand how 
to interpret the scores you send them” but nonetheless “[speculate] freely about your intelligence 
and even your personality on the basis of how you do.”448  Katzman likewise assured customers 
that “the SAT is not written by Nobel Prize-winning physicists of Pulitzer Prize-winning 
journalists,” just “ordinary folks who had ordinary test scores.”449  Because normal people wrote 
the SAT, one did not have to be a genius to do well. Rather, test takers needed to remember a 
few basic rules: always guess rather than leave an answer blank, no matter what ETS or your gut 
says; mark up the test booklet as much as you need; and rack up points by focusing on the earlier 
questions in a set because they were invariably easier. Clever test-takers, Katzman stressed, only 
bothered memorizing the 200 or so vocabulary words the College Board routinely used, and 
worked backwards to save time on algebra questions. Readers of Cracking the SAT also learned 
to avoid acting like Joe Bloggs, a thoroughly average student whose “hunches are always wrong 
on on difficult questions.”450  Test-takers should always go for answers Joe Bloggs would choose 
early in each verbal and math section, Katzman noted, and avoid all answers Joe would be lured 
by at the end of each section. Once students mastered avoiding Joe Bloggs’s pitfalls for each 
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question type, they could have their hand at a full-length practice test—which, for an additional 
seven dollars, the Princeton Review would score and offer detailed computer-generated analysis.  
Through Cracking the System, Katzman turned TPR into a brand that made customers at all price 
points feel too clever to be average.  
 By the mid-1980s, Katzman was an ascendant figure who used relatively controversial 
behavior to his company’s advantage. Such braggadocio occasionally crossed into illegal actions, 
leading to a series of lawsuits and appeals between Katzman and Educational Testing Service 
during the mid-1980s. The rulings in these cases further entrenched the test-prep industry in a 
contentious but ultimately mutually beneficial relationship with standardized test makers over 
the legality of certain business practices. Legal actions began in August, 1985, when ETS filed a 
civil action against both Katzman and The Princeton Review in the United States District Court 
for New Jersey. ETS aimed to forbid the test-prep company from using several hundred 
“confidential test questions” allegedly pilfered by Katzman and his employees for TPR clients.451  
Katzman and TPR were accused of coaching clientele with “facsimile” versions of SAT-Math, 
SAT-Verbal, and other College Board test questions--causing ETS to discontinue nearly 300 
“secure” test questions slated for use in the 1985 versions of the SAT.452 ETS maintained 
Katzman’s theft of secure test questions not only compromised the integrity of the test but, more 
importantly, was an act of copyright infringement. 
																																																								
451 Educational Testing Service v. John Katzman and The Princeton Review, Inc., 626 F. Supp. 527 (1985), 
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452 Educational Testing Service v. John Katzman, The Princeton Review, Inc., Robert S. Scheller, and 
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 As the case opinions illustrated, ETS and already reached a détente with Katzman over 
earlier instances of theft, when TPR was a fledgling sole proprietorship. In 1982, Katzman came 
under the possession of “certain Math and English Composition Achievement Tests,” and 
distributed material from these exams to his clientele prior to their official use by ETS.453 
Katzman refused to reveal how he attained the material, but reached an accord with ETS the next 
year with the following terms: 
to return all copies of the purloined tests, to refrain from copying or distributing 
any ETS copyrighted or copyrightable materials or registering for or attending 
any test administered by ETS unless it was for bona fide purposes, and to notify 
ETS if any unlawfully obtained ETS tests came into [his] possession and provide 
ETS with information as to their source.454 
 
ETS alleged that Katzman betrayed that agreement by copyrighting test-prep questions too 
similar to actual SAT questions. The test-maker also indicated that in early 1985, “Katzman 
attempted to take the SAT as a standby candidate at Dwight-Englewood School in Englewood, 
New Jersey,” a tactic also used by other TPR employees after the earlier agreement.455  These 
combined actions indicated to ETS that Katzman sought to profit off of the test-maker’s 
creations and had no intention to stop.  
 The judges for these multiple cases had to determine whether the state of New Jersey was 
the proper jurisdiction for ETS to file suit against Katzman or TPR and, most pressingly, whether 
objects like standardized test questions were novel enough items to merit a copyright 
infringement suit. New Jersey District Court Judge Maryanne Trump Barry deduced that, despite 
being a New York resident, “Katzman [was] amenable to suit in New Jersey” because his 1983 
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arrangement with Princeton-based Educational Testing Service was valid precedent for his 
contact in the state, even if TPR had been incorporated in another state the interim.456  Third 
Circuit Court of Appeals Judge Dolores Sloviter upheld that Katzman’s distribution of 
“facsimile” test questions was unjustifiable. Sloviter found both of Katzman’s arguments about 
ETS’s choice of copyright lacking. Even if ETS copyrighted their tests as compilations, Sloviter 
noted, the test questions within such compilations were still protected by copyright.457  The judge 
also dismissed the claim that ETS questions were uncopyrightable ideas rather than 
copyrightable expressions of ideas, and declared TPR’s educational benefits were too minimal to 
consider the academic fair use loopholes for breach of copyright.458  But, although Sloviter found 
some of TPR’s “facsimile” questions to be so similar to ETS originals to essentially be 
unwarranted copies, the judge also declared that the preliminary injunction overreached. Sloviter 
ruled that the earlier prohibition against  “’adapting’ ETS’ materials may [have encompassed] 
permissible use of ETS’ material,” as Katzman and TPR were unduly prevented by the 
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injunction from potential legitimate business practices.459  Whatever Educational Testing 
Service’s special needs were, it could not impede upon the business of testing. 
 What complicated Educational Testing Service’s litigious behavior was that test 
manufacturers had already entered the test-prep market. Between truth-in-testing legislation and 
the FTC’s qualified legitimization of test-coaching, standardized testing manufacturers found 
themselves in a precarious position at the beginning of the 1980s. How could they continue 
functioning if correct test answers had to be publicly disclosed, and if test-coaching companies 
could continue expanding operations?  Such changes could have created prohibitively large 
research and development budgets. Test manufacturers found a solution to both problems in the 
same place: by taking material rendered obsolete by disclosure policies and selling it in the 
marketplace, thereby upending truth-in-testing advocates’ class-based complaints and consumer 
politics.  
 By releasing old material, test-makers’ could reap both profits and public esteem while, 
at the same time, maintaining their position that short-term practice was largely ineffective. The 
College Board’s first mass-market preparatory product, 4 SATs, was a direct consequence of 
truth-in-testing legislation. Its popularity led to the commercially sold 10 SATs in 1983.460  For 
the first time, students could become acquainted with the SAT through previous versions of the 
exam. But the organization also stressed that little good would actually come from sitting down 
and taking all ten tests—nor thinking anything beyond long-term preparation would do much 
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good. 461  As some critics noted at the time, many commercial SAT-prep products on the market 
were ill suited to prepare students for the actual test. Many prep guides either mangled the 
logical structure of question types or contained “bizarrely superfluous” vocabulary lists and 
reference guides with little relevance to the SAT.462  Other products relied on new computer 
technology, and offered practice tests stored on floppy disk, sometimes for as much as $300.463  
The College Board’s commercial material, by contrast, automatically held market appeal because 
it was guaranteed to be as similar as possible to the actual test material; the SAT’s validity and 
reliability depended on relative consistency between subsequent versions of a test, so consumers 
could rest assured that SAT released because of transparency laws were close to what they would 
encounter on test day.464  What else could compare to the real thing, particularly when it cost less 
than ten dollars?  Commercially publishing obsolete material allowed the College Board to 
convey that truth-in-testing legislation would not hobble the quantity or quality of its testing 
content, while signaling to test-prep companies that even the release of genuine test questions 
would not undermine entire system.  
 Although The Princeton Review ultimately lost its legal battle against Educational 
Testing Service, Katzman’s company demonstrated that the test-prep industry’s legitimacy 
during the 1980s hinged in part upon companies displaying distinguishable attitudes toward the 
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SAT and standardized testing in general. (Katzman claimed his legal defeat was actually a 
victory; the two years and hundreds of thousands of dollars ETS invested in its lawsuit only led 
to a reward of “$52,000 in damages” and a massive growth in The Princeton Review’s 
business.)465  Unlike Kaplan, The Princeton Review publicly held the SAT in contempt—and 
Katzman would later liken the exam to “a cancer.”466  But Katzman’s disgust for the very 
product that made his company possible makes sense when seen as an act of creating a corporate 
persona. By publicly sharing a disdain for the exam with TPR’s key demographic, Katzman 
allowed clients to believe that their choice in test-prep could also reflect their view toward 
standardized testing —creating handsome profits for Katzman and his company in the process.  
The Knotty Logic of the Contemporary Educational Marketplace 
 In the ensuing decades, certain test-prep companies have developed into massive 
enterprises that court additional groups of educational consumers. No test-prep company has 
experienced as much change as Kaplan, which grew into a for-profit educational provider that 
now keeps an entire media conglomerate afloat. In November 1984, the Washington Post 
Company purchased Kaplan, indicating a desire to broaden the test-prep company’s scope of 
services and market penetration.467  Although Kaplan earned $35 million from nearly 95,000 
clients that year, the company reached “only a small percentage” of high school students who 
took the SAT at the time.468  Despite a steady growth in clientele, market reach, and revenues, 
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Kaplan remained a relatively minor holding for Washington Post Company until the turn of the 
century.469  Beginning in the late 1990s, Kaplan segued into offering its own higher educational 
services, purchasing online postsecondary programs such as Concord Law School that had 
already received accreditation. Kaplan thus plugged into the nascent for-profit higher education 
market without investing too much on infrastructure.470  By 2005, these higher education 
ventures overtook test-prep as Kaplan’s most revenue-generating sector.471  It was the Great 
Recession, however, that made Washington Post Company “more dependent than ever on a 
single business: Kaplan”—and in particular, its higher education division.472  As economic 
calamity drove the newspaper industry into a tailspin, it also pushed economically insecure 
Americans into for-profit colleges, allowing the Washington Post Company to weather the fall of 
print journalism at the cost of becoming dependent on trends in higher education.  
 Kaplan’s expansion into higher education also illustrates the complicated relationship 
between test-prep companies, their sources of profit, and the state. Of the $1.9 billion dollars in 
revenue Kaplan, Inc. generated in 2015, about 45% came from its Higher Education division.473  																																																																																																																																																																																		
Barriers for Millions of Students and Caused a Sonic Boom in the Business of Education (New York: Kaplan 
Publishing, 2001), 141; Lemann, Big Test, 227; Shepherd, 121-127, 140-145. 
 469 Between 1995 and 1999, Kaplan’s operating revenues nearly tripled, from $89 million to $259 million. 
But its revenues for 1999 were still only 12% of total operating revenues for the Washington Post Company that 
year. See: Washington Post Company, 1999 Annual Report to Stockholders, iii, 31, http://media.corporate-
ir.net/media_files/irol/62/62487/reports/ar99/wpo_000331_200_120_n.pdf  
 470 Washington Post Company, January 3, 1999 Form 10-K, (filed March 26, 1999), hardcopy p.13, U.S. 
Securities and Exchange Commission EDGAR Database, http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/104889/ 
0000950133-99-000908.txt; Washington Post Company, December 31, 2000 Form 10-K (filed March 23, 2001), 
hardcopy p.17; EDGAR, http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/104889/000095013301001017/w46916e10-k.txt 
(last accessed March 17, 2017). 
 471 Washington Post Company, 2007 10-K, 46; Washington Post Company, 2004 10-K. 30, both available 
at Graham Holdings Investor Relations, http://www.ghco.com/phoenix.zhtml?c=62487&p=irol-reportsannual.  
 472 Donald E. Graham, “To Our Shareholders,” Washington Post Company 2009 Annual Report, 2.  
 473 The Washington Post Company changed its name to Graham Holdings in 2013 following the sale of the 
newspaper to Amazon founder Jeff Bezos; see: Debbi Wilgoren, “Washington Post Co. Renamed Graham Holdings 
Company to Mark Sale of Newspaper,” Washington Post November 18, 2013. 
 246 
While this was considerably lower than its 2010 peak of $2.9 billion, Kaplan nonetheless 
provided a greater share of Graham Holding’s profits than ever before, accounting for nearly 
three-quarters of the conglomerate’s revenue that year.474  Kaplan University, which ran for-
profit degree programs for nearly 40,000 students nationwide, derived its greatest source of 
funds from federal student financial aid, particularly Title IV loans. These loans provided Kaplan 
University about 628 million dollars by 2015—and by extension, nearly a quarter of all Graham 
Holdings operating revenue. Kaplan University took in enormous revenues even after the federal 
government had reached its breaking point with for-profit colleges’ student loan profit schemes; 
the Department of Education had already caught Kaplan padding tuition bills and matriculation 
fees by thousands of dollars, and had punished the school for producing graduates with 
extremely high debt-to-earnings ratios and abysmal loan repayment rates.475  Although test-prep 
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they served “nontraditional” students who typically had lower incomes and less access to capital—and thus, were 
less likely to repay their loans to a degree satisfactory to existing federal standards. Washington Post maintained that 
the federal government’s turn toward stricter student loan policies would in effect heard historically underserved 
communities because tougher loan repayment guidelines would compel for-profit schools to turn away students who 
had no ability to pay upfront. The real solution, they argued, was less regulation—not only in the rules that allegedly 
prevented for-profit schools from lowering tuition (or, rather, removing the subsidies that kept public and nonprofit 
private schooling relatively inexpensive), but also removing the 90-10 cap that mandated at least 10% of school 
tuition revenue come from sources outside federal loans (barring the well-exploited loophole that did not count 
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continues to generate hundreds of millions in annual revenues for Kaplan, for-profit education 
has become its most profitable enterprise, deeply ensnaring the corporation within education 
policy and federal funds. 
 As certain test-prep companies took on other educational roles, some test-makers started 
acting more like sales-focused corporations. Over time, the College Board’s changes to the SAT 
seemed less like efforts to fine-tune its flagship test and more like image-conscious rebranding 
efforts. Addressing longstanding concerns with the integrity of the test score scale, the College 
Board completely recetenered the SAT in 1995. Although recentering the test eliminated the 
convoluted statistical process by which the College Board equated new versions of the SAT back 
to a version created in 1941, some critics (notably educational historian Diane Ravitch) 
suggested the most visible side effect—a dramatic rise in SAT Verbal scores—was a way to 
placate students while sidestepping declining nationwide standards in language and reading 
education.476  Other efforts by the College Board, such as changing the test’s name from 
“Scholastic Aptitude Test” to simply “SAT,” seemed more overtly focused on improving public 
relations.477  Even major changes to the composition of the SAT allowed the College Board new 
opportunities for profit. Before debuting an overhauled version of the SAT in 2005, the College 
																																																																																																																																																																																		
veteran benefits as federal financial aid). See: Washington Post Company, 2012 10-K, 1-10; Mark Kantrowitz, 
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and Donald E. Graham, “2010 Letter to Shareholders,” February 23, 1022, Graham Holdings Investor Relations, 
http://www.ghco.com/phoenix.zhtml?c=62487&p=irol-reportsannual. 
 476 College Board Office of Research and Development, “The Effects of SAT Scale Recentering on 
Percentiles,” Research Summary RS-05, May 1999, http://files.eric.ed.gov/fulltext/ED563025.pdf; Sage Stossel, 
“Hard Lessons: Diane Ravitch Argues for a Return to Academic Rigor in Our Nation’s Public Schools,” The 
Atlantic, November 1, 2000, https://www.theatlantic.com/past/docs/unbound/interviews/ba2000-11-01.htm (last 
accessed March 18, 2017); Neil J. Dorans, The Recentering of SAT Scales and Its Effects on Score Distributions and 
Score Interpretations (New York: College Entrance Examination Board, 2002), 
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 477 Peter Applebome, “Insisting It’s Nothing, Creator Says SAT, Not S.A.T.,” New York Times, April 2, 
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Board released The Official SAT Study Guide for the New SAT, which included eight practice 
tests to familiarize students with the test’s new essay section and grammar questions.478  By 
placing test-prep companies in a reactive position, the College Board could reassert itself as the 
best possible source for SAT prep—banking on reliability and affordability to fuel student-
consumers’ satisfaction for their line of test-prep and, by extension, the SAT itself. 
 The College Board has since continued to blur the line between test-makers and test-prep 
companies, posing their organization as the only ethical test-prep provider for those who aspire 
for a secure spot in the middle class. The organization rolled out a revamped SAT in March 
2016, touting the redesign as part of a larger “opportunity agenda” to preserve the bond between 
college education and middle-class employment.479  Gone were the requisite essay, the 
traditional guessing penalty, and “vocab you’ll never use again.”480  The College Board instead 
assured teens that the new SAT focused on “the stuff you’ve been learning in high school, the 
stuff you’ll need to succeed in college,” such as graphic interpretation, contextual meaning, and 
evidentiary support.481  Citing trenchant, widespread rates of remedial college coursework—and 
affirming that college education was increasingly necessary for stable employment—the College 
Board premised the SAT overhaul on its belief that, if refined correctly, the standardized test 
could serve as a potent conduit between secondary education and middle-class life. In the 
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 481 “Math Test,” College Board website, https://collegereadiness.collegeboard.org/sat/inside-the-test/math  
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College Board’s view, revising the SAT could redress systemic problems in both education and 
the economy.482 
 Central to the College Board’s revamped agenda for the SAT was the organization’s 
partnership with the online nonprofit educational service Khan Academy. Khan Academy agreed 
to design “free, world-class prep materials” to mitigate the class-based disparities that many 
American students faced when preparing for the SAT.483   This preparatory material—which 
included “hundreds of previously unreleased questions[,] videos with step-by-step instructions” 
and “adaptive and game-based online instructional offerings”—aligned with Khan Academy’s 
existing series of autodidactic materials.484  Noting its “close collaboration with the authors of 
the SAT themselves,” as well as its development of “sophisticated, interactive software,” Khan 
Academy assured future test-takers that its preparatory material would be both legitimate and 
affordable.485  In remarks to the New York Times, College Board President David Coleman 
portrayed the relationship as a part of larger class struggle, asserting “’[i]t is time for the College 
Board to say in a clearer voice that the culture and practice of costly test preparation that has 
arisen around admissions exams drives the perception of inequality and injustice in our 
country.’”486  Coleman insisted the College Board had an obligation to undermine the way 
																																																								
482 In 2013, 1.7 million students took the SAT. While it had long been the most popular standardized 
college entrance exam, it has recently slipped just behind the ACT. See: Tamar Lewin, “A New SAT Aims to 
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“’some test-prep providers intimidate parents at all levels of income.’”487  Salman Khan echoed 
these sentiments when interviewed for Time, insisting “’If the test-prep companies think they can 
add value, I’m sure they’ll try. But from my point of view, this is the College Board making sure 
it’s not about money.’”488  The College Board’s partnership with Khan Academy was the next 
rhetorical step in its relationship with student-consumers: the College Board was the only source 
students-consumers could trust to guide them through College Board exams and into a middle-
class life path. 
 The College Board’s partnership with Khan Academy sparked a heated (albeit 
unsurprising) turf war with the standardized test-prep industry. Test-prep companies lobbed 
dismissive statements about the College Board’s plans. Paul Kanarek, an executive for the 
Princeton Review, admitted that “any test prep provider who [was] focused on teaching content 
[was] now ruined,” but that his company had little to worry about, as its strategy-based 
“philosophy [had] never been content-oriented.”489  One representative for Kaplan Test Prep 
acknowledged that SAT prep, whatever its form, was crucial—but that consumers will still flock 
to trusted companies such as Kaplan to secure an advantage.490  Even competing test 
manufacturers inserted their opinion. Executives from rival standardized test manufacturer ACT 
diminished the College Board’s plans, asserting that ACT had long valued creating testing 																																																								
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Firms, SAT Gets Makeover,” Politico, March 5, 2014; http://www.politico.com/story/2014/03/sat-test-prep-
makeover-104291.html   
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material both relevant to collegiate needs and aligned with various secondary-school curricula.491
 Whereas test-makers used to pose the illegitimacy of test-prep material on psychometric 
principles—that test-prep courses and guidebooks were illegitimate because they fruitlessly 
crammed students’ heads with information that could only be learned from years of schooling—
they now pose their disdain for test-prep companies as a critique of consumption. Or, as the 
College Board and Khan Academy now quip, “Skills Aren’t Bought.”492  Certainly, consumer 
advocates did not envision an educational environment in which test-makers retained incredible 
sway over the course of American students’ education, nor one in which socioeconomic biases 
reflected and reinforced through standardized testing regimens would endure as clearly now as 
they did in the 1970s. But these tests remain, as do their many biases. Over the past four decades, 
standardized test manufacturers have shifted the public justification of their exams—from 
psychometric devices that predicted the likelihood of test-takers’ educational success to products 
that could help young people make sound educational choices that would secure middle-class 
comfort. Standardized testing companies took advantage of the blurry relationship consumer 
advocates posed between the U.S. middle class and public interest, and thrived in a new 
environment in which disclosure and transparency could be turned into profit. It was this shift 
that enabled many of the features of standardized testing we take for granted today—and 
generated, at least for some Americans, an uneasy sense of self when weighing test scores 
against their ambitions. 
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CONCLUSION: STANDARDIZED TESTING REGIMES 
 
 IN AN UNCERTAIN EDUCATIONAL FUTURE 
 
 
 Standardized testing represented the promises and perils of the postwar liberal state. For 
those lucky enough to be in the middle class, particularly white men in the middle class, 
standardized testing was a logical instrument meant to give order to individuals’ talents and steer 
youth into productive academic and vocational pursuits. For those who were not of this 
privileged sort—if one were a woman, or black, or working class, or neurologically atypical, or 
any combination thereof—standardized testing was often a marginalizing device, a tool used to 
provide data that would serve as evidence for existing ideologies and prejudices. Standardized 
testing has thus always been an oppressive technology for some even as it has helped many 
others: such is the horror of modern science and technology. What kept the practice afloat for 
decades, however, was that the group who benefitted most from standardized testing did not feel 
that the practice, however widespread, breached their sense of the acceptable reach of the state. 
By acting as a force for business, state, and educational actors to cultivate mutual interests, 
standardized testing kept all three entities in check—and also largely outside of scrutiny of the 
white middle class. Hence, by serving the needs of several disparate institutional bases, 
standardized testing could maintain a broad bipartisan appeal, even as it kept millions of 
Americans outside of power.  
 The wholehearted federal embrace of accountability testing programs at the turn of the 
twenty-first century changed the dynamic between the white middle class and the joint 
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corporate-state-education standardized testing complex. Although federal consideration of 
accountability testing had some roots in the Reagan Administration’s fear-mongering A Nation 
At Risk and the Clinton Administration’s Goals 2000 initiative, the practice didn’t really take 
flight until the G.W. Bush Administration’s No Child Left Behind program, which pegged the 
idea of student success to proficiency models.493  Although No Child Left Behind was designed 
to ensure students from the most disadvantaged socioeconomic backgrounds and historically 
neglected communities received the funding and attention necessary to meet national standards 
in reading and mathematics, the policy more often than not created a glut of standardized testing 
in America’s least-equipped schools. Despite No Child Left Behind’s stated goal of ensuring 
American students would be completely proficient in assessed subjects by 2014, no vested 
parties ever spelled out what, exactly, proficiency meant, why the terms for proficiency could 
vary from state to state, or how on earth 100 percent proficiency was even logically possible.494  
While No Child Left Behind aimed to make educational opportunity more equitable, it often left 																																																								
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the most disadvantaged students wading through a sea of standardized tests without many clearly 
articled educational goals set in place.  
 What really made white suburbanites turn against No Child Left Behind, however, were 
Obama-era policy amendments. Common Core sought to streamline the annual standardized tests 
students encountered all while giving states greater leeway in coordinate nationwide efforts. 
These changes put suburban schools under scrutiny in ways that exposed the creative accounting 
used by many to maintain high ratings. The reaction against federal accountability testing 
programs reflected the fears among the white middle-class that the standardized testing system 
was no longer designed to create a social order in which their children were promoted though 
school and guided into a collegiate path that will replicate their middle-class existence. White 
parents this felt their children were victimized by the very system they once embraced and the 
very system designed to benefit them.495  This white suburban opposition to Common Core 
reforms combined with the racial animus at the foundation of American far-right politics. 
Whatever critiques of standardized testing and accountability systems may have existed—and 
many valid criticisms did exist—became swept under a larger racist fear in Common Core 
represented the tyrannical whims of an overbearing and unacceptably black federal government.  
 Widespread discontent with Common Core, imbued with racist and anti-state fantasies, 
helped propel Donald Trump into the White House, creating the nauseating educational policy 
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moment that we now inhabit. In addition to stoking xenophobia and white nationalism, Trump 
ran for president on the promise of abolishing Common Core, time and again insisting it was 
federal overreach without either acknowledging that states voluntarily opted into the program or 
offering any suggestion of what standards-based systems could replace it. Despite no imminent 
threat to the traditional structure of educational oversight, and despite the Every Student 
Succeeds Act already rolling back the heavy-handed federal testing policies of No Child Left 
Behind, the lip service paid to the idea that education must be under local control was enough for 
Trump’s voting base. Several months into the administration, however, the question of how to 
undo Common Core remains unanswered. Trump’s appointee for Secretary of Education, Betsy 
DeVos—a billionaire who seems unable to comprehend fundamental concepts of contemporary 
American educational policy such as “proficiency” and “growth”—has instead fashioned her 
agenda around undermining federal protections for students piece by piece. For DeVos, the 
entire federal educational apparatus must be refashioned wholesale as a platform for the 
amorphous and fanciful notion of “choice,” a concept that has largely amounted thus far to 
rolling back protections for students from minority and marginal communities.496  Steering the 
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department away from investigating civil rights abuses doesn’t do a thing Common Core, of 
course—but it does send a clear signal to Trump’s fans who the state is supposed to serve.  
 Last year, Americans found themselves at a fork in the educational road—with neither 
turn particularly good. On one path was the familiar world, of accountability testing and 
neoliberal centrist charter school systems, built upon Waiting for Superman and Michelle Rhee 
and Arne Duncan. The other path—the one the United States seems to have chosen for the 
moment—is far more chaotic, with potentially far fewer federal structures yet with no actual 
sense that testing will go away. An educational landscape with far fewer standardized tests is 
possible, but it requires adopting politics committed to investing more heavily in public school 
funding and teacher salaries. This requires money. It also requires a commitment by Americans 
themselves not to rely on private solutions where public ones could work. There is something 
profoundly cowardly in Americans’ willingness to write off entire major urban districts to 
charter school wizardry and Silicon Valley technocratic ‘disruption’ for the sake of lower taxes 
in upper income brackets. To this end, standardized testing regimes never truly have to change, 
so long as those in the white middle class feel that the state is not overstepping its bounds by 
making its presence felt in their everyday lives. Rather than making choices that would undo the 
ways the state uses standardized testing to govern our lives, Americans have chosen to 
undermine the state and leave standardized testing to whoever can pick up the slack. For a 
question with no right answers, Americans still made the wrong choice.  	
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